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ABSTRACT
Knowledge, for Locke, consists in perceiving agreement' 
between ideas, i.e., rouÿily either (a) the perception of 
necessary truth, or (b) the perception of certain facts about 
oneself. He subsequently includes sensitive knowledge con­
cerning objects actually present to the senses, Leibniz holds 
a less strict position.
There can be no knowledge without ideas and, for Locke, 
there can be no ideas without the appropriate experience, 
Leibniz, even after heavily qualifying Locke's view, still 
seems to disagree.
Locke distinguishes "identical" from "non-identical" 
necessary truths and suggests that the former are all trifling. 
Leibniz holds that all necessary truths are identical but 
does not argue for the possibility of discovering necessary 
truth. Locke also suggests that the knowledge of identical 
necessary truths, and on occasion even of non-identical truths, 
consists simply in the knowledge of the uses of words.
Leibniz rbjects such nominalistic tendencies.
For Locke, knowledge of existence is confined to that 
of oneself, God, and objects actually present to the senses,' 
Leibniz holds a more liberal view, appealing to the reasonable­
ness of the claim that there are external objects not actually 
present to the senses - a reasonableness which Locke recog­
nises.
3,
Human knowledge of general truths in science and meta­
physics is virtually impossible for Locke because one can 
perceive very few logical connections. Leibniz again objects 
on the grounds that Locke is demanding too much for knowledge, 
but also because he feels there are greater possibilities of 
knowledge here in Locke* s sense - or at least tliat there is 
more a priori knowledge possible here than Locke allows.
In view of points raised above, Leibniz remains chiefly 
a rationalist. Locke's case is not so clear. Aside from his 
position on the origin of ideas, and save for leanings towards 
empiricism, Locke is in certain respects even more of;a 
rationalist than Leibniz.
I should like to thank Professor 
H, B. Acton for supervising this thesis, 
and particularly for his suggestion that 
I include a consideration of Locke and 
Leibniz as empiricist and rationalist.
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Unless otherwise indicated, square brackets used in 
quotations are miné.
Abbreviations will be used as in the following 
examples;
*E IV iii 2, p.190* means Locke's An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser, Book 4, Chapter 3,
Section 2, page 190.
*NE IV iii 2, p.423, G 356' means Leibniz's New Essays ' 
Concerning Human Understanding. Book 4, Chapter 3,
Section 2, page 423 in A. G. Langley's translation and
page 356 in Volume 5 of C. I. Gerhardt's Die philosophischen
Schriften.
* G iii 242* means page 242 of Volume 3 of Gerhardt's edition.
7INTRODUCTION
In January 1688, an abstract of John Locke's An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding appeared in Jean Le Clerc's 
Bibliothèque Universelle.^ At the time, Locke (1632-1704) 
was residing in Rotterdam, possibly functioning as one of 
the advisers to William of Orange. A year later, James II 
had fled England and Locke returned after an absence of over 
five years. In December 1689, the Essay (dated 1690) first 
appeared and, partly because of the abstract and partly 
because of subsequent excerpts in Le Clerc*s journal (Vol. 
XVII), occasioned considerable immediate interest on the 
Continent.^
Among those whose attention was attracted by Locke's 
work was Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), librarian to 
the Duke of Brunswick at Hanover and by this time noted in 
several capacities amongst the intellectual circles of 
Europe. Leibniz's first written comments on the Essay were 
in the form of a short set of remarks (Langley, pp 13-19,
G V, 14-19) made while initially reading through the book.
^ol. VIII, pp 49-142. The abstract was prepared by Locke 
and translated by Le Clerc. For a description of the 
stages through which Locke's thought and writing on know­
ledge and related matters progressed prior to publication 
of the Essay, see R. I. Aaron, John Locke. 2nd edition 
(Oxford, 1955), Part I, Ch. iii, Notes 1-2.
^See J. W, Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas (O.U.P., 
1956), especially Ch. i.
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He sent these remarks to Thomas Burnet of Kemnay In March
1696, and Burnet passed them on to Locke for his comments.
Not uncharacteristically,^ the latter declined to answer in 
any detail, replying to Burnet merely that there were a 
number of points he did not fully understand (see Burnet to 
Leibniz, 30 November 1696, G iii 185-86; 3 May 1697, G iii 
197-99; and 26 July I698, G iii 242). In fact, however, 
Leibniz's paper commanded little respect from Locke - a lack 
of respect he expressed in correspondence with his friend, 
William Molyneux (see Locke to Molyneux, 10 April 1697,
Works (1823 edition) ix, p.407; and Locke to Molyneux, 3 May
1697, Works ix, p.4l7), and an attitude which he also there 
expressed towards Leibniz's "Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, 
and Ideas" (originally in Acta Eruditorum, 1684; G iv 422-26).
Leibniz then wrote a second set of remarks (Langley, 
pp 20-25, G V 20-24), dealing exclusively with the First and 
Second Books of the Essay. But once again the mediation of’ 
Burnet failed to elicit a philosophical response from Locke, 
who excused himself on the grounds that his affairs allowed 
him insufficient time to frame a satisfactory reply (see 
Burnet to Leibniz, 23 October 1700, G iii 273).
The Essay meanwhile quickly passed through three more 
editions (1694, 1695 and 1700); and in 1700 a French edition
^For an account of Locke's general unwillingness to present 
detailed replies to his critics, see ibid.
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appeared, based upon the enlarged English fourth edition and 
translated by Pierre Coste. In September 1700, Leibniz re­
viewed the French edition for the Monatliche Auszug (Langley, 
pp 26-37, G V 25-36; he added a brief note the following 
year; Langley, pp 37-38, G v 36-37), concentrating on the two 
chapters Locke added in the fourth edition, viz., "Of the 
association of ideas" (E II xxxiii) and "Of enthusiasm" (E IV 
xix). The review was favourable, but largely expository.
Cbste's translation provided Leibniz, whose understand­
ing of English was on his o\m admission only passable (see 
Leibniz to Burnet, 17/27 July 1696, G iii 179-85), with the 
opportunity of coming to grips with the full force of Locke's 
thou^t, ' He then began writing the New Essays Concerning 
Human Understanding  ^ an extensive commentary on the Essay in 
the form of a dialogue between a spokesman of Locke (Phila- 
lethes) and a representative of Leibniz (Theophilus). Owing, 
however, to the fact that a work of this nature required con­
siderable time, much of which was consumed by Leibniz's varied 
activities and interests, and that the style of Leibniz's 
French needed polishing, the book was not ready for publica­
tion by the time of Locke's death in 1704. And, partly because 
Leibniz was disinclined to publish a detailed commentary on 
the work of a dead author, and, perhaps, partly because he 
eventually learned of Locke's disparaging comments concerning 
his earlier written remarks on the Essay (see Gerhardt's
10 :
introduction and notes, Langley, pp 3-12, G v 3-13), the New 
Essays remained unpublished until 1765,^ almost fifty years
after his death.
2. The Essay is in large part designed to uncover, in
general terms, areas in which human knowledge is impossible, 
or virtually impossible. It is not solely devoted to such a 
project, however; for Locke is at the same time concerned 
with combatting any form of scepticism which completely re­
jects the understanding's chances of accomplishing anything 
in or near the field of knowledge. Thus, he is also interes­
ted in pointing out areas where human knowledge Is possible, 
and is concerned with whether or not, in those cases where 
knowledge is impossible, one can at least acquire, say, well- 
founded opinion. Indeed, he even feels that the negative act 
of revealing the limits of human knowledge can itself be use­
ful in preventing radical scepticism, since it steers the mind 
away from those areas where the pursuit of knowledge is hope­
less and therefore away from constant failure and disappoint­
ment, i.e., away from conditions which could easily generate 
radical scepticism (see E Intro. 2-7, PP 26-32).
I intend to consider the major points Locke makes in
It was then published in Oeuvres Philosophiques latines et 
francoises de feu Mr, de Leibnitz, ed. R. E. Raspe, 
Amsterdam and Leipzig.
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carrying out such a project and Leibniz's reactions to them.
In actually writing the Essay, of course, Locke does not 
subordinate his whole investigation to the limits and extent 
of human knowledge. Discussions, e.g., of the ideas of sub­
stance, power and personal identity, of primary and secondary 
qualities, or of the utility of maxims, are sufficiently de­
tailed to command attention on their own. Moreover, since 
Leibniz's commentary follows Locke very closely and, perhaps, 
since his philosophical interests while writing the New Essays 
were relatively varied, he, even more than Locke,. does not 
focus his full attention on the question of establishing a 
modified scepticism. Nevertheless, taking the extent of human 
knowledge as a central thread for discussion does, I think, 
provide a reasonably unified and yet comprehensive point from 
which to view their positions, especially as given in the 
Fourth Book of the respective texts. Consequently, that is 
the course I shall adopt - with the exception that the con­
cluding section represents a brief attempt to see how the 
terms 'empiricist' and 'rationalist' might be applied to each 
philosopher in relation to points made in the prior discussion. 
One final introductory comment: Leibniz approaches the
Essay neither as a completely hostile critic nor as a neutral 
commentator. His expressed intention is to seek what is worth­
while in Locke's position and to "complete" it in those 
respects in which it m i ^ t  prove vrrong or inadequate (see NE
12.
Pref., pp 41-42, G 41-42) - where many of the acts of comple­
tion employ elements from a philosophical system that had 
largely taken shape in his mind by this time^ and which even­
tually was to receive the title of 'monadology'. Such a pro­
gramme, however, is not always conducive to explaining Locke's 
position on a given problem in the critical detail it requires 
and, combined with Leibniz's often cryptic manner of writing, 
it sometimes creates the need for discussing Locke's view at 
some length before introducing Leibniz's side.
Ipor example, by 1700 Leibniz had Witten "Reflections on 
Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas" (l684), had corresponded 
with Arnauld (1686-90), and:had written the "New System 
of the Nature of Substances and of the Communication 
Between Them, etc." (l695) and "On the Ultimate Origina­




Prom the premise that "the mind, in all its thoughts 
and reasonings, hath no other immediate objects but its own 
ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate", Locke infers
(l) "it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant 
about them", and (therefore) (2) "Knowledge [is] . . . nothing 
but the perception of the connexion of and agreement, or 
disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas." (E IV i 1-2, 
p.167; minus italics). For instance, knowing that white is 
not black consists in perceiving disagreement between the idea 
of whiteness and the idea of blackness; or knowing that the 
three internal angles of a triangle equal two right angles 
consists in perceiving (necessary) agreement between the idea 
of the three internal angles of a triangle and the idea of 
equality to two rigtit angles (see E IV i 2, p.168).
Leibniz has three preliminary comments to make on such 
a view:
(l) The word 'knowledge' has another ("more general") sense 
in which knowledge does not simply consist in knowing the 
truth-value of such-and-such a proposition (whether it be 
knowing in Locke's or in a wider sense). Knowledge in this 
sense is found "in ideas or terms, before we reach propositions 
or truths". For instance, a man "who has attentively looked 
at more pictures of plants and animals, more diagrams of
14.
machines, more descriptions or representations of houses or 
fortresses, who has read more ingenious romances, heard more 
curious narratives, this one, I say, will have more knowledge 
than another, even though there should not he a word of truth 
in all that which was portrayed or related to him; for the 
custom he has of representing in his mind many express and 
actual conceptions or ideas, renders him more fit to conceive 
what is placed before him; and it is certain that he will be 
better instructed and more capable than another who has 
neither seen nor read nor heard anything, provided that in 
these stories and representations he takes nothing as true 
which is not so" (NE IV 1 1-2, pp 397-98, G 337-38).
In this sense, we know what an x is, but do not neces­
sarily know that an x is such-and-such, at least in any arti­
culate fashion. We can form the idea of an x, can use words 
to refer to an x (or, as Locke might put it, can use the word 
*x*), can understand words used to refer to an x, and thereby 
are capable of recognising x*s, identifying x's, knowing true 
propositions about x*s, etc. Having knowledge in this sense 
undoubtedly entails having some knowledge that an x is such- 
and-such (e.g., that an x is not a non-x), but its demands 
are minimal, and knowing \diat an x is does not solely consist 
in such knowledge.
A possible reason for Leibniz's reference to this sense 
of 'knowledge' (thou^ one he himself does not give) is that
15.
he makes use of the word, in this way in attempting to elu­
cidate the Cartesian classification of ideas in terms of 
clarity and distinctness. For example, in "Reflections on 
Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas", he writes; "Knowledge is either 
obscure or clear; clear ideas again are either indistinct 
or distinct; distinct ideas are either adequate or inadequate, 
symbolic or intuitive . . . .  An idea is obscure when it 
does not suffice for the recognition of things after they 
have been experienced . . . .  On the other hand, knowledge 
is clear when it is sufficient to enable me to recognize the 
things represented; . . . such knowledge . . .  is indistinct 
as soon as I am not able to enumerate separately the charac­
teristics required to distinguish the thing from others . .
. . A distinct idea, however, is . . . one based on distinc­
tive characters . . .  in a word [of anything] of which we 
have a nominal definition, which is nothing more than an 
enumeration of the sufficient distinguishing characters.
There is also distinct knowledge of an indefinable term when 
it is primitive, i.e., when it is unanalyzable . . . .  In 
composite ideas . . .  if every element included in a distinct 
concept is again distinctly known, and if the analysis is 
carried throu^ to the end, then the knowledge is adequate." 
(Selections, pp 283-85, minus some italics; see also NE II 
xxix 2, 4, pp 266-67, G 236-37; NE II xxxi 1-2, pp 278-79,
1 6 .
G 247-48).!
Thus, the preceding account might be amended slightly 
to read: Knowledge in this sense is knowledge attendant upon
having clear, as,opposed to obscure (in the indicated sense), 
ideas. On the other hand, in order to move up the line from 
clear to distinct ideas, one must acquire (more) knowledge 
in the "knowledge of truth" sense.
Aside from either its utility in clarifying Leibniz's 
own use of 'knowledge', or its intrinsic interest, the dis­
tinction between knowledge attendant on (clear) ideas and 
knowledge of truth is of some importance insofar as it in­
volves a reference to abilities, capacities, being fit, etc., 
as opposed to "occurrent" mental acts. For, in order to know 
at time T what an x is - i.e., to be able to form the (clear) 
idea of an x, or use words to refer to an x, etc. - one need
not be having at time T an idea of an x in any "occurrent"
2
sense of 'having an idea'. And this point directs attention 
to Locke's distinction between actual and habitual knowledge 
- a distinction I shall consider below^-
Leibniz refers to "Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and 
Ideas" in NE II xxix 2, p.266, G 236; and in NE III iv 
4-7, p.319, G 275; and also in one of the papers he wrote 
on the Essay prior to writing the New Essays (see Langley, 
p.14).
^Although one must remember that, for Leibniz, there are no 
"bare" faculties, abilities or powers. Rather there are 
only "dispositions or tendencies" which for him seem to 
involve unconscious acts. See below, pp 117-20.
17.
(2) Given that we are concerned with knowledge in a 
"knowledge of truth" sense, Leibniz objects that, althou^ 
"truth is always grounded in the agreement or disagreement 
of ideas, . . .  it is not true in general that our knowledge 
of truth is a perception of this agreement or disagreement. 
For when we know truth only empirically, from having experi­
enced it, without knowing the connection of things and the 
reason there is in what we have experienced, we have no per­
ception of this agreement or disagreement, unless we mean 
that we feel it in a confused way without being conscious of 
it. But your examples, it seems, show that you always demand 
a knowledge in which one is conscious of connection or oppo­
sition, and this is what cannot be granted you." (NE IV i 
1-2, p.400, G 338-39; see also NE IV ii 14, pp 4l7, 420,
G 353; NE IV vi 13, pp 461-62, G 386-87).
This point is extremely important, e.g., in connection 
with Locke's views on the extent of human knowledge in a 
discipline such as physics. As Leibniz suggests, of course, 
one should avoid a mere "dispute about terms" (NE IV ii 14, 
p.4l7, G 353). Nevertheless, even the verbal point - if this 
is all that is involved - that Locke uses the word 'knowledge' 
in a sense which is far more restricted than that in which it 
is ordinarily used is useful for the purposes of clarifying 
just what claim Locke making when he denies knowledge to 
the physicist. (See below, pp 85-96, 200-06).
18
From Locke's examples - viz., perceiving that white 
is not black, and that the internal angles of a triangle 
(necessarily) equal two right angles - Leibniz apparently 
takes 'perceiving the agreement/disagreement between ideas' 
to mean perceiving a logically necessary connection, as op­
posed to discovering (contingent) truth by empirical methods. 
Now, solely on the basis of the examples Locke gives here, 
Leibniz is right in viewing perception in this way. But, 
given certain points which Locke subsequently makes (notably 
that we can, in the relevant sense, perceive the existence 
of ourselves, or the existence of any idea which we are 
having), to confine knowledge- perception to the "seeing" 
of necessary truths is to limit it more severely than Locke 
in fact does. The point is a minor one, however, because, 
restricting the frame of reference to the knowledge of 
general truths - which is what Leibniz probably is doing 
here - perception of agreement/disagreement does consist in 
the (a -priori) knowledge of necessary truth.
(3) Finally, Leibniz ri^tly observes that the proposed 
"definition^ . . . appears only suited to categorical truths, 
in which there are two ideas, the subject and the predicate; 
but there is besides a knowledge of hypothetical truths or
^See below, pp 82-83.
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what may be reduced thereto (as disjunctives and others) in 
which there is connection between the anteoedant and the 
consequent proposition; thus more than two ideas may enter 
therein." ( Œ  IV i 1-2, p.400, G 339). He therefore quali­
fies Locke's position as follows: "Let us . . . apply what
will be said of the connection of ideas to the connection of 
propositions, in order to include in one whole the categorical 
and hypothetical truths." (NE IV i 3, p.400, G 339).^
In a somewhat different context - Viz., his discussion of 
particles - Locke writes: "But besides affirmation or
negation, without which there is in words no truth or 
falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to 
others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but 
whole sentences one to another, with their several rela­
tions and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse."
(E III vii 1, p.98).
20.
2, Actual and Habitual Knowledge
After claiming that knowledge consists in perceiving 
the agreement or disagreement^ between ideas, Locke turns to 
consider briefly (some of) "the different acceptations of the 
word knowledge." For "There are several ways wherein the 
mind is possessed of truth; each of which is called knowledge." 
(E IV i 7, 8, p.172). And, in doing so, he tends to loosen 
slightly (thou^ not intentionally) his initial identifica­
tion of knowledge with the perception of agreement between 
ideas.
He distinguishes actual knowledge from habitual know­
ledge: Actual knowledge is "the present view the mind has of
the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas" (E IV i 8, 
p.172); whereas one habitually knows a proposition to be true 
if one has actually perceived the agreement of its ideas and 
has not forgotten it, so that "whenever that proposition comes 
again to be reflected on, he . . . assents to, and is certain 
of the truth of it." (E IV i 8, p.172). Thus, having habi­
tual knowledge is to have knowledge in a non-occurrent sense, 
since habitually knowing at time T that white is not black 
does not entail actually perceiving at T that white is not 
black, or actually asserting at T that white is not black, or
^Henceforth, unless the context especially demands it, I 
shall omit references to the negative^form of agreement, 
i.e., to disagreement.
21.
actually judging at T that white is not black. Rather, all 
that is necessary is that one has actually perceived, and 
remembers - i.e., does not forget (save, perhaps, for momen­
tary lapses) - that white is not black.
Now, for an account of knowledge in "different accepta­
tions of the word", the introduction of habitual knowledge is 
important. For, as Locke rightly points out, the human mind 
could be said to know very little at any given time if 'know­
ledge' were restricted to actual knowledge. Whereas, in at 
least one "accepted" sense of 'knowledge', what a man knows 
at any given time is usually considerably more than what he 
actually perceives at that time.
Still, even Locke's habitual knowledge is significantly 
restricted relative to ordinary usage. For, in order to have 
habitual knowledge, one must have actually perceived agreement 
between ideas and, to the extent that identifying the acquisi­
tion of knowledge with the actual perception of agreement be­
tween ideas is a restriction on the ordinary notion of 
acquiring knowledge, so identifying habitual knowledge with 
knowledge initially acquired by perceiving is a restriction 
on the ordinary notion of knowledge. Now, Locke subsequently 
does slightly loosen the restrictions on 'actual knowledge* 
to let it include "sensitive knowledge" of the existence of 
objects "about which our senses are actually employed" (e.g., 
see E IV ii 14, pp 185-88). Accordingly, he loosens habitual
22.
knowledge to include knowledge initially acquired by "sensa­
tion" and remembered - though obviously not habitual know­
ledge which is "actualised" by "sensing" that such-and-such 
a particular object existed at such-and-such a time (see E 
IV xi 11, pp 336-37). Even so, the extension of knowledge to 
include "sensitive" knowledge - itself a questionable move 
within the context of Locke's general argument - still leaves 
knowledge confined to a narrow range.
Moreover, in order to know habitually that p, we must, 
whenever the occasion presents itself, (roughly) either (a) 
actually immediately perceive (i.e., intuit) that p, or (b) 
actually mediately or demonstratively perceive that p via the 
original or a new set of proofs, or (c) actually remember or 
recall (i.e., in a sense which involves our actually thinlcing) 
that we have once perceived that p and thereby have "perfect 
certainty" about p (see E IV i 9, PP 172-75). And if this 
point is taken strictly, the type of remembering which habi­
tual knowledge demands is itself rather limited relative to 
remembering in the appropriate ordinary sense - with a corres­
ponding limitation on the notion of habitual knowledge.
Not only is habitual knowledge more confined than know­
ledge in the corresponding ordinary sense, but admitting
Since the notion of sensitive knowledge is attended with 
difficulties, and since any qualifications demanded by it 
are of no' significance in this context, I shall ignore it 
throu^out the rest of this section.
23.
habitual knowledge itself seems to involve admitting forms 
of knowledge which are not forms of the perception of agree­
ment between ideas, either actual or habitual.
For, in admitting as knowledge the memory that one has
perceived that p, Locke is doing the very thing he seeks to
avoid in excluding (e.g.) the mere remembering that p - viz., 
to admit a form of knowledge which does not consist in per­
ceiving a necessary truth, or perceiving an agreement between 
immediate objects or objects actually present to the senses. 
After confessing to initial reservations, he defends his move 
as follows: "upon a due examination I find it comes not short
of perfect certainty, and is in effect true knowledge. That 
which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in 
this matter is, that the agreement or disagreement of the 
ideas in this case is not perceived . . .  by an actual view 
of all the intermediate ideas whereby the agreement or dis­
agreement of those in the proposition was at first perceived; 
but by other intermediate ideas . . . .  He remembers, i.e.' 
he knows . . .  that he was once certain [e.g^ of the truth 
of this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are 
equal to two right ones. The immutability of the same rela­
tions between the same immutable things is now the idea that 
shows him, that if the three angles of a triangle were once 
equal to two riglit ones, they will always be equal to two 
right ones. And hence he comes to be certain" (E IV i 9,
24.
pp 173-74). Now, certainly if I have perceived (correctly) 
that A is B, it necessarily follows that A is B, and there­
fore, I know that I have so perceived and if I see the 
connection between my having so perceived and the truth of 
*A is B*, then I know (demonstratively) that A is B. But the 
point is that the purported knowledge of the premise in this 
case is not itself a form of perception but simply amounts to 
a form of remembering - and it is therefore difficult to see 
why Locke should not %vrite this off as an instance of "be­
lieving one's memory" as readily as he presumably would an 
instance of merely remembering such-and-such a necessary 
truth.^ This criticism seems to be at least part of the 
force of the following comment made by Leibniz: "The mediate
idea ' j^i.e.. the premise that one has once perceived that A is 
b] of which you . . . speak, presupposes the fidelity of our 
memory; but it sometimes happens that our memory deceives us, 
and that we have not made every necessary effort, althou^ we 
now believe we have" (NE IV i 9, p.402, G 341) - though he 
might have done better not to complicate matters with the 
fallibility question here.
^Parallel points might be made concerning the remembering 
which Locke admits in complex demonstrations (e.g,, see 
E IV i.9, p.175; E IV ii 7, PP 181-82), Or, indeed, con­
cerning the memory of having perceived that p which for 
Locke seems to be involved in any case of "actualised" 
habitual knowledge that p (see E II x 2, p,194, re memory 
in general).
25.
Leibniz*s subsequent remarks raise another point in 
this connection: "the more care we employ, the more reli­
ance we can place upon past reasonings . . . .  But unless 
we remember that we have been absolutely accurate, we cannot 
have this certainty in the mind. And this accuracy consists 
in an orderly procedure, the observance of which in each part 
is an assurance as regards the whole . . . .  And by this 
means we have all the certitude of which human things are
capable." (ME IV i 9, p.403, G 341-42). For, although there
is a sense of 'perception* in which perception is necessarily 
correct, Leibniz's comments point to the truth that the human 
mind is fallible even in the area of perceiving necessary 
truth - i.e., that there is also a sense in which one can 
* misperceive. Now, the sense of 'perceive' relevant to this
particular context is such that one must be able to remember
that one perceived that A is B without necessarily remembering 
that A is B - for Locke apparently wants to avoid making 
knowledge depend upon the latter - and the only sense in 
which this is possible is that in which misperception is 
possible.
Consequently, even if remembering that one has perceived 
such-and-such were a form of perceiving the agreement between 
ideas, one could not demonstratively perceive that 2i2=4 from 
simply the remembered premise that one has perceived that 
242=4 - though, as Leibniz points out, if great care has been
26.
taken in one's previous calculations, and a number of checks 
carried out, one can have very good reasons for concluding 
that 242=4. Therefore, to include such an inference as a 
form of knowing on Locke's theory would equally loosen the 
identification of knowledge with perception, for only deduc­
tive inferences can count as perceiving agreement between 
ideas.
Strictly speaking, as an account of various uses of the 
word 'knowledge' - "vulgar" or otherwise - Locke's discussion 
comes nowhere near being complete (He does not mention, e.g., 
'knowing how to type' or 'knowing Jeeves'). Furthermore, as 
an account of an ordinary use of 'knowledge', his notion of 
habitual knowledge is only to some extent successful. Part 
of the reason for this, however, is that he does not seriously 
set himself such ends as a philosopher (though had his "nomina- 
listic" tendencies increased or had he lived in a somewhat 
different philosophical climate, he miÿit well have directed 
more attention along such lines). Rather, in introducing 
actual and habitual knowledge, he seems more concerned with 
distinguishing between an ordinary sense of 'knowledge* in 
which knowledge is not an occurrence or act and another (per­
haps special - he does not clearly specify) sense in which 
knowledge is an occurrence or act - possibly to prevent con­
fusion on this point. Having drawn the distinction, however.
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he does not expressly state in what sense he is using, or 
is going to use, 'knowledge*, presumably leaving it as a 
contextual matter and one that is of little concern to him.
As far as Leibniz is concerned, although he does introduce 
another sense of 'knowledge* (the "knowledge of ideas" sense), 
it is not surprising that he does not take up the indicated 
linguistic points, in view of his expressed anti-nominalism.
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3. Agreement
Locke attempts to clarify the notion of agreement 
between ideas by listing four possible kinds;^
I Identity or diversity: e.g., 'Red is red*, *A cow is 
not a non-cow*, * "White is not black* (see E IV i 4,
p.169). Following Leibniz's suggestion, one might ex­
tend the class to hypotheticals: 'If A is B, then A is
B ', 'If A is B, then it is not the case that A is not 
B ' - or to the corresponding disjunctives and conjunc­
tives (see NE IV ii 1, pp 4o4-05, G- 343).
II Relation; "the relation between any two ideas, of what 
kind soever, whether substances, modes or any other. For 
. . . there could be no room for any positive knowledge 
at all, if we could not perceive any relation between 
our ideas" (E IV i 5, p.170): e.g., *2+2=4*, * Two tri­
angles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal*. 
I take the expression 'positive knowledge* in the quoted 
passage to mean perception of an agreement which is 
necessarily not trifling and therefore not identity. 
Consequently, in this particular context, identity is
Since a proposition, for Locke, consists in asserting agree­
ment between ideas (E IV v 2, p.244), the classification 
of agreement can double as a classification of propositions: 
"The affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas 
we have, may . . .  be reduced to these four sorts, viz. 
identity, co-existence, relation, and real existence."
(E IV iii 7, p.198).
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not a species of relation. The other important point 
here is that the ideas between which relations hold, in 
the sense in which 'relation* is used in this context, 
can apparently be ideas of any kind of thing, "whether 
substances, modes, or any other",
III Co-existence or non-co-existence in the same subject 
(sometimes referred to as necessary connection or re­
pugnancy): "this belongs particularly to substances"
(E IV i 6, p.170) - e.g., 'Hostility co-exists in a sub­
stance with rationality and animality', 'Water boils at 
100° C*. Confining oneself to the same context, then, 
it seems that co-existence is a species of relation, 
i.e., a relation which by definition only concerns ideas 
of substances. For Locke expressly extends relation to 
ideas of any kind of thing - including substance - and 
he gives no special principle according to which co­
existence must be excluded.
IV Real existence: * There are elephants', 'God exists'.
The classification is hardly a rigorous one, however. 
For one thing, immediately after drawing up the list, Locke 
admits that "identity and co-existence are truly nothing but 
relations" (E IV i 7, p.171). Thus, in this sense of 'rela­
tion*, identity a species of relation, whereas in the 
previous sense of 'relation', identity is excluded from the
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class of relations. Furthermore, when Locke eventually comes 
to apply his classification of agreement in discussing the 
extent of human knowledge, he uses 'relation* and 'co­
existence' in such a way that relations and co-existence are 
mutually exclusive, as well as relations and identity, and 
co-existence and identity. -And it is in this sense of 'rela­
tion* that the classification of agreement into (l) existence,
(2) relation, (3) co-existence and (4) identity acquires a 
co-ordinate status.
Thus, marking the three senses of 'relation* with sub­
scripts corresponding to the order in which they are here 





(e.g. * There are ants') ,-----------_ i
Relation! Identity
, (e.g. 'An ant is an ant')
I t
Relation:, Co-existence
(e.g. 2^2-4) (e.g. 'Opium is a narcotic')
The chief reason for his classification not being a 
particularly tidy one is probably that he is not concerned 
with classification in itself, but - in addition to his ex­
pressed aim of elucidating the general notion of agreement - 
is primarily interested in introducing a number of concepts 
of kinds of agreement which he eventually finds useful in 
discussing the extent of human knowledge. And, since his
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classification seems to him sufficiently distinct to serve 
such purposes, he shows no further concern with logical 
niceties.
Thus, after admitting that identity and co-existence 
are each a kind of relation, he defends distinguishing iden­
tity and co-existence in his list on the grounds that "they 
are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our 
ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct 
heads, and not under relation in general; since they are so 
different grounds of affirmation and negation, as will easily 
appear to any one, who will but reflect on what is said in 
several places of this Essay." (E IV i 7, pp 171-72). Briefly, 
he distinguishes co-existence from identity because in the 
case of identity our knowledge extends as far as we have 
ideas, whereas in the case of co-existence our knowledge is 
severely limited. He distinguishes identity from both co­
existence and relation (in the third, most restricted sense) 
because our knowledge of identity is largely of trifling 
matters and he is concerned with the possibilities of our 
knowing the truth of non^trifling propositions. And, he 
distinguishes existence from relation^, identity and co­
existence, because our knowledge of existence is also severely 
limited, but for rather different reasons than our knowledge 
of co-existence - remembering that the notion of a proposi­
tion asserting co-existence, or identity, or relation, is.
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for Locke, the notion of a general proposition, vÆiere a gene­
ral proposition is one which does not entail an existential 
proposition (see E IV ix 1, p.303; E IV xi 13, pp 338-39).
In this connection, one might speculate that a vaguely
felt reason for his marking existence off from other types of
agreement is to allow for the point that any statement of the
form 'All x's exist' or 'Some x's exist whereas other x's do
1
not' or 'Some x's exist* is absurd. Similarly, any statement 
of the form 'x exists* is redundant. Indeed, Locke might even 
be prepared to allow that any statement of the form 'There 
are no x's' or 'There is no x' - including 'There is no God' - 
can never be self-contradictory, or that any statement of the 
form 'An x necessarily exists' is necessarily not true. Thus, 
in the same vein of thought, 'A man is warm-hearted, has two 
legs, eats meat, is fundamentally lazy, and exists* incorpo­
rates making two significantly different kinds of claim - i.e., 
involves asserting two significantly different kinds of 
agreement.^ On the evidence of Locke's actual writings.
This is not to deny that the sentences I am using here could 
be given an interpretation such that the statements they 
would be used to make would not be absurd.
2From the fact that asserting '... exists* or 'There is ...' 
is not to assert an agreement of such-and-such a kind, it 
does not follow that there is no idea of existence or that 
the idea of existence is indistinguishable from the idea of 
what we assert to exist. Otherwise the very notion of the 
agreement Locke calls 'existence' would be a spurious one.
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however, such considerations can certainly be no more than 
interesting speculations.
There seem to be certain theoretical problems in ap­
plying the scheme of classification in the way that he does. 
For, it seems possible to have cases of co-existence which 
correspond to (at least many) cases of relations (in the 
most restricted sense ) - e.g., 'The quality of a triangular 
shape (ideally) co-exists in a substance with the quality of 
having three internal angles equal to two right angles' cor­
responds to the relational agreement * The three internal 
angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles'^- such 
that the human mind is as capable of perceiving the former 
as the latter. And what then of the limitations of human 
knowledge in the area of co-existence? Conversely, it seems 
possible to have cases of relations which correspond to (at 
least many) cases of co-existence - e.g., 'Fixedness co-exists 
with yellowness, fusibility, malleableness, etc.' correspond­
ing to 'Fixedness co-exists in a substance with yellowness, 
etc.' - such that the mind is as incapable of perceiving the 
former as the latter.
Now, in order to avoid difficulties of this sort, it
^One might also introduce, e.g., '2 applesf2 apples-4 apples' 
corresponding to '2f2~4', but this raises certain ques­
tions about- the status of numbers and qualities. It also 
illustrates the rough character of the notions of co­
existence and relation.
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is useful to view Locke's classification roughly as: (l)
identity, (2) existence, (3) co-existence== the type of agree­
ment sough-t by the natural and social scientist, and (aside 
from existence) by the metaphysician and theologian, (4) 
relation— the type of agreement found in mathematics and 
morality. This comes closer, I think, to the scheme he 
actually employs in investigating the extent of human know­
ledge, although it is somewhat different from the one he in­
dicates in theory beforehand,
Leibniz has relatively little to say about Locke's 
classification. Without making reference to the latter's 
subsuming identity and co-existence under relation, he 
sketchily reduces agreement to two kinds, comparison and con­
currence: "That of comparison gives diversity and identity,
either complete or partial . . . . Concurrence contains
what you call coexistence, i.e. connection of existence. But 
when we say that a thing exists or that it has real existence, 
this existence itself is the predicate . . . .  The existence 
of the object of an idea may also be conceived, as the con­
currence of this object with the Ego. Thus I believe it may 
be said that there is only comparison or concurrence" (NE IV 
i 3-7, P.401, G- 339-40; see also, NE II xi 4, p.144, G 129). 
From comparison, then, he singles out identity, and from con­
currence, concurrence with the ego, as "the relations which 
deserve to be distinguished among others" (NE IV i 3-7, p.401,
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G 340) - the former because for Leibniz all necessary agree­
ment reduces to identity, and the latter presumably because 
of his theory that the created universe consists solely in 
an infinity of egos or ego-like substances. Unfortunately, 
he does not elaborate: "More exact and more profound re­
searches might perhaps be made; but I content myself here 
with making remarks. " IV i 3-7, p.4oi, G 340).
In view of Locke's expressed purpose in introducing his 
classification - viz., to clarify the general notion of agree­
ment - it is worthwhile, I think, to consider briefly two 
points which Leibniz does not introduce:
(l) In the sense of 'relation' appropriate to this 
context -- whether it be a relation in any of the three senses 
indicated above - to assert a relation between ideas is not 
to assert a relation in the sense in which, e.g., 'Bill is 
taller than Bob' and 'A dog hates a cat', assert the relations 
of being taller than and hating. Thus, in asserting a rela­
tion between the idea of 2+2 and the idea of equality to 4, 
the relation being asserted is not the relation of equality, 
nor is it a relation in the sense in which '24 2=4' asserts the 
relation of equality. For instance, one can assert a rela­
tional agreement by asserting 'White is white' and this does 
not assert a relation in the indicated 'more usual sense. And 
if it is objected that 'White is "véiite' merely consists in
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'White is identical with white' and is therefore a concealed 
relational assertion in the usual sense, one can reply by 
pointing out that, although 'White is white' is logically 
equivalent to 'White is identical with white' and although 
Locke's use of 'identity' seems to cover either assertion, 
nevertheless the two propositions assert relative agreements 
of a different kind - a difference which cannot be accounted 
for if relative agreement (i.e., relation in the sense appro­
priate to this context) is taken to be a relation in the more 
usual sense. For, in the appropriate sense of 'relation', 
'White is white' asserts the relation of being identical with 
(white) whereas 'White is identical with white' asserts the 
relation of having the property of being identical with 
(white). But, on the argument given in the objection both 
propositions assert the relation of being identical with.
And, if the objector then claims that 'White is identical 
with white* in reality amounts to 'White has the property of 
being identical with white' and therefore that there a 
difference in the relations being asserted but that they are 
nevertheless relations in the more usual sense, he can be met 
with parallel points concerning the distinction between 
asserting the relation of having such-and-such a property 
and asserting the relation of having the property of having 
such-and-such a property - and he must stop somewiiere or the 
infinite regress will generate an impossible relation.
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(2) In the course of his discussion of truth, Locke 
seems to introduce a sense of 'agreement' which is signifi­
cantly different from that in which identity, relation, co­
existence and existence are equally kinds of agreement.
He describes truth in terms of propositions, drawing a 
distinction between mental and verbal truth which corresponds 
to a distinction between mental and verbal propositions:
"Truth, then, seems to me, in the proper import of the word, 
to signify nothing but the joining or separating of Signs, as 
the Things signified by them do agree or disagree one with 
another. The joining or separating of signs here meant, is 
what by another name we call proposition. So that truth 
properly belongs only to propositions: whereof there are two 
sorts, viz. mental and verbal; as there are two sorts of signs 
commonly made use of, viz. ideas and words." (E IV v 2, p.
244, minus some italics).
His introduction of a verbal proposition and verbal 
truth occasions a charge of nominalism from Leibniz (see NE 
IV V 1-2, pp 450-51, G 377-78) - probably in part because of 
Locke's prior discussion of essences in which his nominalism 
is more readily discernible, and in part because there might 
be some suggestion that the mental proposition that A is B, 
where it is expressed by a verbal proposition, consists in 
the mental proposition signified by the verbal proposition 
'A is B'. In this particular context, however, such a question
38.
is of no relevance and it might be side-stepped by viewing 
Locke's distinction as follows: A mental proposition is an
assertion of agreement between ideas, whether words are used 
to do so or not, and a verbal proposition is either simply a 
sentence or a sentence which is used to assert such-and-such 
a mental proposition - where the mental proposition that A is 
B, whether or not it is expressed in words, does not consist 
in the mental proposition signified by the sentence *A is B'. 
Unless otherwise indicated, I have used, and shall continue to 
use, 'proposition' in the sense of a mental proposition.
Now consider the following description of truth: "When
ideas are so put together, or separated in the mind, as they 
or the things they stand for do agree or not, that is, as I 
may call it, mental truth. But truth of words is something 
more; and that is the affirming or denying of words one of 
another, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree" (E IV 
V 6, p.247), For the sake of convenience, I take this to 
amount to: A proposition is true if either the ideas agree
as they are asserted to agree or at least the things for which 
the ideas stand agree as the ideas are asserted to agree.
And, a verbal proposition is true if the proposition it is 
used to assert is true.
The point of particular interest in this context is 
that Locke seems to be allowing for the distinction between 
necessary and contingent truth in his general theory of
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truth - the suggestion being that a proposition in which the 
ideas agree as asserted is a necessary truth whereas a propo­
sition such that only the things for which ideas stand agree 
as the ideas are asserted to agree is a contingent truth.
For instance, if the idea of a man agrees with the idea of an 
animal, then the proposition that a man is an animal is neces­
sarily true. On the other hand, if only the thing for vdiich 
the idea of a man stands - viz. a man - agrees with the thing 
for which the idea of a biped stands - viz. a biped - then 
the proposition that a man is a biped is contingently true.
If this account of how 'idea A agrees with idea B' is 
used in this context holds, then the sense in which the ex­
pression is used here must be distinguished from the sense in 
which it is used by Locke to list various forms of agreement, 
and therefore from the sense in which it is at least sometimes 
used in 'Knowledge consists in the perception of agreement 
between ideas'. For instance, if 'Idea A agrees with idea B' 
entails 'The proposition that A is B is necessarily true', 
then the notion of existential agreement is absurd. Existen­
tial propositions are contingent propositions; even Leibniz - 
with the exception of 'God exists' - admits this point. More­
over, any other form of agreement which entails an existential 
agreement would be impossible - e.g., 'Ed is ill', 'Some men 
like music'. And finally, although for Locke many apparently 
contingent cases of co-existence are not really contingent.
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he does not seem prepared to claim that it is impossible to 
have a contingent co-existence.
Thus, although it is quite permissible to use 'agree­
ment* in the stricter sense of necessary agreement, it is 
important not to confuse it with the looser sense in which 
agreement receives its four-fold classification. In the 
looser sense, then, the idea of x agrees with the idea of y 
if and only if the proposition *x is y' is true - whether the 
truth be necessary or contingent.
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II- PERCEPTION AND IDEAS
Why does Locke say 'The knowledge that a man is an 
animal consists in perceiving the appropriate kind of agree­
ment between the (abstract) idea of a man and the (abstract) 
idea of being an animal*, instead of saying something like 
'The knowledge that a man is an animal consists in (intellec­
tually) perceiving the appropriate kind of agreement between 
a man and being an animal * ? Similarly, why does he say 
'Asserting the proposition that a man is an animal consists 
in asserting agreement between the (abstract) idea of a man 
and the (abstract) idea of being an animal* rather than the 
more straightforward 'Asserting the proposition that a man is 
an animal consists in asserting agreement between a man and 
being an animal'? In short, why are ideas so important for 
him?
Here again, Leibniz does not expressly raise such 
questions, partly because he agrees with Locke to a signifi­
cant degree on the role ideas play in human knowledge. But 
I think some inquiry along these lines should prove useful, 
not because any short answers to the indicated questions are 
so important, but because the points one must consider in 
order to understand such answers' reveal certain central threads 
in the largely shared background of their respective positions 
on knowledge.
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Knowledge for Locke is restricted to perception of 
agreement between ideas because ideas are, with apparently 
one exception, the only immediate objects of the mind - the 
exception being the mind itself and certain of its- acts, 
operations or experiences. Now, he does subsequently loosen 
the identification of knowledge with perception in admitting 
"sensitive knowledge" of the existence of external objects 
"actually present to the senses". But, although sensitive 
knowledge undoubtedly counts as knowledge for Locke (or even 
as perception in a looser sense; see E IV iii 2, p.190), it 
is scarcely credible that admitting sensitive knowledge 
involves, for him, admitting external material objects as 
immediate objects in any relevant sense of 'immediate object*. 
Consequently, I shall view his position as restricting the 
status of being an immediate object to the self, the particu­
lar ideas it has, and some of its acts, operations, etc. 
Moreover, since the extension of knowledge to include sensi­
tive knowledge itself poses problems of its own, I shall 
again discuss Locke as if 'knowledge* has not been loosened 
in this fashion and reserve consideration of the extension 
until later.
It seems clear, then, that in order to understand the 
place of ideas in Locke's theory of knowledge, it is necessary 
to understand his notion of an immediate object. Before 
tackling this problem, however, it is useful to make two
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points:
(a) If 'perceiving agreement between ideas* used to
include both the examination of abstract ideas and the 
reflective perception (e.g.) that I exist,iam having a 
sensible idea of green, or am thinking about philosophy, 
then such an expression covers two significantly different 
things. For instance, perceiving that 24-2=4 (i.e., per­
ceiving the appropriate kind of agreement between the idea 
of 2+2 and the idea of equality to 4)^ does not consist in 
perceiving that I am having the abstract idea of 24 2 or of 
equality to 4, or any such fact about myself and the ideas 
I have. Conversely, in perceiving that I am sensing black,
I do not seem to be "examining my abstract ideas" in the way 
that I purportedly am in perceiving that 2+2=4.
Now, one can perhaps see why Locke describes perceiving 
that I am sensing black as 'the perception of an agreement 
between ideas*. For, in such cases of reflective perception, 
what I perceive, or part of what I perceive, often that I
am having such-and-such an idea. Nevertheless, as just noted, 
this is not the reason which can be given for characterising
^One must distinguish between 'perceiving agreement between 
the ideas of ...* and 'perceiving that ... agrees with 
...'. Otherwise, the distinction between, e.g., perceiving 
that 2+2=4 and perceiving that the idea of 2+2 agrees with 
the idea of equality to 4 could fold. For, perceiving 
that 2+2=4 consists in perceiving agreement between the 
ideas of 2+2 and equality to 4.
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the perception that 2+2=4 as 'the perception of agreement 
between ideas'; for perceiving that 2+2=4 does not consist 
in perceiving that I am having such-and-such ideas. The 
suggestion, rather, seems to be that in perceiving that 
2+2=4, I examine my abstract ideas of 2+2 and of equality to 
4 - ideas which are "immediately present" to me - in a way 
which is presumably analogous to the way I examine myself 
and my ideas in reflectively perceiving that I have such-and- 
such ideas.
(b) Leibniz's position on the knowledge of necessary truth 
seems very similar to Locke's in this respect.^ For one 
thing, Leibniz generally accepts Locke's use of expressions 
like 'perceiving agreement between ideas'. Indeed, he him­
self does not hesitate to write, e.g., "truth is always 
grounded in the agreement or disagreement of ideas, but it is 
not true in general that our knowledge of truth is a percep­
tion of this agreement or disagreement." (NE IV i 1-2, p.400, 
G 338). Furthermore, in arguing for innate principles, he 
often points out that necessary truths are discovered by 
looking in the mind (see below, pp 123-28), and he makes 
little effort to draw a sharp line between looking "inward" 
in this sense and examining oneself in reflection.
In other respects, it is clearly different - e.g., Leibniz 
holds that all necessary truths have the form of "identi­
cals" and therefore the knowledge of a necessary truth is 
the knowledge of the truth of an identical proposition.
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On the other hand, in the context of his discussion 
of intuitive knowledge, he does allow for differences in 
the respect under consideration:^ "in short, you can say 
in general that all primitive truths of reason are immediate 
with respect to an immediateness of ideas. As for the pri­
mitive truths of fact, they are the immediate internal ex­
periences of an immediateness of feeling." (NE IV ii 1, 
p.4lO, Gr 347; minus italics). Similarly, concerning *I exist' 
he writes: "it is a proposition of fact, based upon an im­
mediate experience, and it is not.a necessary proposition, 
whose necessity is seen in the immediate agreement of ideas." 
(NE IV vii 7, P.469, G 391-92; see also NE IV ix 2, p.499,
G 415).
For Locke, in the broadest sense of 'idea', an idea 
is "whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man 
thinks" (E Intro. 8, p.32). In this case, 'thinks' is used 
in a highly generic, Cartesian sense to include, e.g., sensa­
tion, remembering, recollection, contemplation, reverie, 
attention, reasoning. Judging, and even dreaming and (in a 
sense) knowing (e.g., see E II xix, "Of the modes of thinking**, 
pp 293-300). Thus, he himself says that 'idea' is used to 
express "whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or
IAnd, of course, he clearly recognises that reflective know­
ledge is of contingent truth.
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whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in 
thinking" (E Intro. 8, p.32; minus italics). Eventually, 
in distinguishing ideas from qualities, he expressly refers 
to an idea as the immediate object of perception, thought 
or understanding, and something the mind perceives iji it­
self (see E II viii 8, p.169). Thus, on the one hand, there 
are ideas in the mind - e.g., ideas of solidity, motion, 
extension - and on the other, qualities in bodies - e.g., 
solidity, motion, extension - as well as minds, persons, 
events, nations, groups of bodies, etc.^
Leibniz shares the view that an idea is an immediate 
object in the mind; for example, in response to what he pre­
sents as Locke's opening remarks in Book II, viz., that "the
2
idea is the object of thou^t", he writes: "l admit it,
provided you add that it is an immediate internal object, 
and that this object is an expression of the nature or the
See E II viii 9, p.169, where Locke apologises for some­
times talking about ideas as if they were in things them­
selves, and asks to be understood as meaning "those 
■ qualities in the objects which produce them in^us"; see 
also E II viii 22, p.177, where he re-affirms the impor­
tance of distinguishing between ideas in the mind and 
qualities in bodies.
^Locke actually says: "EVERY man being conscious to himself
that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied about 
whilst thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past 
doubt that men have in their minds several ideas" (E II i 
1, p.121), and thereby at least strongly suggests that 
ideas are "internal" objects.
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qualities of things." (ME II i 1, p.109, G 99). For Locke, 
of course, ideas are representatives of things, although (a) 
it is important to distinguish the ways or senses in which, 
say, abstract ideas and sensible ideas might be said to "re­
present" things, and (b) in the case of sensible ideas, not 
all ideas copy or resemble things (e.g., see E II viii 7, 
p.168; E II viii 15, p.173). Leibniz, on the other hand, 
feels that in those cases where Locke thinks that sensible 
ideas do not resemble things, i.e., in the case of ideas of 
secondary qualities, there is still a kind of incomplete or 
expressive resemblance, or "orderly relation", between the 
idea and thing (see NE II viii 13, 15, 21, 24, pp 132-35,
G 118-21).
Consequently, I think it true to say that both Locke 
and Leibniz share, at least in substance, what has come to be 
known as the representative theory of perception,^ although
^If required, confirmation of this view can be found, in 
Locke's case in E IV iv ("Of the Reality of Knowledge"), 
especially 3-4, pp 228-30; E IV ii 14, pp 185-88 (where 
he first introduces the notion of "sensitive knowledge"), 
and E IV xi ("Of Our Knowledge of the Existence of Other 
Things"), and in Leibniz's case particularly in NE II ix 
8, pp •137-38, G 122-23: "When, then, a painting deceives
us there is a double error in our judgments; for first we 
put the cause for the effect, and think we see immediately 
the cause of the image . . . for, properly speaking, we see 
only the image, and we are affected only by the rays of 
light. And since the rays of light require time (however 
little it be), it is possible for the object to be destroyed 
in this interval, and for it no longer to exist when the 
ray reaches the eye, and that which no longer exists cannot 
be the object present to the sight. In the second place, 
we further deceive ourselves when we put one cause for
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they differ considerably on related points (e.g., on uncon­
scious perception, innate ideas, the importance of sensible 
ideas as far as the question of the origin of ideas is con­
cerned, the "causes" of sensible ideas, primary and secondary 
qualities, the "simplicity" of sensible ideas).
Now, in view of the highly variable use to which Locke 
puts the word 'perception* (Leibniz's usage in this respect 
is somewhat more uniform) - e.g., it is sometimes used synony­
mously with the generic 'thought', sometimes used to mean an 
idea, sometimes used to mean only a sensible idea, sometimes 
used to mean a sensation (itself an ambiguous term in Locke's 
hands), sometimes used to mean intuitively and demonstratively 
"seeing" that such-and-such is necessarily the case, and some­
times used to mean sense-perception in the sense in which 
seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling and tasting constitute 
forms of sense-perception - it is important to be clear in 
just what sense, or senses, the word is being used at any given 
time. In the discussion which immediately follows, I shall 
be primarily concerned with perception in the sense of sense-
another, and think that what comes only from a flat picture 
is derived"from a body . . . .  This confusion of the 
effect with the cause, whether true or false, often enters 
into our judgments, moreover, upon other things. Thus we 
feel our bodies, or what touches them, and we move our arms 
by means of an immediate physical influence, which we think 
constitutes the connection of the soul with the body, 
while in truth we feel and change in that way only what is 
in us." See also, his remarks in NE IV ii l4, pp 421-22,
G 355-56 and NE IV xi 1-10, pp 512-13, G 426.
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perception. But even here, certain roufzh distinctions need 
to be drawn in order to help understand the positions of both 
Locke and Leibniz on perception - distinctions which they 
themselves do not expressly draw, but which I hope do not do 
injustice to their views.
Perception might consist in perceiving that such-and- 
such is the case, but not in the sense in which knowledge for 
Locke consists in perception. For instance, I might walk 
into a room and see that the Prime Minister is wearing a blue 
tie or that a chair in the corner is painted yellow, or a 
blind man might walk over to a table and feel that it has 
been sand-papered. On a liberal interpretation, someone might 
even hear over the radio that Germany has just declared war on 
Russia or see in the newspapers that thirteen purple goats 
have been found on the moon.
Perception in this sense is distinct from perception 
in Locke's sense^ because it consists in neither perceiving a 
necessary truth nor perceiving that A is B where A and B are 
necessarily immediate objects. It is not necessarily true 
that the Prime Minister is wearing a blue tie and the Prime 
Minister and his blue tie are not immediate objects to me.
The situation with Locke is somewhat more complicated than 
this account might suggest, since he does eventually admit 
sensitive knowledge. However, in this immediate context,
I am taking 'perception* as he uses it in initially describ­
ing knowledge - i.e., in the sense in which perception is 




And it seems to be in the sense of ‘perceive* introduced in 
this paragraph that Locke himself refers to someone seeing 
one man run another man throu^: “But yet it is evident the
author himself knows the proposition to be true, remembering 
he once saw the connexion of those ideas; as certainly as he 
knows such a man wounded another, remembering that he saw him 
run him through.“ (E IV i 9, p.175).^
One might also single out perception in a “non-proposi- 
tional** sense in which, e.g., John* s perceiving a dog does 
not entail John* s perceiving what he perceives a^ a dog. For 
example, John might be watching a scene being enacted for a 
film in which one actor (Clark) pretends to run another actor 
(Yul) through, but not know that Clark and Yul are acting.
In such a case, in the sense of ‘perceives* introduced here, 
John sees Clark pretending to kill Yul but thinks that Clark 
is killing Yul, i.e., John takes Clark to be a murderer and 
not an actor. On the other hand, one can distinguish percep­
tion in a sense in which John cannot perceive something - e.g., 
a dog, a man running another man through - unless he perceives
it as such - i.e., as a dog, or as a man running another man 
2
through. For instance, attending to perception in the two
And note also the sense of ‘perceive* in which perceiving the 
existence of an external object can, for Locke, provide a 
sensitive knowledge of the existence of that object.
^Where ‘perceiving as* is neutral with respect to whether or 
not it is correct.
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senses indicated here, one m i ^ t  then say ‘In a sense she saw 
the leader of the revolution because she saw a man in a green 
hat and he was the leader of the revolution, but in another 
sense, she dldn* t see the leader because she didn't see him 
as such*. And, in the latter sense John does not see Clark 
pretending to kill Yul.
One might distinguish yet another sense of ‘perceiving* 
in which perceiving a so-and-so does not entail perceiving 
something as a so-and-so insofar as it does not involve per­
ceiving something in a sense which entails that there i_s 
something - i.e., in this sense John simply takes there to be 
a murder, irrespective of whether there are any men doing any­
thing which John takes to be something else - indeed, irre­
spective of whether or not anything exists (save John and his 
perception). And one could continue to juggle alternative 
senses of ‘perception* along such lines for quite some time, 
without further profit to this particular'’discussion. Rather, 
what is of central importance here is to distinguish perceiving 
in any of the senses indicated thus far from perceiving in the 
following sense.
In this sense, I do not see, e.g., men, chairs, actors, 
swords, but only see colours of various shapes and sizes, of 
various shades and illuminations, and in various spatial 
relationships, undergoing various changes of spatial relation­
ships, etc. Similarly, in this sense, I do not hear automobiles.
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horses, radios, hut only sounds of varying pitch, tone, loud­
ness, and, perhaps, in various spatial relationships. In this 
sense, I do not smell cakes, factories or fish, hut smell 
only smells, taste only tastes, feel only texture, extension, 
motion, heat and cold, etc. Sense-perception in this sense is 
sometimes referred to by Locke as * sensation’, althou^ as 
noted above this latter term, like ’perception* (and ’impres­
sion’ ), receives variable employment in his hands (e.g., in 
the sense of an internal object of sensation, i.e., a sensible 
idea; in the sense of the process of a sensible idea’s being 
produced; in the sense of an effect in the brain; and in the 
sense in which it refers to things like hunger,^thirst, pain,
p
pleasure, etc.). I shall chiefly refer to it as ’sensing’.
One can then draw a further distinction, viz., that be­
tween the sense in which, e.g., ’John senses an instance of 
red* entails, and the sense in which it does not entail, * There 
exists an instance of red*. Call the former * the existential 
sense* and the latter * the non-existential sense*.
The notion of sensing and the distinction between the 
existential and non-existential senses of * sensing* seem to te 
central to the representative theory of perception, at least
^And even here one might distinguish hunger sensations from 
feelings of hunger.
^And I shall henceforth generally use ’perception* to refer 
to forms of perception other than sensing.
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in the form held by Locke and Leibniz. For it is in the case 
of sensing, and not in the case of perception in other senses, 
where the mental “representatives" which are capable of copy­
ing or resembling the external world, or at least certain 
elements in it, seem to emerge. Consequently, I shall for 
the moment concentrate on sensing.
Using ’see* in a sense in which seeing is a form of 
sensing, both Locke and Leibniz would probably agree that o n e • 
cannot see a material object, e.g., a chair, because^ seeing 
a chair entails seeing at the same time the other side of a 
chair - which is impossible owing to the demands made by ’the 
other side*. Similarly, in a sense of ’hear* in which hearing 
is a form of sensing, one cannot hear, e.g., a cow, because 
one cannot in this sense hear something which gives milk, has 
horns and big brown eyes, etc. (or whatever * cow* means).
One can only hear the moo, which is in fact made by a cow, 
although one does not in this sense hear a cow mooing. Such 
uses of * see * and ’hear’ may be relatively unusual, or even 
thoroughly bizarre; but the important question here is whether 
they are intelligible uses, and whether it is true that we do 
in fact see and hear, i.e., sense, things in this way. And
This is aside from the general point which Locke expressly 
makes and Leibniz at least implies - that one cannot sense 
substances of any kind (see E I iii 19, p.107 and Leibniz’s 
comments, in which he traces the idea of substance to re­
flection; see also NE IV ii l4, pp 421-22, G- 355).
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for Locke and Leibniz, the reply to both the latter questions 
(given suitable qualifications) would appear to be ’yes’.
In this context, an important point in connection with 
sensing is that the existential and non-existential senses are 
mutually exclusive - e.g., if John senses an instance of red 
in the existential sense, then he is necessarily not sensing 
an instance of red in the non-existential sense, and vice versa, 
This, I think, marks an important difference between sensing 
and other forms of sense-perception. For instance, if one 
concentrates on a sense of ’perception’ in which perception 
consists on the one hand in recognising or noticing a so-and- 
so, and on the other hand in merely taking something to be a 
so-and-so (though not in a sense which implies error), the re­
sult generally is that perception on the former view simply 
consists in a correct form of perception on the latter view - 
i.e., that perceiving in the existential sense consists in 
correctly perceiving in the non-existential sense. Thus, in 
this case, perceiving in the existential sense entails per­
ceiving in the non-existential sense. But, in the case of 
sensing, if I am now sensing an instance of green in the exi­
stential sense, I am not - indeed, I cannot be - sensing an
1
instance of green in the non-existential sense.
Certain minor complications can present themselves in this 
connection insofar as one can construct an existential sense 
of ’sense’ in which, e.g., John’s sensing an x in this 
existential sense would entail John’s sensing an x in the 
non-existential sense. In order to do this, one could let
55.
To apply briefly some of the preceding distinctions to 
a specific case, consider a situation in which a boy is 
examining a toy, such that the toy is red but, because of the 
lighting, it in a sense looks "orowa to the boy, although be­
cause he knows what conditions of lighting are present and 
the effect they have on how things look, in another sense the 
toy looks red to him. In this example, the boy senses brown 
but perceives red (he also perceives a red toy, and might 
perceive that it in a sense looks brovrn to him). If, however, 
the toy had looked brown to him in both senses, then he would 
have both sensed and perceived brown. On the other hand, the 
situation might be such that the boy senses red in the existen­
tial sense without perceiving the colour at all; for example, 
if the red toy is in a shop window along side a large eye­
catching yellow toy, and the latter attracts the full attention 
of the child, then the child m i ^ t  sense red out of the "corner 
of his eye" or "on the periphery" without perceiving it. Or,
* sensing an x* mean sensing an x in a non-existential sense 
plus the existence of an x plus whatever else mii^t be 
necessary. And, given Locke’s and Leibniz’s representative 
position on perception, this existential sense would be 
important because it would be the only existential sense of 
’sense’ in which one does in fact sense anything. Neverthe­
less, the central point here is that the existential sense 
of ’sense’ indicated in the text, in which existential and 
non-existential sensing are mutually exclusive, seems to be 
intelligible, i.e., free from contradiction, and therefore 
the distinction as outlined stands. Unless otherwise indi­
cated, the existential sense of ’sense’ with which I am 
concerned is the one indicated in the text.
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one m i ^ t  sense brown in the existential sense, but perceive 
it incorrectly as red; for example, consider the case vhere 
a rust-brown object moves rapidly across a man’s field of 
vision and he takes the colour to be red, although he does 
sense brown.
One m i ^ t  also attempt to distinguish sensing from cer­
tain other forms of perception by pointing out that, whereas 
sensing can only be veridical or non-veridical, perceiving 
can be correct or incorrect, right or wrong,^ And a point 
which seems closely connected with this one is that sensing 
is in some sense passive, whereas perceiving is in some sense 
active. Such a notion involves complex considerations, how­
ever - considerations which cannot be discussed adequately 
here, partly because of my own inability to frame them clearly, 
and partly because, even if I were able, such a discussion 
would take us on too great a tangent. Still, it is useful 
to note the following points in this connection:
The passive character of sensing must be a well-qualified 
one if it is to be maintained in even a rough form on behalf 
of Locke and Leibniz, because, in Locke’s view, we can to 
some extent control what we sense by moving our bodies and 
the various parts of our bodies, or by altering the ’’environ-
If veridical sensing is identified with sensing in the exis­
tential sense, then ’veridical sensing’ is ambiguous inso­
far as ’existential sensing’ is ambiguous; the possibility 
of such an ambiguity, however, seems of little consequence 
here.
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ment" (e.g., changing the lighting conditions, removing fog 
or mist, wearing glasses or hearing aids), or by oaring for 
the state of our sense-organs, nervous systems, brain cells, 
etc. And Leibniz would probably agree in substance with a 
corresponding point - i.e., provided the appropriate expres­
sions were used in the special metaphorical sense demanded 
by his system of immaterial substances which cannot literally 
interact or have bodies which they move. Furthermore, Locke 
suggests that the diversion of one’s attention can (thouÿi 
presumably need not) have some effect on what one senses (e.g., 
see E II ix 4, p.184). And Leibniz certainly agrees with 
this point to the extent that attention is a determining fac­
tor as far as the "distinctness" of what we sense is concerned 
(e.g., see NE Pref., pp 47-48, G 46-47).
Nevertheless, it is clear that for Locke there a 
sense of ’passive’ in which sensing is definitely passive 
(see E II i 25, PP 142-43; E II ix 1, p.l83; E II xxi 74, 
pp 371-72), i.e., in which sensing is the end-product of a 
causal process involving "impressions" being made (via impulse) 
on the sense-organs, nervous system, certain areas in the 
brain, etc.: "sensation; which is such an impression or
motion made in some part of the body, as produces some per­
ception in the understanding." (E II i 23# p.l4l, minus 
italics and square brackets. For some of his brief excur­
sions into the physical and physiological aspects of this
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causal process, see E II viii 4, p.167; E II viii 11-22, pp 
171-78). As already suggested, for Leibniz, one can only 
speak truly of bodily impressions causing the mind to sense 
things if one uses expressions such as ’bodily impressions’ 
and ’cause* in a special metaphorical way. For, in the ordi­
nary sense of the appropriate expressions, everything in the 
mind "arises from its o-vm depths" according to the decree of 
God (e.g., see NE I i 1, p.70, G 66-67; IIE II xxi 72, pp 218- 
19, G 195-96). Even granting the special usage, however, it 
seems that Leibniz is not prepared to view the mind’s sensing 
things as being quite so passive a business as Locke, if he 
were to speak Leibniz’s language would suggest. Thus, Leibniz 
writes: "But I should suppose that there is also action in
sensations so far as they give us more distinct perceptions 
and consequently the opportunity of making remarks and so to 
speak of developing ourselves." (NE II xxi 72, p.220, G 196). 
But, whatever this point might amount to, he does tend to 
identify sensible ideas with confused ideas (e.g., see NE II 
viii 9, p.132; NE I i 11, p.82) and, in turn, to associate 
having confused ideas in this sense with being passive: "But
taking action as an exercise of perception and passion as its 
contrary, there is action in true substance only when their 
perception . . .  is developed and becomes more distinct, as 
there is passion only when it becomes more confused" (NE II 
xxi 72, p.219, G 195; minus italics). In making this point,
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however, one might note in passing that he apparently ex­
cludes from the list of sensible ideas those ideas which Locke 
maintains come from more than one sense: "The ideas which
are said to come from more than one sense, like those of 
space, figure, motion, rest, are rather from common-sense, 
that is to say, from the mind itself, for they are ideas of 
the pure understanding, but related to externality, and which 
the senses make us perceive"(NE II v, p.129, G 116). And 
such a view certainly seems to constitute an important quali­
fication on the distinction between sensing and perceiving, 
as far as what is sensed is concerned, if it is to be applied 
to Leibniz.
On the other hand, the sense in which perceiving, as 
distinct from sensing, might be said to be active, must also 
be carefully qualified. For, both Locke and Leibniz imply 
that perceiving cannot be voluntary in the sense that, e.g., 
going out to buy a pint of milk, or driving an automobile, or 
pushing a lawn mower, can be voluntary. Thus, Locke, while 
drawing a comparison between sense-perception and "intellec­
tual" perception (but drawing no distinction within sense- 
perception between sensing and perceiving), makes the point 
that, although a man can have control over whether or not he 
will exercise his perceptual faculties, under what conditions 
he will exercise them, and how carefully he will exercise 
them (at least in those cases where being careful is appropriate
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in the exercise of the given faculty), once such conditions 
are settled, "it depends not on his will to see" what he does 
see (see E IV xiii 1-2, pp 357-58). Leibniz agrees with the 
point as applied to (the acquisition of) beliefs and implies 
agreement in the cases relevant to this discussion: "We have
. . . established the fact that it does not depend upon man 
to have this or that opinion in the present state, but it de­
pends upon him to prepare himself to have it or not to have it 
eventually, and that thus opinions are voluntary only in an 
indirect manner." (NE IV xiii 1-2, p.528, G 438; see also NE 
IV i 8, p.402, G 340). In this respect, then, sensing and 
perceiving seem to be pretty well on an equal footing.
Nevertheless, there does seem to be some sense of 
’active’ in which someone perceiving something is, whereas 
someone sensing something is not, active. For what one per­
ceives often depends not only on the state of one’s sense- 
organs or neural and cerebral system, the character of the 
environment, and the direction of one’s attention, but also on 
what one knows in a broad sense, and not simply insofar as 
what one knows can influence the direction of one’s attention, 
or lead one to alter the character of the environment or the 
state of one’s sense organs, nervous system, etc. Thus, 
under certain conditions, one is subject to criticism from a 
slightly different viewpoint for failing to perceive such-and- 
such than for failing to sense such-and-such. And, under
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certain conditions, successfully perceiving such-and-such can 
be a mark of intelligence, whereas successfully sensing such- 
and-such is only a sign of good eye-siÿit or clear visibility.
Some support for ascribing the core of such a view to 
the positions of Locke and Leibniz is provided by a distinction 
they both expressly accept - viz., the distinction between 
having a sensible idea, and "judging". For instance, Locke 
vjrites: "When we set before our eyes a round globe of any
uniform colour, v.g. gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain 
that the idea thereby imprinted on our mind is of a flat 
circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and 
brightness coming to our eyes. But we having, by use, been 
accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies 
are wont to make in us; what alterations are made in the re­
flections of light by the difference of the sensible figures 
of bodies; - the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, 
alters the appearances into their causes. So that from that 
which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the 
figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to 
itself the perception of a convex figure and an uniform 
colour; when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane 
variously coloured, as is evident in painting." (E II ix 8, 
p.186). And again: "si^t, . ; ; conveying to our minds
the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to 
that sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure.
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and motion, the several varieties whereof change the appear­
ances of its proper object, viz. light and colour; we bring 
ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in 
many cases by a settled habit, - in things whereof we have 
frequent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick, 
that we take that for the perception of our sensation which 
is an idea formed by our judgment; so that one, viz. that of 
sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce 
taken notice of itself; - as a man who reads or hears with 
attention and understanding, takes little notice of the charac­
ters or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by 
them." (E II ix 9, p.188). Leibniz heartily agrees with the 
central point involved here (see NE II ix 8, pp 136-38, G 122- 
23).
Now, aside from any special questions raised by viewing 
perception as a form of judgment (e.g., on the grounds that 
the latter is something which can be either true or false, 
whereas the former can only be either correct or incorrect), 
it must be emphasised that neither Locke nor Leibniz recog­
nises the full significance of this distinction for a theory 
of sense-perception and do not carry the distinction I have 
marked with the words ’sense* and ’perceive’ into contexts 
which might well profit by its introduction. Thus, concerning 
the point that a man is often "beholden to experience, improve­
ment, and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the
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least use of, or help from them" (E II ix 8, p.l87), Locke
writes: "But this is not, I thinli, usual in any of our
ideas, but those received by si^t." (E II ix 9, p. 188). 
Leibniz’s view, on the other hand, seems somewhat more com­
prehensive in this respect: "Tliis confusion of the effect
with the cause, whether true or false, often enters into our 
judgments, moreover, upon other things. Thus we feel our 
bodies, or what touches them, and we move our arms'by means 
of an immediate physical influence, which we thinlc constitutes
the connection of the soul with the body, while in truth we
feel and change in that way only what is in us." (NE II ix 
8, pp 137-38, G 122-23).
At any rate, although the distinction which both Locke 
and Leibniz draw between having sensible ideas and "judging" 
does not warrant the claim that they expressly distinguish 
sensing and perceiving to the extent that it is distinguished 
here, it nevertheless suggests that the sensing-perceiving 
distinction can in substance be ascribed to their positions 
without producing a violent warping effect.
If some such notion of sensing can be secured on behalf 
of Locke and Leibniz, it seems to generate two different views 
of an immediate object. On the one hand, whatever the mind 
senses in the existential sense seems to be an immediate 
object. For example, if it were the case that the moving spot
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of brovm I am now sensing were being sensed by me in the 
existential sense (which, according to the représentâtionalist, 
is not the case), then it would be an immediate object to me. 
In this case, an immediate object is something public - i.e., 
you can sense the same thing as I am sensing - and is capable 
of existing independently of anyone’s sensing it. And, if 
one were to draw a distinction between reflective experience 
and reflective' perception (or "reflective judgment"), corres- • 
ponding to the distinction between sensing and perceiving, one 
might also say that any object of reflective experience is an 
immediate object (indeed, is necessarily an immediate object), 
and in this way account for the mind and certain of its opera­
tions being immediate objects. In this case, an immediate 
object is not something public - you cannot experience my 
mental operations. Still, for Locke, I can exist without 
being an object of reflective experience - viz., when I am in 
a deep sleep (although it is perhaps debatable whether I, as 
distinct from my mental operations, can be an object of re­
flective experience, according to Locke’s view). And for 
Leibniz, many of my mental acts are apparently not objects 
of reflective experience - viz., unconscious perceptions, at 
least of the kind I have during a deep sleep (see NE II i 
9-19, pp 111-19, G 101-08).
On the other hand, for both Locke and Leibniz, the ex­
pression ’an immediate object’ also refers to, ajnong other
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things, whatever one senses in the non-existential sense. And 
it is in this sense of ’immediate object’ that an idea is an 
immediate object - a sensible idea being an immediate object 
of sensing. But - and this seems to be one of the central 
planks of a representative theory of perception - an immediate 
sensible object in this second sense is not considered to be 
as different from an immediate sensible object in the first 
sense as one might initially expect. For, in the second sense, 
an immediate sensible object achieves much the same status 
as an immediate sensible object in the first sense, save that 
it becomes logically private and, presumably, necessarily 
mental and therefore mind-dependent - in short, a private 
mental "representative" of some element in the public, non­
mental world. For example, the motion I am now sensing is 
not in the world but is in my mind; it is not something which 
exists for you to see as well as me, as the motion of the auto­
mobile which just passed by exists; it is not something which 
exists when I cease to sense it, as the heat of the stove can 
exist even when I draw my hand away from it and no longer 
feel it (since heat is a secondary quality for Locke and - 
though in a slightly different way - for Leibniz, heat in 
fact is not a mind-independent object; nevertheless, neither 
philosopher implies that it is impossible for heat to be such 
an object).
Now, the step from claiming that an immediate sensible
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object is what one senses in the non-existential sense to 
claiming that an immediate object in this sense is an inter­
nal mental object of the type roughly indicated in the pre­
ceding paragraph, is a questionable one. My concern here, 
however, is not so much with the pros and cons of such a view,
but with trying to understand the position as far as this is
possible. With this aim in mind, then, it migit be useful to 
contrast the notion of an immediate object as an internal 
mental object with a weaker interpretation of the equation 
’immediate sensible object--what one senses in a non-existen­
tial sense’. On this latter interpretation, to view any 
value of the ’what’ in ’what one senses in a non-existential 
sense’ as an object in any sense of ’object’ which allows one 
to claim it as a private object, or as a mental object, or as 
an object which is produced by the senses, or as an object 
which resembles such-and-such a quality, is mistaken. What 
one senses in the non-existential sense is an object only in 
the sense that, if x is what one senses, then one senses x -
but in no stronger a sense. Thus, if x is what one senses in
the non-existential sense, then it is impossible for x to be 
y unless one senses y in the non-existential sense. And 
therefore, if one claims that the motion I now sense is an 
internal, mental object, produced by the senses, and resem­
bling the motion of a body three feet in front of me, on 
this interpretation, it would follow that I sense in the non-
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existential sense something which is internal, mental, pro­
duced by the senses, and resembling such-and-such a body.
But j.s this the case? Do I not simply sense motion? In­
deed, can I sense the privacy of the motion? Or can I sense 
its mental character, and what then becomes of the distinction 
between sensation and reflection? Or can I sense its being 
produced by the senses? Or can I sense the resemblance be­
tween the "internal motion" and the motion of the body in 
front of me?
Similarly, on this interpretation, the claim that I 
cannot sense in the non-existential sense the same thing as 
you incorporates a misconception, insofar as the only sense of 
’thing* in which I can sense a thing in the non-existential 
sense is the sense in which you and I are both sensing the 
same thing if, e.g., we are both sensing red. The denial 
that we can sense the same thing - i.e., the claim that the 
objects of sensing in the non-existential sense are logically 
private - is made only as a result of accepting the view that 
one can sense a thing in a stronger sense of ’thing’ than
In one passage in E IV ii l4, p.188, Locke’s expression 
actually suggests such a view; "So that, I think, we may 
add to the two former sorts of knowledge [i.e., intuitive 
and demonstrative] this also, of the existence of particu­
lar external objects, by that perception and consciousness 
we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them"; given 
the context of his various remarks on "sensitive knowledge", 
however, interpreting him in this way is open to serious 
question.
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this interpretation allows. Thus, ’John cannot sense the 
same thing as Mary’ - i.e., ’John cannot have the same 
sensible idea as Mary’ - is not false, but absurd, insofar 
as it presupposes the necessarily false ’John can sense a 
thing’.
"S .
At any rate, whatever difficulties attach to such a 
view, it is important to realise that Locke and Leibniz ^  
tend to view an immediate sensible object which consists in 
what one senses in the non-existential sense as an internal 
mental object, and therefore tend to view an idea as an ob­
ject in this sense.
Furthermore, both men extend the notion of an immediate 
object in this sense beyond the confines of experience (i.e., 
beyond sensation and reflection) to include, among other 
things, thinliing in a more customary sense. Thus, as men­
tioned above, Locke lets ’idea’ mean "whatsoever is the object 
of the understanding when a man thinks", in a sense of ’thinks’ 
which includes the type of thinking that goes on when, e.g., 
one is working through a demonstration in mathematics. The 
objects of the understanding when a man is thinking in this 
more restricted, and more usual^ sense, are abstract ideas
^See E II ix 1, p.183: "PERCEPTION . . .  is by some called
thinking in general. .Thouÿi thinking, in the propriety of 
the English tongue, signifies that sort of operation in the 
mind about its ideas, wherein the mind is active; where it, 
with some degree of voluntary attention, considers anything."
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(among others^). In discussing the use of words, Locke ex­
plicitly refers to such ideas as "internal conceptions", 
describing them as follows: "MAN, though he have great
variety of thoughts, and such from which others as well as 
himself might receive profit and delight; yet they are all 
within his own breast, invisible and hidden from others, nor 
can of themselves be made to appear. The comfort and advan­
tage of society not being to be had without communication of 
thoughts, it was necessary that man should find out some 
external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas, which 
his thoughts are made up of, m i ^ t  be made known to others."
(E III ii 1, p.8). What one is thinlcing of in having thoughts, 
then, is a private mental object - i.e., an abstract general 
idea or an idea of a particular - just as what one senses in
a non-existential sense is a private mental object - i.e., a
2
sensible idea.
among others’ because one should, I think, at least leave 
- room for the kinds of non-sensible idea one would have if, 
e.g., during the course of a mathematical proof, one were 
to introduce a particular example to clarify the situation 
and thereby think of this particular triangle, or the par­
ticular triangle which ... - i.e., the kind of idea one 
could use a proper name to signify. At times, Locke’s 
position leaves little room for such an idea,
^One big difference here, hov/ever, is that in the case of 
thouÿits, there is no corresponding existential sense in 
which, e.g., ’John thinks of a cow entails -Î There is a 
cow’, where existential and non-existential senses are 
mutually exclusive.
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Leibniz apparently shares Locke’s basic view that 
having thou^ts consists in having ideas, i.e., in having 
private objects in the mind, althou^ again, he differs from 
Locke on a number of related issues. For instance, he has 
reservations about accepting Locke’s theory of abstraction as 
an account of the formation of general ideas (see NE III iii 
6-7, pp 309-10, Gr 268-69). He is critical of the occasional 
suggestion in Locke that having an abstract idea of an x 
consists in having a certain kind of image of an x (viz., one 
which is made to represent any particular x. See ÏÏE II xxix 
13, 15, 16, pp 273-75, G 2 4 2 - 4 4 ) And he would presumably 
be equally critical of the view that the abstract idea of an 
x consists in a sensible idea of an x which has been somehow 
"retained", "stripped" of certain of its "parts", and made 
capable of representing any x (Locke’s expression in E III 
iii 6, pp 16-17, and E II xi 9, pp 206-07, could suggest this 
somewhat crude view). Further, in arguing for innate ideas, 
Leibniz constantly emphasises the distinction between the 
idea as an internal object and the actual conscious considera­
tion of the idea, i.e., the actual thought of so-and-so; for
Although, in discussing abstract ideas, Locke does not ex­
plicitly describe them as kinds of images, certain of his 
expressions might suggest such a view; e.g., see E III iii 
6-9, pp 16-19 and E III ii 6, p.11, where he uses the ex­
pression "those thoughts and imaginations they have within 
their own.breasts". The suggestion is certainly not a 
clear-cut one, however.
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he adopts the position that an idea can exist in the mind 
without being actually or consciously considered or perceived, 
and thus lead a "virtual" existence, the object of unconscious 
perception (see HE Pref., pp 46-53, G 46-52; NE I i, passim;
NE II i 9-19, pp 111-19, G 101-08) - and this presumably 
holds for the objects of thought as well as for sensible ideas. 
He disagrees with the view that all ideas originate in ex­
perience (e.g., see NE Pref., pp 42-43, G 42-43). Indeed, he 
takes his metaphysics another step further than Locke and 
tends to view the objects of thought (as well as necessary 
truths) as being in some way "grounded in" the eternal mind 
of God, drawing expressly on St. Augustine in doing so (see 
m  IV xi 13, pp 516-17, G 428-29).
In discussing words and ideas, Locke emphatically makes 
the point that words can be used to signify only ideas, and 
that each man can use words to signify only his own ideas 
(see E III ii, pp 8-13). Now, part of what Locke seems to be 
getting at with this claim is that words are used to signify 
only (one’s own) ideas in the sense that they are used to 
communicate only (one’s own) ideas, i.e., to let others know 
only what ideas I have in my mind,^ in the sense of ’know’ in 
which one knows what someone means by such-and-such words or 
expressions when one understands what such words or expressions
^This point is ambiguous, but I have left it as such because 
the ambiguity can be found in Locke.
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mean, i.e., understands what is being said or referred to or 
described or asked or requested, etc. Thus, in describing the 
signifying use of words, Locke employs expressions such as 
"communicating thou^ts", "making invisible ideas knoi-m to 
others", "sensible marks of ideas", "stands for ideas", and
"speaking in order to be understood" (see E III ii passim).
And thus, in a speaker-hearer situation, the successful use 
of a word as a sign must "excite in the hearer the same idea 
which it stands for in the mind of the speaker" (E III ix 4, 
p.105). He therefore distinguishes two ways in which words 
can be used as signs: either to communicate with others, or
to record one’s own thoughts as an aid to the memory, and - 
thus "communicate with oneself" at a later date (see E III ii 
2, p.9; E III ix 1-3, pp 104-05).
Now, it is of some importance to note that in using
words as signs of my ideas and thus letting others know what 
thou^ts I have in my mind by producing "sensible marks" - 
whether spoken or written words, smoke signals, or certain 
motions of the hands, etc. - I can only do so in a sense of 
’know’ which is quite distinct from that in which Locke claims 
that human knowledge consists in the perception of the agree­
ment or disagreement between ideas. For, not only are the 
"sensible marks" which I produce cut off from you in the sense 
that they cannot (in fact) be immediate sensible objects for 
you - i.e., cannot be sensed by you in the existential sense -
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but my ideas are cut off from you in the sense that they are 
lopiically private objects - i.e., it is logically impossible 
for you to experience my ideas in any way. Thus, even if 
"sensitive" knowledge is accepted as part of Locke’s theory, 
and it is thereby possible for you to know in this way the 
existence of such-and-such a sound, or written shape, etc. - 
which I in fact produce, although you do not know this - you 
cannot know in this way that the given sound signifies such- 
and-such an idea in my mind, or that, in using this word, I 
have such-and-such an idea in my mind. For, although Locke 
does not expressly say so, sensitive knowledge seems to be 
restricted to the knowledge of the existence of either objects 
which it is possible to sense in the existential sense (i.e., 
for Locke and apparently for Leibniz as well, sensible quali­
ties) or objects such that it is possible to sense in the 
existential sense any quality of the given object, though not 
necessarily all its qualities simultaneously (and thus include 
material bodies) - and this excludes ideas. Furthermore, you 
cannot acquire a sensitive knowledge of the existence of such- 
and-such a sound and then demonstrate the existence of such- 
and-such an idea in my mind. For, even waiving the question 
of your demonstrating the existence of my mind in this way, 
since the connection between any given word and idea, or be­
tween a sensible mark and its being used as a sign of an idea, 
is a contingent one (see E III ii 1, p.8; E III ii 8, p.12;
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and E III Ix 4, p,105), the indicated premise does not yield 
the existence of an idea.
In Locke’s strict sense of ’knowledge’, then, one cannot 
make one’s thoughts known to others. Indeed*, Locke himself, 
in Book II, provides some support for this point by distin­
guishing three "sorts" of perception (where perception is the 
act of the understanding, i.e., where the understanding is the 
-power to perceive): "l. The perception of ideas in our minds.
2. The perception of the signification of signs. 3. The per­
ception of the . . . agreement or disagreement, that there is 
between any of our ideas." (E II xxi 5, p.3l4; minus square 
brackets). Since 2. and 3. are distinct, and since knowledge 
in the strict sense consists in 3., therefore any sense of 
’knowledge’ in which knowledge consists in, or includes, 2. 
must be distinct from the strict sense.
In addition to the use of words for communication, how­
ever, Locke seems to be suggesting something else with his 
claim that words are used to signify only ideas - namely, that 
words signify only ideas in a sense of ’signify’ in which ’the 
word X signifies M ’ means that the word x means M - in short, 
that words mean only ideas in the sense of ’mean’ in which it 
is not unusual to say, e.g., that the word ’ constable’ means 
a policeman, as opposed to idie idea of a policeman. Thus, 
concerning definition, Locke sorites: "a definition is nothing
else but the showing the meaning of one word by several other
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not synonymous terms. The meaning of words being only the 
Ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them, the 
meaning of any term Is then showed, or the word Is defined, 
when, by other words, the Idea It Is made the sign of, and 
annexed to. In the mind of the speaker. Is as It were repre­
sented, or set before the view of another; and thus Its sig­
nification ascertained.'* (E III Iv 6, pp 33-34; minus Italics). 
According to this element In his theory, then. It seems to be 
the case that words which prim a facie appear to mean things - 
e.g., *dog*, *brother *, *red*, - really mean the Ideas of 
things - I.e., the idea of a dog, the Idea of a brother, or 
the idea of red.
Now, Locke does not completely abstain from using ex­
pressions to the effect that such-and-such a word means such- 
and-such a thing, as opposed to the Idea of that thing. For 
Instance, consider the passage: '*They [i.e. word^ , In every
man's mouth, stand for the Ideas he has, and ;^lch he would 
express by them. A child having taken notice of nothing In 
the metal he hears called gold, but the bright shining yellow 
colour, he applies the word gold only to his o\m Idea of that 
colour, and nothing else; and therefore.calls the same colour 
In a peacock's tall gold. Another that hath better observed, 
adds to shining yellow great weight: and then the sound gold, 
when he uses it, stands for a complex Idea of a shining yellow 
and a very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities
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fusibility: and then the word gold signifies to him a body, 
bright, yellow, fusible, and very heavy.” (E III 11 3, p.10). 
Here he employs both expressions such as 'calls such-and-such 
a metal ”gold”' or 'the word "gold” signifies a body which 
etc.* and expressions such as * applies "gold” only to his own 
idea* or * the sound "gold” stands for such-and-such an Idea*.
In this connection two points are Important:
1. In claiming that words signify only Ideas, Locke Is In 
part rejecting a view of language which might fall under the 
tab * advocating real meanings * (this also seems to be one of 
the bones he picks with the advocate of real essences). In 
other words, he Is to some extent attacking the view that the 
meaning of a word consists In something more than simply what 
we use the given word to mean (or what the given word Is used 
to mean, or what that particular man uses the word to mean, 
etc.), where x Is, or Is a part of, what we use a word to mean 
If and only If the given word means, or In part means, x -
I.e., consists In something which exists in the world, and not 
necessarily In the mind, independently of our linguistic de­
cisions or habits. But, In doing so, he seems to retain the 
view that the meaning of a word Is still an object In something 
like the sense In which ”the real meaning” of a word is claimed 
as an object - only in this case, the object Is an Internal, 
private conception. I.e., an idea. Thus, a word which "signi­
fies” a kind of thing of which there are no instances - e.g..
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'centaur* - can still have a meaning, insofar as it can be 
used to signify the appropriate idea - I.e., the idea of a 
centaur. Consequently, Locke to a certain extent holds on to 
the view that the meaning of a word consists in something 
apart from simply what we use the word to mean (in the indi­
cated sense) insofar as the meaning of a word is for him an 
idea; but he rejects any suggestion that it is anything other 
than an idea. Thus he writes: "Because men would not be
thought to talk barely of their o\m imagination, but of things 
as really they are; therefore they often suppose the words to 
stand also for the reality of things . . . .  give me leave 
here to say, that it is a perverting the use of words, and 
brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signifi­
cation, whenever we make them stand for anything but those 
Ideas we have In our own minds." (E III 11 v, p.11; minus 
Italics). Just how, on his own principles, he can allow the 
possibility of our letting words stand for anything but those 
Ideas we have in our own minds, and thus perverting their use. 
Is itself difficult to see. But the basic critical question 
here is whether words stand for, or Indeed can stand for, 
anything - even ideas - in the indicated sense.
2. In accepting the use of expressions such as * the word 
"gold" means a metal which ...* while at the same time sug­
gesting that words mean only Ideas, Locke seems to have some­
thing like the following in mind. The sort of idea which can
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be signified by a word, whether a general or a particular 
idea, has a "representative capacity". A general idea is 
capable of representing an unlimited number of particulars - 
e.g., the idea of a horse is capable of representing an un­
limited number of particular horses, viz., any horse. A 
particular idea (e.g., an idea of John Locke as distinct from 
the particular idea of a man I had three minutes ago), on the 
other hand, is capable of representing one and only one parti­
cular - e.g., the idea of this piece of paper is capable of 
representing one and only one particular, viz., this piece of 
paper (e.g., see E III iii 6, pp 16-17; E III iii 11, pp 21- 
22). Thus words are signs of ideas which, in turn, are "signs" 
of things (e.g., see E IV v 2, p.244; E IV xxi 4, pp 461-62), 
And abstract ideas are viewed as internal "patterns" or "forms", 
under the names of which particulars are ranked or sorted - 
i.e.,'classified - according to whether or not they agree or 
conform with, or are represented by, a given abstract idea 
(see E III iii 12-13, pp 22-24). Consequently, one might take 
a clue from Locke's use of expressions such as 'proper and 
immediate' or 'primary and immediate' to qualify 'signify' in 
his claim that words signify only ideas (see E III i 6, p.6;
E III ii 1, 2, 4, 7, PP 9-11), and distinguish between imme­
diate and mediate signification such that the word *x* 
mediately signifies T (where T need not be an idea) if and 
only if *x* immediately signifies the idea of T, or (in another
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sense) if and only if *x* immediately signifies the idea of A, 
and the idea of A represents T (i.e., T is A)'. And, so the 
argument might run, one can then account for the ordinary 
view that words mean things (where a thing may, but need not 
be, an idea) by reference to mediate signification - i.e., 'x* 
means T if and only if *x* mediately signifies T. %atever 
detailed form such a reconstruction takes, however, it still 
incorporates the somewhat shady view that there is an appro­
priate sense of 'mean* in which words can mean only ideas.
Although Leibniz seems to follow Locke's central line 
in allowing internal conceptions or objects of thought (i.e., 
abstract ideas in this sense), in addition to differing from 
Locke on the.related issues indicated above, he refuses to 
adopt a theory of meaning according to which words can mean 
only ideas. He does not discuss such a theory at any length, 
but-at least he does reject it: "Substances and modes are
equally represented by ideas; and things, as well as ideas, 
in both cases are indicated by words; thus I see but little 
difference, save that ideas of substances and of sensible 
qualities are more fixed. For the rest, it sometimes happens 
that our ideas and thouÿits are the matter of our discourse 
and constitute the thing itself which we desire to signify, 
and that reflective notions enter more than we thinli into 
those of things. We speak, indeed, sometimes of words in a 
material way, without in this case being able to substitute
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with precision in the place of the word its signification or 
its relation to the ideas or things. This occurs not only in 
speaking as a grammarian, but also in speaking as a, lexico­
grapher, in giving the explication of the term," (NE III ii 
4-6, pp 306-07, a 266).
In this particular context, however, the respects in 
which Leibniz agrees with Locke are more important than the 
respects in which he disagrees. For it is because he subscribes 
to abstract ideas - simply in the sense of internal objects 
of thought, and not in any sense which necessarily carries 
with it the view that thoughts are images, or that ideas are 
formed by abstraction, or that ideas constitute the sole 
meaning of words - that he agrees with Locke that the knowledge 
of necessary truth is acquired by perceiving agreement between 
abstract ideas. And it is presumably because abstract ideas 
are private mental objects that Locke thinlcs, and Leibniz 
agrees, (or at least does not voice disagreement) that the 
knowledge of necessary truth is sufficiently analogous to the 
reflective knowledge that, e.g., I exist or am having such- 
and-such an idea at this moment, to justify calling both sorts 
of knowledge 'the perception of the agreement between ideas'ÿ 
without fear of being misleading.
Nevertheless, the point remains that knowledge, e.g., 
that I exist does not consist in the perception of the agree-
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ment between the idea which I use the word *1* to signify 
and the abstract idea of existence; rather, it involves re­
flective attention to myself, as distinct from any such idea 
of myself. This might be contrasted with the knowledge, e.g., 
that gold is a metal, which consists solely in the perception 
of the agreement between the abstract idea of gold and the 
abstract idea of a metal (or, perhaps, of being a metal) - 
i.e., it involves neither the empirical observation of parti­
cular instances of gold nor the reflective perception that 
the perceiver has an abstract idea of gold or is asserting 
that gold is a- metal. And, to the extent that bringing both 
reflective knowledge and the knowledge of necessary truth 
under the common title of 'perception of agreement between 
ideas' obscures such a difference, it can be misleading.
In addition, there seems to be a difficulty in connection 
with the general notion of agreement between abstract ideas. 
For, it is not the case that (e.g.) the abstract idea of a 
man agrees with the abstract idea of an animal if and only if 
one asserts agreement between the abstract idea of a man and 
the abstract idea of an animal, i.e., if and only if one 
claims, or asserts, or even simply considers the proposition, 
that a man is an animal. For one thing, asserting the false 
proposition that a man is not an animal consists in asserting 
a disagreement between the abstract ideas of a man and of an 
animal, where the given abstract ideas agree (e.g., see E IV
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V 9, p.249)^ - which would be impossible if the agreement be­
tween abstract ideas mutually entailed the assertion of such 
agreement. Thus, claiming that one abstract idea agrees with 
another abstract idea is not like claiming that, e.g., this 
sensible idea of red'"agrees with" this sensible idea of being 
beside green insofar* as I now have a sensible idea of red 
beside green, i.e., am now sensing an instance of red beside 
an instance of green. Rather, agreement between abstract 
ideas is strictly a function of the truth of the relevant pro­
position, and this is independent of what agreement anyone 
asserts between the given ideas, or even what agreement is 
perceived (in a sense in which perception can be mistaken) to 
hold between the given ideas. On the other hand, however,
'The abstract idea of a man agrees with the abstract idea of 
an animal* apparently does not simply mean that a man is an 
animal or that a man agrees with an animal, or that the propo­
sition *A man is an animal* is true. Consequently, it is at 
least difficult to see just what agreement between abstract 
ideas consists in.
Finally, to return to the question which initially
prompted the preceding discussion of ideas, it is because Locke
2
restricts knowledge to immediate objects - in a flexible
^The point might only extend to necessary falsehoods, however.
^Once again, I am ignoring qualifications attendant upon his 
admitting sensitive knowledge.
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sense^ in which either ideas or oneself and one* s own opera­
tions count as immediate objects - that he restricts knowledge 
to perceiving agreement between ideas, where 'perceiving agree­
ment between ideas* is itself sufficiently flexible to cover 
either the examination of one's ovm abstract ideas or reflec­
tive perception. For, according to Locke, things other than 
oneself and oneIs mental operations or one's ideas are not 
immediate objects.
Thus, strictly speaking, he is not simply defining know­
ledge as the perception of agreement between ideas, because 
(if for no other reason) he suggests that if, e.g., sensible 
qualities were immediate objects - a possibility he does not 
expressly exclude - then one would be able to know that there 
are such-and-such sensible qualities - something which would 
be impossible if 'knowledge* meant simply the perception of 
agreement between ideas. And thus, Leibniz's reference to 
Locke's claim that knowledge is the perception of agreement 
between ideas as a definition of knowledge (see NE IV i 2, 
p.400, G- 339) could be misleading if taken out of context.
Leibniz, on the other hand, accepts the view of one's 
o\m ideas and oneself (plus one's o\m mental operations) as 
immediate objects, and to this extent he shares Locke's posi­
tion. Moreover, he agrees that things other than oneself and
^Though neither Locke nor Leibniz would admit it to be as 
flexible as I have suggested.
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one's own ideas are not immediate objects. But he does not 
agree that knowledge is confined to immediate objects. And, 
even if Locke's extension of knowledge to include the sensitive 
knowledge of the existence of objects actually present to the 
senses is taken into account, he still thinks such a view of 
knowledge is much too narrow. For, prima facie at least, it 
seems more plausible to claim that, in the relevant ordinary 
sense of 'know', I know that all men are mortal, that Germany 
and England fought a war from 1914 to 1918, that water boils 
at 100^ C, or that the telephone downstairs is still black, 
than to claim that, in the same sense, knowing is, necessarily 
restricted to immediate objects, abstract ideas or otherwisei"»
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Ill THE EXTENT OF HUI^ IAN KNO’CLEDGE
1. Knowledge and Certainty
Tucked away at the end of his chapter on the extent of 
human knowledge (E IV iii, pp 190-225) is a general boundary 
set by Locke which deserves more attention in view of points 
raised in the preceding discussion. In substance, it amounts 
to the claim that the knowledge of general truth is acquired 
only by the contemplation of our own abstract ideas, whereas 
the knowledge of particular truth is acquired only by experi­
ence - where (rouglily) a particular truth is one which entails 
an existential proposition and a general truth does not. "So 
that as to all general knowledge we must search and find it 
only in our minds; and it is only the examining of our ovrn 
ideas that furnisheth us with that. Truths belonging to es­
sences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are eternal; and 
are to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences: 
as the existence of things is to be known only from experience." 
(E IV iii 31, pp 224-25; see also E IV vi 13, p.263; E IV ix 
1, p.303; E IV xi 13-14, pp 338-40).^
The claim that the knowledge of particular truths is acquired 
only by experience faces a possible problem in connection 
with 'God exists* and the Ontological Argument; Leibniz ex­
pressly accepts a qualified form of such an argument, while 
Locke, although he does not use it, does not reject it as 
being invalid in the Essay - see E IV x 7, PP 310-12 and 
Leibniz*8 comments, pp 502-04, G 4l8-19; in his manuscript 
material, however, there is evidence that Locke does reject 
it; see Aaron, John Locke, p.242; and see below, pp 165-67.
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As I have more or less assumed thus far, knowledge ac­
quired solely by examining our abstract ideas is, for Locke, 
the knowledge of necessary truth. This is clear, I think, 
from the fact that (a) in discussing the perception of the 
agreement between ideas, where such ideas are general, Locke 
sometimes uses the expression * necessary agreement* (e.g., 
see E IV 1 2, p.168); (more pointedly) (b) in arguing for his 
thesis that we can have little knowledge of general truth con­
cerning substances because we are unable to perceive (instruc­
tive) agreement between the relevant ideas, he rests his 
argument squarely on the point that we cannot perceive a 
necessary (instructive) connection between the relevant ideas 
(e.g., see E IV iii 9-17, pp 199-207; E IV vi 8-10, pp 256-59); 
and (c) he expressly claims that the type of knowledge conse­
quent upon examining abstract ideas is the knowledge of eternal 
truth (see E IV xi l4, pp 339-40; E III iii 19, pp 30-31; E IV 
i 9, p.174; E IV 111 31, p.224)/
Consequently, for Locke, the knowledge of general truth 
entails the knowledge of necessary connection - i.e., one can­
not know that something general is the case without knowing 
that it is necessarily so. And, therefore, in addition to the
In this connection, Locke sometimes suggests the "nominalis- 
tic" position that a proposition's necessary truth depends 
in some way upon the use of certain words; see also E IV 
vi 9, p.257; E IV viii, pp 292-302; and see below, pp 149- 
58.
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point that knowledge of "particulsj?" truth must be acquired 
(at least in part) by empirical means, it follows that any 
knowledge provided by empirical observation must be of "par­
ticulars".
Now, given this, in order (a) to simplify the topography 
of the following discussion, and (b) to minimise certain de­
batable issues raised in the preceding examination of percep­
tion and ideas (notably in connection with ideas in the tech­
nical sense of internal objects), Locke's general theory of 
knowledge might be put as follows;»
(Actual) knowledge is either (l) of necessary truth, or 
(2 ) concerning what one immediately experiences in the exis­
tential sense, or (3) concerning external objects which are 
"actually present to the senses", or (4) of any truth strictly 
demonstrable from premises in (l), (2), or (3 ). From this^ 
it follows that the knowledge of general truth is necessarily 
of necessary truth and, given that external objects are not 
sensed by us in the existential sense, the only knowledge we 
can have concerning external objects must fall into (3) or 
(4) - two of the central planks in Locke's platform.
The points at which Leibniz differs from such a view 
can then be indicated as follows:
The knowledge of general truth need not be restricted 
to the knowledge of necessary truth, but may include, e.g., 
"assent" to a general (true) proposition on the basis of strong
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evidence - i.e., on the basis of grounds which do not logically 
entail the given proposition but nevertheless provide strong 
support for it. And the knowledge of particular truth need 
not be restricted to immediate objects or objects actually 
present to the senses (or to truths demonstrable from (l),
(2) and (3) above), but may include, e.g., "assent" to a par­
ticular (true) proposition in history on behalf of which strong 
evidence can be adduced by the person concerned.
Now, Leibniz does show some agreement with Locke's posi­
tion to the extent that he thinks that the knowledge of primi­
tive truth is either the (a priori) knowledge of self-evident 
necessary truth or the (a posteriori) knowledge of selected 
facts concerning oneself and one's ideas (see NE IV ii 1, 
pp 404-10, G 343-48; NE IV ix 2, p.499, G 4l5; for Locke's dis­
cussion of intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, see E IV ii 
1-13, pp 176-8 5). But, the point remains that he does not 
confine the knowledge of derivative truth to the extent that 
Locke does - i.e., does not confine such knowledge to truths 
which can be logically deduced from premises falling into (l), 
(2 ), (3 ) or (4) above. For, on Leibniz's view, either the 
premises might not fall into the indicated categories or the
argument might not be a deductive one.
It is now worthwhile, I think, to take a slightly.closer 
look at just how Leibniz makes the point that Locke's view of
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knowledge is restrictive relative to the relayant ordinary use 
of 'knowledge'. In the first instance, Leibniz writes: "it
is quite true that truth is always grounded in the agreement 
or disagreement of ideas, but it is not true in general that 
our knowledge of truth is a perception of this agreement or 
disagreement. For. when we know truth only empirically, from 
having experienced it, without knowing the connection of things 
and the reason there is in what we have experienced, we have 
no perception of this agreement or disagreement, unless we 
mean that we feel it in a confused way without being conscious 
of it. But your examples, it seems, show that you always de­
mand a knowledge in which one is conscious of connection or 
opposition, and this is what cannot be granted you." (lIE IV i 
1-2, p.400, G 338-39).
For convenience, I take the central point in this pas­
sage to be confined to the knowledge of general truth. Thus, 
the point seems to be that the knowledge of general truth is 
not necessarily restricted to the knowledge of necessary truth 
- and, since Leibniz does not qualify his use of words in 
making such a claim save to indicate that he is using 'know* 
in a "knowledge of truth" sense, we can correctly assume that 
he is here using 'knowledge' in an (appropriate) ordinary 
sense. Consequently, it seems acceptable to claim, on behalf 
of Leibniz, that in the (or any) appropriate ordinary sense of 
'knowledge', the knowledge of general truth is not restricted
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to the knowledge of necessary truth. Thus, he subsequently 
writes: "Opinion, based on probability, deserves perhaps the
name knowledge also; otherwise nearly all historic knowledge 
and many other kinds will fall." (NE IV ii l4, p.417, G 353; 
this remark therefore includes the knowledge of particular 
truths as well). In this case, he comes closer to stating 
expressly that 'knowledge*, in its ordinary sense, is not re­
stricted to the extent that Locke restricts it - i.e., that 
'knowledge' in its ordinary sense, can be correctly applied 
to "opinion based on probability", as well as to intuitive or 
demonstrative perception and "sensation". Thus, in the same 
section, he later states: "I also thinli that to these species
of . . . certain knowledge you can add the knowledge of the 
probable; thus there will be two sorts of knowledge, as there 
are two sorts of proofs, the first of which produce certitude, 
and the second end only in probability" (NE IV ii l4, p.420,
G 354; minus italics). But, he does not make it completely 
clear whether he feels that Locke (a) is using 'know' (and 
cognates) in a special restricted sense relative to ordinary 
usage, in such a way that the knowledge of general truth is 
necessarily the knowledge of necessary truth and the knowledge 
of particulsJT truth i^ necessarily knowledge concerning im­
mediate objects or objects actually present to the senses, and 
therefore uses 'know' in such a way that the claims in question 
are true but not as radical (and perhaps not as interesting)
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as they might first appear to be, or (b) is using 'know* in 
the appropriate ordinary sense, and is therefore mistaken in 
making certain of the claims under consideration.
Now, Leibniz allows for the possibility of Locke's using 
'knovr* in a special restricted sense by expressly seeking not 
to "dispute about terms" in this connection (see NE IV ii l4, 
p.417, G 353). In other words, the suggestion is that if 
Locke - for some reason or other^ - wants to use the word 
'knowledge' in such a way that 'The knowledge of general truth 
must be of necessary truth' is analytically true, this is his 
privilege. Indeed, Locke himself would whole-heartedly em­
brace this point. But, if he using 'knowledge' in a special 
restricted sense when he claims, e.g., that we cannot know thee 
existence of any finite external objects save those actually 
present to the senses, such a claim amounts to 'In a sense of 
"knowledge" in which knowledge must fall into one of,the cate­
gories (l)-(4) indicated above, one cannot know the>existence 
of etc.*. And, if Leibniz were to attempt to argue against
e.g., because, in a deductive argument, if the premises are 
true and the inference valid then the conclusion is neces­
sarily true; whereas, in a non-deductive argument, if the 
grounds are true and the inference sound, it is not neces­
sarily the case that the conclusion is true - or, at least, 
in a deductive argument, if one sees that the premises are 
true and the inference valid, one then sees that it neces­
sarily follows that the conclusion is true; whereas, in a 
non-deductive argument, if one sees that the grounds are 
true and the inference sound, one does not see that it 
necessarily follows that the conclusion is true; see E IV 
XV 1-3, pp 363-65.
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such a claim by using 'knowledge' in the wider ordinary sense, 
the result would simply be a verbal argument. And this is 
something he wants to avoid.
Nevertheless, Leibniz does, on occasion, seem to argue 
against Locke's claim and use 'knowledge* in its wider ordi­
nary sense in doing so (i.e., in NE IV i 2, p.400, G 338-39 
or NE IV ii l4, p.420, G 354). Before considering the signi­
ficance of this fact, however, it is first worth noting that 
if Locke is using 'knowledge' in a special restricted sense, 
and gives no indication - even a clear contextual one - that 
he is doing so, then, on his own principles, he can be criti­
cised for adopting a misleading use of'language (e.g., see 
E III X 6, p.126; E III xi 27, p.164). Leibniz does not carry 
the point to such lengths, partly, perhaps, because the task 
he sets himself is not simply to criticise but to "complete" 
Locke and he might feel that once he has made the point that 
the knowledge of general truth, in the relevant ordinary sense 
of 'knowledge*, is not necessarily restricted to the knowledge 
of necessary truth, he has fulfilled his objectives in this 
respect. Nevertheless, the latter point is of sufficient im­
portance to warrant emphasis - particularly for the purposes 
of sharpening the issues in the subsequent discussion of the 
extent of human knowledge in, e.g., physics or metaphysics - 
and one effective way of doing this is to direct attention to 
Locke's special use of * knowledge * by criticising him for
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inadequate advertising.
There seems, however, to be something more involved in 
this case than simply a special and misleading use of the word 
'knowledge*, For there seems to be some elementedf confusion 
on Locke's part between knowledge in the relevant ordinary 
sense and knowledge in the more restricted, special sense. 
Indeed, this is indicated by the fact that Leibniz uses 'know- 
ledge in the relevant ordinary sense and sets against Locke 
the claim that the knowledge of general truth is not neces­
sarily the knowledge of necessary truth, and yet cannot be 
readily accused of entering into simply a verbal argument on 
this point. Thus, although (e.g.) during the course of his 
argument that human knowledge concerning substances is severely 
limited, Locke often uses 'knowledge' in the special restricted 
sense indicated above (i.e., knowledge becomes "certain know­
ledge" and one must, analytically, perceive the appropriate 
agreement in order to know), he does not distinguish with suf­
ficient care knowledge in this sense from knowledge in the 
more customary sense. Consequently, on occasion at least, he 
seems to slip into making a claim about knowledge which would 
be true if (and only if) it were about knowledge in merely 
the special restricted sense but which, in confusion, covers 
knowledge in the more customary sense and is (therefore) not 
true. For instance, consider the passage: "We are not there­
fore to wonder, if certainty be to be found in very few
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general propositions made concerning substances: our know­
ledge of their qualities and properties goes very seldom 
further than our senses reach and inform us {presumably he 
lias in mind here the knowledge of particular truths concerning 
substance^ , Possibly inquisitive and observing men may, by 
strength of judgment, penetrate further, and, on probabilities 
taken from wary observation, and hints well laid together, 
often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to 
them. But this is but guessing still; it amounts only to 
opinion, and has not that certainty which is requisite to 
knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our o^m 
thoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our o^ vm 
abstract ideas." (E IV vi 13, p.263). Now it might be, and 
probably to some extent is, the case that Locke's use of ex­
pressions such as 'guessing' and 'opinion' is loosened rela­
tive to ordinary usage in order to fill the gap left by the 
restrictions imposed on 'knowledge'. Nevertheless, since he 
uses such expressions in the way that he does in this passage 
without giving any indication of special usage, it is plausible 
to claim that he does not clearly see the difference between 
guessing in the usual sense and guessing in a special sense 
in which, e.g., my judging that my wife went to work yester­
day, that fire burns, or that all men are mortal, are only 
guesses. In other words, in Locke's own terminology, he does, 
not clearly percèive the disagreement between the abstract
95.
idea signified by 'guessing' in its usual sense and the ab­
stract idea signified by 'guessing' in its special, looser 
sense. And a corresponding point holds concerning knowledge.
Indeed, one can introduce an ah hominem twist to the 
argument and note that Locke himself is constantly warning 
against confusion of this kind, in philosophy as well as in 
other disciplines. For instance, in discussing maxims he 
makes the point that employing maxims where our ideas are not 
"determined"^ can lead to trouble. He suggests, for example, 
that an over-reliance on the principle of identity can easily 
lead one to confuse body in the sense of extension with body 
in the sense of a solid extended substance and then to argue 
as follows: A vacuum is extension without body. Body is
extension. Therefore, a vacuum is extension without extension. 
Thus a vacuum is impossible (see E IV vii 12-13, pp 285-87; 
Locke perhaps does not develop the point in quite this fashion, 
but it seems to be what he is in part getting at). Other in­
stances of his attack on this and related types of confusion 
can be found in his discussion of the abuses of words (e.g., 
see E III X 6, pp 126-27) and of distinct and confused ideas 
(E II xxix 4-16, pp 487-96). Now, although Leibniz's pro­
gramme may not demand the ^  hominem dimension, it does demand 
that he malce clear just what Locke is claiming, what is wrong
^See "The Epistle to the Reader", pp 22-24, concerning his 
introduction of the term determined .
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V7ith it, and thereby disclose what is true. And the point 
that Locke's view of knowledge is to some extent confused is 
certainly relevant to this project.
A set of roughly parallel points can be made concerning 
Locke's views on certainty. For, according to his position, 
one can only be certain about anything if one perceives agree­
ment between ideas - i.e., knows something in his restricted 
sense. Thus, in distinguishing "certainty of knowledge" from 
"certainty of truth", he writes: "But that we may not be mis­
led in this case by that which is the danger everywhere, I 
mean by the doubtfulness of terms, it is fit to observe that 
certainty is twofold: certainty of truth and certainty of
knowledge. Certainty of truth is, when words are so put to­
gether in propositions as exactly to express the agreement or 
disagreement of the ideas they stand for, as really it is. 
Certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or dis­
agreement of ideas, as expressed in any proposition. This we 
usually call knowing, or being certain of the truth of any
proposition." (E IV vi 3, p.252).
Certainty of knowledge must therefore be sharply dis­
tinguished from certainty in simply the sense of being sure 
or being of firm persuasion. Indeed, Locke directs heavy cri­
ticism against "enthusiasts" who "are sure, because they are 
sure" and who believe that "their persuasions are right.
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because they are strong in them" (E IV xix 9, p.434), whereas
no such criticism can be directed against anyone who lets cer­
tainty be his guide (though both Locke and Leibniz would cri­
ticise a man who let only certainty in Locke's strict sense be 
his guide, to the exclusion of either "assurance" or well- 
grounded faith - on the grounds that such a person (a) aspires 
after what he as a mere man cannot attain, (b) demands some­
thing which is not necessary for his needs, and (c) refuses 
something which is both sufficient and necessary for his needs. 
Thus, Locke predicts an early death for anyone who sincerely 
demands certainty in all his beliefs and actions, e.g., see 
E IV xi 8-10, pp 332-36). Enthusiasts, then, are not certain 
in Locke's sense. Their minds are characterised by an in­
flexible conviction devoid of any reason whatsoever, and there­
fore devoid of the perception of agreement between ideas.
Since certainty is (roughly^) tied to the perception of 
agreement between ideas, however, it must also be distinguished 
from mere "assurance" or "confidence" - e.g., from the kind of 
conviction we can have in the truth of a proposition in physics 
for which there is strong support, or a proposition in a law- 
court ascribing a crime to a particular man and on behalf of 
which there is very strong evidence; for in neither case do we 
perceive agreement between the relevant ideas (G.g ., see E IV
I'Roughly' because of Locke's admission of sensitive knowledge.
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xvi 6-8, pp 375-76). And it is at this point that Locke's 
use of 'certainty' tightens up relative to the, or at least 
a, corresponding ordinary use. For, in the, or at least a, 
relevant ordinary sense (waiving any objections that ordinary 
uses of 'being certain' are not as sensitive to the distinc­
tion between being certain and simply being sure asd this dis­
cussion might suggest), a scientist, e.g., can be certain 
about the truth of a given proposition without seeing that it 
is necessarily true, or a man can be certain about a particu­
lar truth even though the particulars involved are neither 
immediate objects to him nor actually present to his senses, 
and have not been immediate objects or actually present to his 
senses. Moreover, as in the case of knowledge, Locke is not 
always too clear on the distinction between certainty in his 
restricted sense and certainty in the looser sense. Thus 
Leibniz at one point comments: "But if experience justifies
these consequences in a constant manner, do you not find that 
you can acquire certain propositions by this means? Certain,
I say, at least as those which assert, for example, that the 
heaviest of our bodies is fixed and that the one which is 
after it the heaviest is volatile, for it seems to me that the 
certainty (understanding it as moral or -physical), but not the 
necessity (or metaphysical certainty) of these propositions 
which are learned by experience alone and not by analysis and 
the bond of ideas, is established among us and with reason."
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(n e IV vi 13, pp 461-62, G 386-87; see also NE IV vi 8, p.
460, G 385-86, where he speaks of "experimental certainty"; 
and NE IV xi 1-10, p.513, G 426, where he distinguishes be­
tween "luminous" and practical certainty).
No doubt there is, in (at least technical) ordinary 
usage, a sense of 'certain' as applied to propositions in 
which a general proposition is certain if and only if it is 
necessarily true. Thus, Leibniz himself contrasts certitude 
or certain knowledge (i.e., knowledge of propositions which 
are certain) with probability and knowledge of the probable 
(NE IV ii l4, p.420, G 354). Nevertheless, it need not follow 
that because, in ordinary usage, a general proposition is cer­
tain if and only if it is necessarily true, therefore, in or­
dinary usage, a man is certain of a general truth if and only 
if he "sees" that p (where p is a general proposition) and it 
is necessarily true that p. And, even if it were to follow, 
or aside from this argument, even if it is the case that there 
is in ordinary usage a sense of 'certain' in which certainty 
about general truths entails the knowledge of necessary truth, 
the important point here is'that Locke uses 'certain' in this 
way and on occasion confuses certainty in this sense with cer­
tainty in a looser sense.
Before moving on to the next general limitation on know­
ledge, however, it might prove worthwhile to note briefly a
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possible reason for Locke's restricting certainty and know­
ledge in the way that he does. In general, the reason would 
appear to be that, in those cases which fall inside the scope 
of knowledge for Locke, there are fewer possible ways of going 
wrong than in those cases falling outside. For instance, in 
the case of consenting to a general contingent proposition on 
the basis of evidence, one can either (l) go astray on the 
evidence itself, or (2) make a mess of drawing the inference 
(or both), or (3), given sound evidence and an equally sound 
argument, still be ivrong simply by virtue of the fact that 
the conclusion supported by the given evidence is false. On 
the other hand, in the case of assenting to a necessary truth, 
if the perception is intuitive (a mode of "perception" which is 
presumably impossible in the case of contingent general truths), 
then the only way of going astray is by misperceiving. If the 
perception is mediate, however, then one can either introduce 
false premises (and here the fallibility of memory is an im­
portant factor for Locke, though it equally applies to non- 
deductive inferences) or make an invalid inference; but given 
true premises and a valid inference, one cannot be mistaken 
as far as the conclusion is concerned, unlike cases of non­
deduct ive inferences, A point such as this could perhaps ex­
plain why Locke loosens his identification of knowledge ;fith 
the perception of the agreement oetween ideas to include sen— 
sitive knowledge. For, although in believing that there is
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now a round "red" object in front of me, given the fact that 
I now sense (in the non-existential sense) a round red object,
i.e., that I now have a sensible idea of a round red object, 
and to that extent have not gone wrong, I can still go v/rong 
insofar as I might be having a sensory illusion or hallucina­
tion in this respect, and to this extent a belief or "percep­
tion" concerning an immediate object has an advantage over a 
belief concerning an object which is merely actually present 
to the senses - although all this is true, nevertheless, be­
liefs concerning objects actually present to the senses them­
selves have an advantage insofar as a belief which concerns 
objects neither immediately present nor actually present to 
the senses might be right as far as what is sensed is concerned 
and as far as what is veridically sensed is concerned (i.e., 
the reasons one has for holding such a belief might be sound 
in this respect), and yet still be wrong. For, even though I 
suffer no sensory illusion, I might still be mistaken concerning
the area beyond my senses.
Nevertheless, if there is something in this point it can 
easily be taken to extremes. For instance, one might claim a 
"level" or "degree" of knowledge - say intuition - where there 
is no possible way of going wrong, i.e., wnere tne human mind 
is infallible. Thus, Locke describes as follows the (intuitive) 
perception of identity or diversity between ideas: "By this
the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree
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V7ith itself, and to be what it is; and all distinct ideas to 
disagree, i.e. the one not to be the other: and this -it does
without pains, labour, or deduction; but at first view, by its
natural power of perception and distinction . . . .  A man in­
fallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his mind, that 
the ideas he calls white and round are the very ideas they 
are; and that they are not other ideas which he calls red or 
square . . . .  Tliis then is the first agreement or disagree­
ment which the mind perceives in its ideas; . . . and if there
ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found to be 
about the names, and not the ideas themselves, whose identity 
and diversity will always be perceived, as soon and clearly as 
the ideas themselves are; nor can it possibly be otherwise."
(S IV i 4, pp 169-70). Indeed, the fact that Locke admits 
demonstration to be less "perfect" than intuition because de­
monstration, particularly in complex cases, often requires 
remembering the truth of the premises employed, and that, save 
for Some^'docrease in clarity, he acknowledges no other reason 
for its relative imperfection, tends to reinforce the view 
that, for him, "pure" perception itself is free from possible 
error (see E IV ii 6-7, pp 180-82). Error, rather, seems to 
lie largely in incorrect judgment, assent, belief, etc.
Now, in one sense of 'perception' (and related terms), 
perception does necessarily carry correctness with it. In 
this sense, perception simoliciter is knowledge. Nevertheless,
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(a) the fact that one cannot perceive incorrectly in this 
sense does not imply that the human mind has a power of infal­
lible perception in the sense with which we are here concerned; 
rather, (b) the very possibility of perception in a sense in 
which it has correctness i/ritten into it implies that percep­
tion, in the sense with which we are concerned, is fallible. 
For, all that, e.g., John's so-called infallible perception 
that 2t2~4 can amount to is something like 'John sees that 
2+2=4' in a sense which presupposes ' 24-2=4' , and this implies 
that John perceives that 2+2=4 in a sense in which '... per­
ceives that 2t2-4' does not presuppose that 2+2-4, i.e., in a 
sense in which it is possible for him to misperceive. And it 
is in the latter sense of 'perception', and only in the latter 
sense, that the question of the fallibility of perception is 
relevant to the question of whether the human mind is ever in­
capable of mistake.
Without becoming too involved, however, there seems to 
be a second way in which Locke's position can be taken too 
far - viz., to suggest that in any given case of, say, percep­
tion of necessary truth - either immediate or mediate- one has 
greater "evidence", or stronger reasons, or firmer grounds, 
for one's belief, assent, claim, or what have you, than in any 
possible case of, say, judging that such-and-such a proposition 
is true on the basis of (logically inconclusive) evidence, or 
even of "perceiving" that such-and-such a material object
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exists in front of me right now. Such a view seems deeply 
ingrained in Locke's notion of "degrees" of knowledge or cer­
tainty, and in the line he draws between knowledge and certainty 
on the one hand and mere judgment and assurance on the*, other. 
And it lends some support to the suggestion that Locke feels 
the claims he makes concerning knowledge hold for knowledge in 
the relevant ordinary sense - for otherwise, the line might 
not have been drawn so sharply.
Against such a view, one might introduce the following 
example where John has "seen" that such-and-such a mathematical 
proposition is true, but (l) at the time was suffering imper­
fect health, (2) he has not been able to "see" its truth since, 
and (3) generally speaking, he is not'a very good mathematician. 
Nevertheless, there is no room for doubting John's memory that 
he did "see" the truth of the given proposition because (i) his 
memory on this point is extremely clear; (ii) there are several 
witnesses to attest to the expression of 'EurekaI' at the time, 
though they are now unfortunately unable to bring about his 
vision once more; and (iii) his notebook also records the 
fact, but contains nothing to prompt his "seeing" its truth 
again. On the other hand, (and the following factors are 
known to John), a number of acknowledged, outstanding mathe­
maticians have gone on record as flatly denying the truth of 
the proposition in question and there is no recorded case of 
anyone else claiming its truth; unfortunately, however, any
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proofs which such mathematicians might possess are not acces­
sible to John. In such a case, then, the defence of the propo­
sition, from John's viewpoint, seems in a weaker position 
than Locke's account of the degrees of knowledge appears to 
allow. Similarly, concerning the alleged superiority of in­
tuition over demonstration, one might introduce cases where 
one immediately perceives a given proposition to be true, but 
subsequently mediately perceives it to be false, where the 
latter is more "evident" than the former.
The second point would obviously receive considerable 
support from the first point if the latter could be sustained 
(a fact which provides a further reason for ascribing the 
first point to Locke's position). For, if "pure" perception 
were infallible, then no form of fallible perceiving or judging 
or assent, etc. could ever occupy a superior position to pure 
perception.^ For instance, in the above example, John's 
having (purely) perceived the truth of the given mathematical 
proposition would necessarily clinch the issue. If anything, 
however, the first point is standing in a worse position than 
the second.
seoarate case would then have to be made out for the privi­
leged status of "sensitive knowledge", or remembering, or 
even "impure" perception.
io6.
2. The Origin of Ideas
Knowledge is impossible without ideas. For instance, 
one cannot know that 2+2*4 or that red is not white unless 
one can form the abstract ideas of 2+2, equality to 4, red, 
or white. Locke's theory of the origin of ideas therefore 
becomes significant in the context of a discussion of the 
extent of human knowledge. For, according to this theory, 
one cannot have an idea unless it originates in experience - 
i.e., unless it is either provided by sensation or reflection 
or derived from ideas which are so provided (see E II i 5, 
pp 124-25; S II i 24, p.142; E II xii 8, pp 216-17; E II xvii 
22, p.293).
For our purposes, the force of saying that an idea is 
derived from ideas provided by experience can at least ini­
tially be put as follows: an idea is derived from experience
if and only if it is of something which has already been ex­
perienced or can be broken down into component ideas of 
things which have already been experienced. For instance, 
the abstract idea of red is derived from experience if one 
has previously sensed red, or the image of a mermaid is de­
rived from experience if one has previously experienced 
"mermaid-component8".
According to Locke's position, then, one cannot have 
an abstract idea of a so-and-so unless one has previously 
experienced a so-and-so or the relevant components (a corres­
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ponding point, therefore, applies to being able to use words 
to refer to a so-and-so). Consequently, one cannot know any­
thing about colours, houses, metals, etc., without having had 
the appropriate experience (this must be carefully distinguished 
from the claim that one cannot know anything except by empiri­
cal observation or by inference from such observations).
For further clarification of his view on the origin of 
ideas, the following points might be kept in mind:
As far as Locke is concerned, his theory demands the 
temporal priority of the relevant experience, and not simply 
what might be called its "logical priority". In other words, 
he attempts to establish the point that any idea of x which 
is not provided by experience is temporally preceded (in the 
same mind) by an idea of x, or by ideas of the components of 
X, which is, or are, provided by experience - and not simply 
the point that any idea of x not provided by experience is 
such that it is possible to experience x or the components 
of X (see E II i 1-8, pp 121-27; E II i 20-24, pp 139-42). 
Admittedly, the following excerpted passage might suggest 
otherwise: "the order wherein the several ideas come at first
into the mind is very various, and uncertain also; neither is 
it much material to know it." (E II ix 7, p.185). Neverthe­
less, the context makes it clear that the order of ideas in 
which Locke here disclaims interest is the order of sensible
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ideas which the child first has - e.g., the sensible idea of 
light, or sensible ideas which are unaccompanied by pain - 
and not whether or not ideas not provided by experience are 
preceded by the appropriate ideas provided by experience.
Also, although he implies such a view, he is not solely 
concerned with maintaining the linguistic thesis that one can 
use a word to refer to x (i.e., to signify the idea of x) only 
if one has experienced x or x-components. Further, it follows 
from points made in the preceding paragraph that he is not 
satisfied with simply claiming that one can use a word to re­
fer to X only if it is possible to experience x or x-components.
He does not, however, go so far as to claim that it is 
logically impossible for anyone to have an abstract idea with­
out having had the correlative empirical idea(s), nor, there­
fore, does he imply that it is logically impossible to use a 
word to refer to x where one has not previously experienced x 
or x-components. Two points support this comment: (i) He
constantly appeals to experience on behalf of his claim, where­
as, as he himself clearly recognises,, if his claim were 
intended as a necessary truth, the empirical appeal would be 
logically out of place (e.g., see E II i 1, p.121: "for which
I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience";
E II i 5, p.125: "Let any one examine his own thoughts, and 
thoroughly search into his understanding"; and E II xi 15-17, 
pp 211-12). (ii) In discussing faith and the word of God, he
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admits the possibility of God communicating to a man a simple 
abstract idea with no empirical correlate (see E IV xviii 3, 
pp 416-17).
In claiming that all ideas originate in experience,
Locke roughly implies a theory of the ("descriptive or cogni­
tive") meaningfulness of sentences - viz., that a sentence is 
meaningful if and only if it is used to express a proposition 
all the component ideas of which originate in experience.^
Such a theory, however, is somewhat more generous than at 
least most of the various forms a verifiability criterion of 
meaning miglit take. For instance, his position, at least as 
far as he is concerned, readily admits claims such as 'God 
created matter as well as minds', and ' Hi ere is an eternal, 
most powerful, and most knowing Being* (see E IV x, pp 306-24)
- claims which are neither analytic nor verifiable in experi­
ence. It also admits as meaningful sentences which he himself 
uses to introduce various speculations concerning angels (e.g., 
see E II X 9, PP 199-200; E II xxiii 13, pp 404-05; E II xxiii 
36, pp 421-22). Indeed, many of the propositions he would 
consider to be "above reason" (see E IV xvii 23, pp 412-13;
E IV xviii, pp 415-27, passim) would probably fall outside the
For Locke's brief discussion of propositions, see E IV v 1-6, 
pp 244-47: and see S I iii 1, p.92, where he refers to 
ideas as "the parts out of which . . . propositions are 
made".
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scope of meaningful sentences as generally conceived by logical 
positivists. From Locke's viewpoint, then, ideas of God, 
creation, matter, mind, eternity, power, knowing, being, 
angels, etc. are all either originally provided by experience 
or derived from ideas so provided, and this is all that is 
necessary as far as the possibility of asserting such proposi­
tions is concerned.
Finally, in his brief remarks concerning the origin of 
relational ideas, he suggests the need for a qualification on 
his notion of * derived from experience'. For, he occasionally 
suggests that a relational idea is derived from experience if 
(though not only if) it "terminates in" ideas which, or ideas 
the components, of which, have been originally provided by ex­
perience. For instance, if, for the sake of argument, the re­
lational idea of a father can be broken doim into the idea of 
a man who is R to a baby (where R is a "pure" relation), then 
if the idea of R terminates in ideas which originate in ex­
perience, i.e., if the ideas of man and baby originate in 
experience, then the idea of a father is derived from, and 
therefore originates in, experience (see S II xxv.9, 11, pp 
431-43).
Locke is far from clear on this point, however. Thus, 
in another context he discusses "termination" as follows:
"all relation terminates in, and is ultimately founded on, 
those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection:
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so that all we . . , would signify to others, when we use 
words standing for relations, is nothing but some simple ideas, 
or collections of simple ideas, compared one with another.
This is so manifest in that sort called proportional, that 
nothing can be more. For when a man says 'honey is sweeter 
than wax,' it is plain that his thoughts in this relation ter­
minate in this simple idea, sweetness; which is equally true 
of all the rest: though, where they are compounded, or de­
compounded, the simple ideas they are made up of, are, perhaps, 
seldom taken notice of" (E II xxviii 18, p.483). In this pas­
sage, then, Locke suggests that an idea of a relation termin­
ates in a simple idea in the sense that the idea of sweeter 
than terminates in the simple idea of sweetness - and this is, 
or at least could be, a somewhat different notion of termina­
tion than the one sketched above, i.e., he could be taking 
literally the view that ascribing a relation is a matter of 
"comparing" ideas. If this is the notion he is employing in 
claiming that all relational ideas terminate in simple ideas, 
however, his thesis loses its plausibility as far as "non­
proportional" relational ideas such as that of being beside, 
or moving something, or loving someone, are concerned. For, 
is there anything simple corresponding to being beside, or 
moving, or loving, as sweetness corresponds to being sweeter 
than? Such a question therefore hangs over Locke as he con­
tinues: "v.g. when the word father is mentioned: first,
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there is meant that particular species, or collective idea, 
signified by the word man; secondly, those sensible simple 
ideas, signified by the word generation; and, thirdly, the 
effects of it, and all the simple ideas signified by the word 
child." (E II xxviii 18, p.483; and see also his analysis of 
'friend* in the remainder of the passage). Does the word 
* generation* signify a set of simple ideas in the special sense 
in which the expression 'being sweeter than' might be said to 
signify the simple idea of sweetness? As is often the case 
with Locke, however, it is prudent not. to put too fine a point 
on this.
His promised investigation of the empirical origins of 
the relational idea of cause-effect sheds little liglit on the 
question at hand (see E II xxvi 1-2, pp 433-35), although he 
does suggest that we can observe one.being bringing about a 
change in, or bringing about the existence of, another being, 
and he does'not add that the idea of production terminates in 
some simple idea('s) in the way that the idea of being sweeter 
than terminates in the idea of sweetness. As a summary, he 
is content with the vague: "the notion of cause and effect
has its rise from ideas received by sensation or reflection; 
and . . . this relation, how comprehensive soever, terminates 
at last in them. For to have the idea of cause and effect, it 
suffices to consider any simple idea or substance, as begin­
ning to exist, by the operation of some other, without knowing
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the manner of that operation (E II xxvi 2, p.435; see also,'
E II xxi 1-2, pp 308-10).
Finally, while discussing active and passive power, in 
claiming that "bodies, by our senses, do not afford us so
clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from
reflection on the operations of our minds" (E II xxi 4, p.311), 
he suggests that the idea, e.g., of my moving my hand, as dis­
tinct from the idea of myself and of my hand, is provided by 
experience (reflection alone?), and does not terminate in a 
simple idea in the way that the idea of sweeter than terminates 
in the simple idea of sweetness, or (if there j.s a difference) 
in the way that the idea of father terminates in the ideas of 
man and baby (components). And a corresponding point might be 
made concerning the claim: "We are abundantly furnished with
the idea of -passive power by almost all sorts of sensible 
things. In most of them we cannot avoid observing their sen­
sible qualities, nay, their very substances [ij , to be in a 
continual flux." (E II xxi 4, p.311).
Precisely what Locke is claiming with respect to the
notion of a relational idea terminating in experience is thus 
difficult to tell. But, even if we adopt a flexible criterion 
in the face of vagueness and say on his behalf that (rougiily) 
a relational idea terminates in experience either (a) if it or 
its components have been originally provided by experience 
(where relational and non-relational ideas can equally count
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as components), or (b) if the ideas of any relata involved, 
or their components, have been originally provided by experi­
ence, or (c) if the non-relational components originate in 
experience and the relational components terminate in non­
relational ideas which originate in experience in the sense 
that the relational idea of sweeter than terminates in the 
non-relational idea of sweetness, such a claim still consti­
tutes a qualification on his theory of the origin of ideas as 
he initially, and for the most part, presents it. Indeed, in 
his various general statements of the theory - He.] aside 
from the specific application of the theory to relational 
ideas - the only clue he gives to such a notion of 'derived 
from experience' in the Essay is contained in an alteration 
made in the fourth edition to the following passage, from 
"and the compositions made out of them" to "combinations and 
relations": "These [i.e., ideas of sensation and reflection],
when we have taken a full survey of them, and their several 
modes, [combinations, and relations^. we shall find to contain 
all our whole stock of ideas" (E II i 5, p.124; the second set 
of square brackets are Locke's). Otherwise, the notion of 
derivation he conveys is that according to which an idea de­
rived from experience is simply either originally provided by 
experience or composed of ideas originally provided by experi­
ence (where the component ideas may be relational or non­
relational).
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Before introducing and developing his theory of the 
origin of ideas, Locke feels it is first necessary to criti­
cise in some detail the view that ideas and principles are 
innate - in the literal sense in which an innate idea is 
"received by the mind in its very first being" (see E I pp 
37-118). Thus, in this sense of 'innate', even the sensible 
ideas of warmth and hunger had by a baby in the womb fail to 
count as innate ideas (see E II ix 5-7, pp 184-85).
In passing, one might note that the fact that He feels 
compelled to reject innateness in this sense lends ^ further 
support to the view that he is concerned with the origin of 
ideas in a temporal sense - i.e., that he is arguing that 
ideas or their components are not (temporally) first had at 
the moment of creation but, rather, are (temporally) first 
had in sensation or reflection (see E II i 1-2, pp 121-22). 
For, if he were only concerned with establishing, on the posi 
tlve side, that all our ideas are such that it is possible to 
experience what each idea is of, then the question of their 
innateness would be of far less importance - since an innate 
idea which is of some possible object of experience itself 
seems quite possible, whereas an innate idea which originates 
in experience in the temporal sense is impossible, given that 
one is not having the relevant experience at the moment of 
creation.
He is careful to point out that he is not contesting
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innate principles or ideas in any "dispositional" sense, in 
which an idea or principle is innate if one has the capacity 
at the moment of creation to frame (eventually) the given 
idea or see the truth of the given principle (see E I i 5, 
p.4l; E l i  22, p.56). In this connection, he also points 
out that one's use of 'innate' in this sense can be misleading; 
and he highlights a possible confusion by noting that the 
claim for innate ideas in this sense implies that any truth 
a man comes to know is innate and that several truths he will 
in fact never come to know are innate (i.e., because he still 
has the capacity to know them) - consequences which a,dvocates 
of innate ideas in this sense m i ^ t  find unpalatable because 
they fail to distinguish clearly innateness in the disposi­
tional sense from innateness in the literal sense.
Leibniz differs from Locke's position on some very 
fundamental points.
He holds that all ideas are innate in a literal sense, 
but is careful to distinguish the idea, as object of percep­
tion, from the act of perception and to point out that the 
ideas we have at the moment of creation are unconsciously or 
confusedly perceived. Thus, although ideas are innate, the 
actual conscious perception (apperception) of them is not:
"when you say that ideas come to us from one or the other of 
these causes, I understand the statement to mean their actual
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perception, for I think I have shov/n that they are in us be­
fore they are [ap] perceived" (NE II i 2, p. Ill, G 101). "l
distinguish only between ideas and thoughts; for we always 
have all pure or distinct [?] ideas independently of the senses; 
but thou^ts always correspond to some sensation." (NE II i 
23, p.119, G 108). "if the idea were the form of thou^t, it 
would spring up and cease with the actual thought to which it 
corresponds; but being the ob.ject it may exist previous to 
and after the thoughts." (NS II i 1, p. 109, G 99). "l agree 
that the knowledge, or better, the actual consideration 
(envi sagement). of ideas and truths is not innate, and that 
it is not necessary that we have distinctly known them in a 
former state of being, according to Plato's doctrine of remi­
niscence. But the idea being taken for the immediate internal 
object of a notion, 1 ; there is nothing to prevent its
always being in us, for these objects can subsist when they 
are not|apj perceived." ("Specimen of Thoughts upon the First 
Book of the Essay on Human Understanding", Langley, p.21,
G 21).^
As far as the question of innate capacities is concerned.
^For his defence of the notion of unconscious perception and 
its application to the innateness question, see especially 
his criticism of Locke's claim that the mind does not always 
thinlc, NE II i 9-23, pp 111-19, G 101-08, and his remarks 
in the Preface indicating the explanatory force of the no­
tion, pp 47-53, G 46-52, as well as the general discussion 
in NE I i-iii, pp 64-108, G 62-98.
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he diverges from Locke in holding that there are no bare 
capacities or powers for framing ideas, forming propositions, 
seeing truth, etc. Rather, the capacity for framing an idea 
seems to involve some "action", i.e., to involve having the 
idea "virtually" - which, presumably, involves unconscious or 
confused perception. Roughly, then, innate mental capacities 
involve innate mental (unconscious) acts: "You may perhaps
reply that this tabula rasa of the philosophers means that the 
soul has by nature and originally only,bare faculties. But 
faculties without some act, in a word the pure powers of the 
school, are also only fictions, which nature knows not, and 
which are obtained only by the process of abstraction. For 
where in the world will you ever find a faculty which shuts 
itself up in the power alone without performing any act?
There is always a particular disposition to action, and to one 
action rather than to another. And besides the disposition 
there is a tendency to action, ~of which tendencies there is 
always an infinity in each subject at once; and these .tenden­
cies are never without some effect." (NE II i 2, p.110, G 100), 
"And is it the same thing to have a thing without using it as 
to have only the faculty of acquiring it? If that were so, 
we should never possess anything but the things which we 
enjoy; instead of which, we know that, besides the faculty and 
the object, some disposition in the faculty or in the object, 
or in both, is often necessary, that the faculty may exercise
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itself upon the object." (NE I i, p.80, G 75). "For if the 
soul resembled these blanli tablets, truths would be in us as 
the figure of Hercules is in the marble, when the marble is 
wholly indifferent ■ to the reception of this figure or some 
other. But if there were veins in the block which should in­
dicate the figure of Hercules rather than other figures, this 
block would be more determined thereto, and Hercules would be 
in it as in some sense innate, although it would be needful 
to labor to discover' these veins . . . .  Tlius it is that 
ideas and truths are for us innate, as inclinations, disposi­
tions, habits, or natural potentialities, and not as actions; 
althou^i these potentialities are always accompanied by some 
actions, often insensible, which correspond to them.
"it seems that our clever author claims that there is 
nothing virtual in us, and indeed nothing of which we are not 
always actually conscious; but he cannot take this rigorously""" 
(I'lE Bref., p.46, G 45; I quote liberally because the use of
'disposition', among other things, makes the interpretation
1
adopted here to some extent debatable. See also, Î)ÎE I i.
In this connection, one could distinguish dispositions or 
tendencies from simple abilities or faculties in a sense 
(or senses) of 'disposition' in which dispositions do not 
entail (concurrent) acts. But if this is the distinction, 
or the sole distinction, on which Leibniz bases his point, 
then - aside from any question of the truth of his claim - 
in claiming there are innate ideas in the sense that there 
are the appropriate innate dispositions, (a) he is not using 
'innate' in Locke's sense, and (therefore) (b) is entering 
into a largely verbal disagreement in this respect, and (c) 
is leaving himself open to a Lockean charge of a misleading 
use of 'innate' and of some confusion on this issue.
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pp 72-84, G 68-80, passim; NE II xxi 1, pp 174-75, G 155-56). 
Thus, in constantly bringing against Locke the point that 
ideas are innate because the mind is from the start "disposed" 
to form such-and-such ideas, or to see such-and-such truths, 
Leibniz is not simply entering into a verbal disagreement. 
Moreover, he is prepared to admit that ideas the mind eventu­
ally consciously frames, or truths the mind eventually comes 
to know consciously, or many (indeed, perhaps, even all) truths 
the mind does not in fact come to know consciously, are innate 
in the dispositional sense, and to claim that they are there­
fore innate in an occurrent sense (granting their "virtual" 
status).
Confining the point to apperceived ideas, however,
Leibniz is willing to accept Locke's thesis that there are no 
innate ideas, but he cannot accept the further claim that all 
ideas originate in experience. For, his system of immaterial, 
mental substances acting in accordance with a pre-established 
harmony demands that nothing can literally act upon, or cause 
anything to happen in, the mind. Indeed, in reality, there 
are no sense-organs or external physical objects. Consequently, 
strictly speaking, it is not true to claim that any ideas are 
produced by the action of external physical objects on our 
sense organs: "taking action in metaphysical strictness as
that which takes place in substance spontaneously and from 
its omi depths, that alone is, properly speaking, a substance
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which is active, for all arises for it from itself after God; 
it being impossible for one created substance to have influ­
ence upon another . . . .  As for motion, it is only a real 
phenomenon, because matter and mass to which motion belongs 
is not properly speaking a substance. But there is an image 
of action in motion as there is an image of substance in mass 
. . . .  I allow bodies only an image of substance and action, 
because that which is composed of parts cannot pass, to speak 
accurately, as one substance, any more than a flock" (lIE II 
xxi 72, pp 218-19, G 195-96).
Nevertheless, since Leibniz does admit that things like 
motion, mass, body, and physical influence are "well-founded" 
phenomena, he accepts an analogical sense of expressions such 
as 'bodies acting upon the sense-organs to produce ideas in 
the mind', in which one can truly claim that some ideas are 
produced by the senses, and therefore that some ideas originate 
in experience (see the parts omitted from the passage quoted 
above from NE II xxi 72, pp 218-19, G 195-96). Even given 
this, however, he refuses to allow that all ideas originate 
in experience: "l believe even that all the thou^ts and acts
of our soul come from its own depths, with no possibility of 
their being given to it by the senses . . . .  But . . . ac­
commodating myself to the received expressions, since in fact 
they are good and tenable, and one can say in a certain sense 
that the external senses are in part causes of our thoughts.
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I shall consider how . . . one must say even in the common 
system (speaking’ of the action of bodies upon the soul, as 
the Gopernicans speak with other men of the movement of the 
sun, and with cause), that there are some ideas and some 
principles which do not come to us from the senses, and which 
we find in ourselves without forming them, although the senses 
give us occasion to perceive them." (EE I i 1, p.70, G 66-67).
Thus, he says things like "The ideas which are said to 
come from more than one sense, like those of space, figure, 
motion, rest, are rather from common-sense, that is to say, 
from the mind itself, for they are ideas of the pure under­
standing, but related to externality, and which the senses 
make us perceive [i.e., which the senses "occasion"]] ; they are 
also capable of definition and demonstration." (EE II v, p. 
129, G 116). Such ideas, combined with those provided by 
reflection, he often refers to as intellectual or intelligible 
ideas, opposing them to (confused) sensible ideas, and linliing 
them with necessary truths: "The intellectual ideas, which
are the source of necessary truths, do not come from the 
senses; and you admit that there are some ideas which are due 
to the reflection of the mind upon itself. For the rest, it 
is true that the express knowledge of truths is subsequent 
. . . to the express knowledge of ideas; as the nature of 
truths depends upon the nature of ideas, before we expressly 
form one or the other, and the truths, into which enter ideas
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which come from the senses, depend upon the senses, at least 
in part. But the ideas which come from the senses are con­
fused, and the truths which depend upon them are likewise con­
fused, at least in part; while the intellectual ideas, and the 
truths dependent upon them, are distinct, and neither the one 
nor the other have their origin in the senses, although it may 
be true that we would never think of them without the senses." 
(NE I i 11, p.82, G 77). The importance of the link with neces 
sary truths apparently consists in the fact that, because the 
knowledge of necessary truth is not acquired by empirical forms 
of inquiry but is acquired by "looking within the mind itself", 
therefore the ideas involved do not originate in sense-experi- 
ence^ - although he admits that the apperception of such ideas 
is "occasioned" by the senses, i.e., "that we would not con­
sider the ideas in question if we had never seen or touched 
anything" (NE I i, p.78, G 74)
Still, things are not quite as neat and tidy with 
Leibniz's commentary as they might at first appear. For
1 
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Indeed, in their "virtual" form, they must therefore be 
innate as well,.according to Leibniz.
The link between necessary truths and "intellectual (dis­
tinct, non-sensible) ideas" might account for his question­
able treatment of, e.g., 'The sweet is not bitter' as a 
"sensible truth" to which-an a -priori axiom is applied; see 
NE I i 11, p.84, G 79; and "Specimen of Thoughts upon the 
First Book of the Essay on Human Understanding", Langley, 
p.23, G 23. For the argument from the knowledge of neces­
sary truth to intelligible ideas and their innateness, see 
NE I i, pp 78-81, G 73-76.
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instance, he does not always sufficiently credit Locke with 
the point that the knowledge of necessary truth is not ac­
quired via empirical means, but is, rather, acquired solely 
by examining one's abstract ideas (e.g., see Leibniz's re­
marks in his Preface, pp 43-45, G 42-44, which even tend to 
suggest that Locke does not recognise the point at all).
Now, if I understand Leibniz's argument correctly, his view 
is (roughly) that because necessary truths are (known) a 
priori.^ therefore the ideas involved (a) do not originate in 
experience and (b) are innate (he also variously applies the 
argument to truths and knowledge, but we are not concerned 
with such variations). Consequently, according to his view, 
the point that some truths are necessary truths and therefore 
knovm a priori is extremely relevant to the question of the 
origin and innateness of ideas. Tlierefore, he is fully■ en­
titled to suggest that Locke does not attach sufficient impor­
tance to the point in question while discussing origin and 
innateness. Nevertheless, he is not entitled to suggest that 
Locke does not attach sufficient importance to the point out­
side this context (indeed, as has been suggested, Locke relies 
heavily on just such a point in restricting the possibilities 
of knowledge in the natural sciences, metaphysics, etc.), and, 
because Locke does clearly recognise the point but feels that
^See, e.g., NE IV ix 2, p.499, G 4l5, for his use of this 
expression.
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It is not incompatible with his position on origin and innate­
ness, it is therefore incumbent upon Leibniz to produce argu­
ments to show such an incompatibility - arguments which he 
does not produce. Indeed, the way he presents his case often 
exposes'him to the charge of confusing the question of the 
origin of knowledge in the sense of * How do we know such-and- 
such a truth (viz., a posteriori or a priori? )? * with the 
question of the origin of knowledge in the sense of *How do 
we originally com'e- by the ideas involved in such-and-such 
knowledge (viz., experience or otherwise?)?*. As the preceding 
discussion indicates, I hope, to rest a criticism of Leibniz 
merely on the ascription of this confusion would constitute a 
gross oversimplification of his views; but the fact that such 
a charge can with some plausibility be brought against him is 
symptomatic of the basic point that his argument from the a 
priori character of the knowledge of necessary truth to ideas 
which do not originate in experience needs developing.
In this connection, it is also interesting to note that, 
in introducing the knowledge of necessary truth, Leibniz makes 
no attempt to show that the idea of logical necessity - and 
therefore the related idea of an essence - cannot originate in 
experience, given the principle that Locke himself sanctions, 
viz., that no type of empirical inquiry can provide the percep­
tion of (logically) necessary connection. Such a criticism, 
of course, would eventually involve coping with Locke * s theory
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of essences (notably, that the essences we know are merely 
abstract ideas, which, in turn, are what general terms signi­
fy), and his suggested theory of necessary truth (particularly 
the suggestion that necessary truths, as in the case of nominal 
essences, depend upon what abstract ideas we use our general 
terms to signify), but it would also enrich a consideration 
of the origin of ideas in relation to the knowledge of neces­
sary truth.
Another respect in which Leibniz*s commentary weakens 
to some extent concerns the way in which he introduces ideas 
of reflection. For, he does not emphasise the point that such 
ideas do not prima facie constitute counter-examples to any­
thing claimed by Locke - indeed, they are clearly demanded by 
his theory of the origin of ideas. Thus, in simply referring 
to ideas of reflection as * intellectual ideas*, Leibniz does 
nothing to "improve" Locke*s position. Moreover, in making a 
statement such as the following, he does not make things any 
better: ’’Perhaps our clever author will not wholly differ
from my view. For after having employed the whole of his 
first book in rejecting innate intelligence, taken in a cer­
tain sense, he nevertheless . . . admits that ideas, which do 
not originate in sensation, come from reflection. Now reflec­
tion is nothing else than attention to what is in us, and the 
senses do not give us what we already carry with us. That 
being so, can it be denied that there is much that is innate
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in our mind, since we are innate, so to speak, in ourselves? 
and that there is in us: being, unity, substance, duration, 
change, action, perception, pleasure, and a thousand other 
objects of our intellectual ideas? And these objects being 
immediate to our understanding and always present . . . what 
wonder that we say that these ideas with all depending upon 
them are innate in us?” (lIE Pref., p.45, G- 45). For one 
thing, in admitting that an idea such as that of substance is 
provided by reflection (see also NE I iii 18, p.105, G 96;
”Specimen of Thoughts upon the Second Book”, Langley, pp 23- 
24, G 23), unless further arguments are introduced to show 
that ideas of reflection could not consistently be considered 
as originating in experience - i.e., that Locke’s theory it­
self is internally incoherent in accepting reflection as a 
form of experience - Leibniz is in effect removing a possible 
troublemaker for such a theory - and a troublemaker which 
Locke himself is not eager to dismiss quite so easily (see E 
I iii 19, pp 107-08; E II xiii 17-20, pp 228-31; E II xxiii 
2, 3, pp 391-94). Secondly, much more than simply saying it 
is so is required to show that an idea of reflection is neces­
sarily innate in the sense in which Locke is rejecting innate 
ideas - if this is what Leibniz is driving at. At the very 
most, Locke might accept the thesis that from a certain inde­
terminate point in the womb, the foetus has certain experiences 
- e.g., of motion, warmth (see E II ix 5-7, pp 184-85) - and.
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insofar as these are conscious experiences (see his suggestion 
that all experience is conscious, E II i 19, pp 138-39), that 
it has "reflective ideas’’^  of itself and certain of its opera­
tions. But he would probably reject the claim that, at the 
very first moment of creation, the foetus undergoes any form 
of experience. And, even if he were to accept highly rudimen­
tary forms of experience riglit from the very start and to 
accept corresponding "reflective ideas", admitting innate 
ideas of this type would imply neither the innateness of prin­
ciples nor the innateness of ideas to the extent that Leibniz 
seems to want them. Moreover, such "innate" ideas would ex 
hypothesi originate in experience. And, thirdly, taking a 
clue from the eagression "so to speak", if Leibniz is simply 
claiming that the indicated ideas are innate 5^ the sense that 
they are ideas of reflection, the point amounts to little more 
than the idle * Ideas of reflection are ideas of reflection*, 
and points of the kind which Locke himself brings against those 
who claim there are innate ideas while simply using *have 
innate ideas* to mean having an innate capacity to form ideas 
are not without application here. «
V/here a reflective idea must be distinguished from the type 
of idea involved in "attending" to oneself and therefore 
from an idea of reflection in this sense; Locke makes no 
effort to draw such a distinction, however. With the pos­
sibility of such a distinction in mind, a comparison of 
E II i 8, pp 126-27, where he demands attention and effort 
as a condition of reflection, with E II i 25, pp 142-43, 
where he claims that all "simple" ideas - presumably of 
sensation and reflection alike -~are completely passive, is 
interesting.
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Leibniz himself, prior to ^/riting the New Essays, points 
out that the possibilities of ambiguities in any discussion of 
innateness are high (see "Specimen of Thoughts upon the First 
Book of the Essay on Human Understanding", Langley, p.22,
G 21), and it is to be regretted that he does not put more ef­
fort into sorting out the relevant distinctions - indeed, the 
very distinction between the claim that all ideas originate in. 
experience and the claim that no ideas are innate could use 
sharpening. Part of the reason for his shortcomings in this 
respect, however, might rest in the fact that he also feels 
that the question of innateness is not a preliminary one in 
philosophy - in the sense that it requires considerable in­
vestigation of other questions before it can be settled (see 
"On Locke*s Essay on Human Understanding", Langley, p.15, G 15- 
16; one can see why he feels this in view of the somewhat com­
plicated position he does adopt). In other words, he often 
seems to be more concerned with investigating what he considers 
to Toe preliminary questions - e.g., unconscious perception and 
the distinction between the way we know necessary and contin­
gent truths - than with dealing with innateness and the origin 
of ideas in a more direct fashion, feeling, perhaps, that once 
the former are settled the latter readily fall into place. In 
this respect, however, the situation is even more complicated 
than he allows; for innate ideas do not readily fall into 
place.
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Given the philosophical perspective from which Leibniz
is witing, it is not surprising that he does not consider a
contention such as, 'Since knowing how to apply the word "x",
%
or (at least) knowing how to apply words correctly to x, or 
knowing how to apply correctly words which mean x, is suffi­
cient for having^he idea of x, therefore one need not, e.g., 
see a colour in order to have the idea of a colour - i.e., a 
blind man can then have the idea of red, given that he can 
apply words correctly to red*.^ Nevertheless, he might have 
been expected to take some of the counter-examples he intro­
duces against Locke* s position - e.g., the idea of absolute 
infinity and the suggestion that "the origin of the notion of 
the infinite comes from the same source as that of necessary 
truths" (NE II xvii 16, p.164, G 146) - and to attempt to 
demonstrate with greater force their status as genuine counter­
examples.
On the other hand, it would not have been too surprising had 
Locke, with his concern for words and his view that abstract 
ideas are what words signify, considered such a claim - 
though, if consistent, he would probably have opposed certain 
elements in it.
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3. Identity and Relation
At the beginning of Chapter iii of Book IV, Locke makes 
two general points which directly follow from his theory of 
knowledge; (l) "we can have knowledge no further than we 
have ideas" (E IV iii 1, p.190), and (2) "we can have no know­
ledge further than we can have perception of . . . agreement 
or disagreement" (E IV iii 2, p.190; where * perception of 
agreement or disagreement* includes sensitive knowledge).
Because of (l), anything which limits human ideas limits 
human knowledge, and the preceding section in part considered 
Locke* s theory of the origin of ideas in this light. In Book 
IV, in accordance with this theory, he adopts the view that 
knowledge falls short of the "reality of things" because our 
ideas are tied down to what we experience (see E IV iii 6, 
pp 191-92), Two distinguishable points are involved in such 
a view, however: (a) Tbere are many possible ideas which we
cannot in fact .have because our experience is so limited.
(b) There are many kinds of existing things of which we cannot 
have ideas because our experience falls short, not only of the 
way things could be, but also of the way things in fact are. 
That Locke holds both views is clear from the following remarks 
(remembering that (b) entails (a)): "all the simple ideas we
have are confined . . .  to those we receive from corporeal 
objects by sensation, and from the operations of our own minds 
as the objects of reflection. But how much these few and
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narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent 
of. all beings, will not be hard to persuade those who are not 
so foolish as to think their span the measure of all things 
. . . .  He that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, 
and goodness of the Creator of all things will find reason to 
think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, 
and impotent a creature as he will find man to be; who in all 
probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings 
. . . .  And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain 
to by our faculties are very disproportionate to things them­
selves, when a positive, clear, distinct one of substance 
itself, which is the foundation of all the rest, is concealed 
from us. But want of ideas of this kind , . . cannot be de­
scribed. Only this I think I may confidently say of it. That 
the intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly 
alike: that that part which we see of either of them holds no 
proportion with what we see not; and whatsoever we can reach 
with our eyes or our thou^ts of either of them is but a point, 
almost nothing in comparison of the rest." (E IV iii 23, PP 
213-14; see also E II ii 3, p. 146. In this connection, one 
might add that the human situation also receives poor marks 
from the other side of the fence since a whole range of those 
ideas we do possess - viz., ideas of secondary qualities - are 
without counterparts in the world; see E II viii 9-26, pp 169- 
82).
133.
Allowing for the fact that his appeal to the infinite 
power, wisdom and goodness of God as a reason for this view 
could well suggest otherwise, Locke would probably claim that 
his "confidence" in this point is at the most only a matter 
of assurance (hence his use of the expression * in all proba­
bility* ) and not a case of certainty, in his sense of * cer­
tainty* - for, according to his theory of knowledge he could 
not know the truth of such a contention. In this respect, 
then, the situation is somewhat parallel with his theory of 
the origin of ideas (thou^ the type of evidence in each case 
is significantly different).
Because of (2) above, not only does our knowledge fall 
short of the "reality of things" but it even falls short of 
those ideas which we are capable of having; for there are 
limits beyond which the human capacity for perceiving agree­
ment or disagreement cannot extend - limits which Locke pro­
poses to discuss by considering four kinds of perception, 
differentiated in terms of the four types of agreement he 
outlines near the beginning of his inquiry. Briefly, his 
position is: In the case of identity, our knowledge extends
as far as we have ideas (see E IV iii 8, p.199). In the case 
of relations, given the necessary ideas, the possibilities are 
virtually unlimited, or at least limits are not readily dis­
cernible (see E IV iii 18, p.207). In the case of co-existence, 
however, our powers of perception are "very short" (see E IV
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iii 9, p.199). And, in the case of existence, we are limited 
to the perception of (a) our own existence, (b) G-od* s exis­
tence, and (c) the existence of objects actually present to
the senses (see E IV iii 21, p.212).
Although he disagrees in a number of ways with Locke * s 
theory of the origin of ideas, Leibniz does not express, and 
presumably has no desire to express, any distaste for the 
view that our (conscious) ideas fall short of the "reality of 
things" (though he objects to Locke* s tendency to degrade man 
among intellectual beings a bit too much; see NE IV iii 23, 
p.439, G 369). But he does disagree - or at least implies 
disagreement - with a number of things Locke claims concerning 
the extent of human knowledge in the four indicated areas. 
Consequently, in the following discussion, I shall more or 
less follow the pattern set by Locke - beginning with the 
knowledge of identity and relations.
The knowledge of identity or diversity - e.g., the know­
ledge that black is black, or that white is not non-white, or 
that white is not black - is "so absolutely necessary, that
without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no ima­
gination, no distinct thoughts at all" (E IV i 4, p.169). 
Nevertheless, the knowledge of the truth of identical proposi­
tions, at least of the form *A is A* (or, presumably for Locke 
as well as for Leibniz, *If p then p*, or *Either it is the
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case that p or it is not the case that p*), does not carry us
very far, as far as Locke is concerned. For, although all
such propositions are "equally true, equally certain, and 
equally self-evident" they "tes.ch nothing but what every one 
who is capable of discourse knows without being told" (S IV 
viii 3, p.294). In this sense, then, such propositions are 
trifling: "they add no light to our understanding; bring no
increase to our knowledge" (E IV viii 1, p.292).
One must exercise some care in allocating cases to the 
class of identical propositions on Locke’s behalf. For he ex­
pressly and emphatically makes the point that he is using the 
expression * identical proposition* to mean "only such wherein 
the same term, importing the same idea, is affirmed of Itself 
. . . .  But if men will call propositions identical, wherein 
the same term is not affirmed of itself, . . . all that they 
say of propositions that are not identical in my sense, con­
cerns not me nor what I have said; all that I have said rela­
ting to those propositions wherein the same term is affirmed 
of itself." (E IV viii 3, p.295). Consequently, at least in 
this context, * identical proposition* is not used in a loose 
sense to include, e.g., *VJhite is not non-white* or *VJhite is 
not black* - i.e., is not used in the way in which Leibniz 
uses * identical * to cover negative as well as positive identi­
cals (e.g., * Black is not non-black* as well as * Black is
black*) and, amongst negative identicals, "disparates" (e.g.,
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* Black is not white*; see NE IV ii 1, pp 4o4-06, G 343-44).
Nor does it include all those propositions which for Locke 
assert identity or diversity. Therefore, his claim that iden­
tical propositions are trifling does not strictly imply that 
propositions such as * Black is not non-black* or * Black is 
not white* are trifling. Granting this, however, in view of 
his discussion of trifling propositions, there is no apparent 
reason for Locke not to claim that negative contradictory 
"identicals" (using * identical* in the looser Leibnizian sense) 
are just as trifling as positive identicals - although he 
might well have reservations about dismissing all propositions 
in the form of "disparates" on this score. Consequently, on 
the basis of his actual discussion of trifling propositions, 
one can say that, for Locke, the knowledge of identity and 
diversity is of trifling truths, with the possible rider that
* diversity* be confined to contradictories and not extended 
to include disparates.
Locke does not confine the charge of trifling to identi­
cal propositions in this sense, however: "Another sort of
trifling propositions is, when a part of the complex idea is 
predicated of the name of the whole; a part of the definition 
of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the 
genus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of 
less comprehensive terms." (E IV viii 4, p.296; minus italics). 
For instance, the proposition *A soft metal is a metal * - what
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Leibniz sometimes calls *a partial identical* or c'a semi­
identical* - is as trifling as *A metal is a metal*. Now, it 
is significant to note that in this class Locke also includes 
propositions such as *Lead is a metal* or *Every man is an 
animal * - i.e., propositions in which the verbal expression 
used to express the subject is not partially repeated in the 
verbal expression used to express the predicate. It is there­
fore sufficient that the idea signified by the predicate- 
expression is a part of the idea signified by the subject- 
expression, irrespective of whether the sentence used to 
express the (mental) proposition is characterised by the indi­
cated verbal repetition - e.g., the proposition *A material 
object is extended * belongs to this class despite the fact 
that the expression *A material object* is not repeated in 
part in the predicate expression * is extended*. In other 
words, in singling out propositions of this type - eventually 
to be classified as trifling - Locke does not seem to be con­
cerned with the form of the sentence used to express the re­
levant mental proposition, but seems only concerned with whether 
the idea of the subject of the mental proposition contains the 
idea of the predicate - as in (e.g.) * A male sibling is male*. 
Thus, in the preceding sentence, instead of the sentence * A 
male sibling is male* I could have used the sentence *A brother 
is male* to introduce the mental proposition that a male sib­
ling is male without detracting from the "semi-identical" and
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therefore trifling character of my example.
Now, if his explanation of a completely identical pro­
position (e.g., *A man is a man*) is taken strictly, the class 
of completely identical propositions is not so loose in this 
respect. For, as previously noted, a completely identical 
proposition is one in which a word is "affirmed of itself", 
where the word in each case signifies the same idea. And this 
could, theoretically, exclude from the class of completely 
identical propositions a proposition in which the idea of the 
subject and the idea of what’the subject is asserted to be are 
the same, but where different vmrds are used to express the 
idea in each case - e.g., * Gold is a malleable, yellow metal* 
where * gold* means a malleable yellow metal, or *An animal is 
a brute* where * animal* simply means a brute.
Once again, however, in view of his treatment of semi- 
identicals there seems no reason for Locke to deny that the 
latter type of proposition is trifling. Indeed, in his dis­
cussion of semi-identicals, he makes the following remarks: 
"suppose a Roman signified by the word homo all these distinct 
ideas united in one subject, corporietas. sensibilitas, 
potentia se movendi, rationalitas,.risibilitas; he might, no', 
doubt, with great certainty, universally affirm one, more, 
or all of these together of the word homo, but did no more 
than say that the word homo, in his country, comprehended in 
its signification all these ideas." (S IV viii 6, p.297; my
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emphasis of *or all of these together*)} - remarks which in­
dicate that any distinction between, e.g., *A man is a man* 
and *A man is a rational, sensitive animal* where *man* means 
a rational, sensitive animal, is irrelevant in this context - 
i.e., is irrelevant from the viev.qpoint of picking out trifling 
propositions - whether * A man is a rational, sensitive animal* 
counts as an identical proposition or falls under some other 
name.
Thus, it is true to say, I thinlc, that Locke views any 
proposition of identical or semi-identical form as trifling, 
where (a) such a form is independent of whether 'or not there " 
is a corresponding verbal repetition in the sentence used to 
express the given proposition, and (b) where * identical* covers 
negative as well as affirmative varieties, provided (perhaps) 
that * negative identical* does not include disparates. Con­
sequently, although it is true that the knowledge of identity 
or diversity "extends as far as our ideas**, such knowledge 
(save, perhaps, for the knowledge of disparates) concerns only 
trifling propositions and is thus limited in this sense. It 
can therefore be contrasted with the "real instructive" know­
ledge of relations to be found in (e.g.) mathematics (see E IV
Locke*s "nominalistic" tendencies are here illustrated by 
the.suggestion that *A man is rational* simply amounts to 
* Tlie word "man" in part means being rational* ; see below, 
pp 149-58..
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viii 8, pp 298-99)4
Now, this whole discussion gains its full significance 
from the fact that Leibniz believes that (a) all necessary 
truths are identical in form (where * identical * includes 
propositions of the form *A is not non-A*, disparates and 
semi-identicals), and (b) (therefore) it is in theory possible 
to demonstrate the truth of any necessary proposition by using 
as premises only the principle of identity or contradiction 
plus the appropriate definitions (e.g., see NE IV xii 4-6, 
pp 521-24, G 432-34; NS IV vii 1, p.464, G 388; NE IV vil 11, 
p.473, G 395-96; i^ E IV viii 3, p.491, G 4lO).
For, if Leibniz is to retain this view and accept Locke*s
(implied) thesis that, with the possible exception of dis-
2
parates, all identical propositions are trifling, then he 
must admit that the knowledge of necessary truth - including 
mathematical truth - is in large part concerned only with
Real knowledge in this sense can be distinguished from the 
sense in which the knowledge that A is B is real if and only 
if there are instances of A and B, and the sense in which 
the knowledge that A is B is real if and only if, either 
given that one is concerned with existing things, there are 
instances of A and B, or, if one is not concerned with exis­
ting things, then the ideas of A and B are free from incom­
patibilities (i.e., in Locke*s terminology, in the latter 
case the ideas are their "own archetypes and the "reality" 
of any knowledge acquired.depends only on the internal coher­
ence of the ideas involved; see E IV iv pn 226-43; also E IV 
V 7-8, pp 247-49).
^i.e., using * identical* in Leibniz* s loose sense.
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trifling matters. Unfortunately, however, Leibniz does not 
see - at least in any clear way - the consequences of such a 
combination, and therefore does not attempt to criticise 
Locke* s theory from this viewpoint. For instance, had Leibniz 
followed the line of thouglit which surrounds his notion of a 
distinct idea as an idea of something the distinguishing 
characteristics of which can be given, or an idea the defini­
tion of which can be given (e.g., see NE II xxix 4, pp 266- 
67, G 237; also, ’’Reflections on Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas’’), 
he might have adopted a course of reasoning like the following: 
Consider a case where John is discussing a logical point 
and claims that one proposition (p) contradicts - another propo­
sition (q) in the sense of * contradicts* in which p contradicts 
q if and only if p entails q (i.e., as distinct from any sense 
which allows that p contradicts q if p entails neither-q-nor-q) 
In such a case, it would be possible for John to have an idea 
of contradiction without knowing that contradiction consists 
in implying the negation of some proposition, and that it is 
therefore distinct (e.g.) from contradiction in any sense which 
allows *p contradicts q if p entails neither-q-nor-^ despite 
the fact that * contradiction* simply m eans entailing the nega­
tion of a proposition. In this case, then, John does not know 
that contradiction is entailment of negation, despite the fact 
that the form of * Contradiction is entailment of negation* is 
identical and that he does know that entailment of negation
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is entailment of negation. Thus, in discovering that contra­
diction is entailment of negation John acquires a distinct, 
as opposed to simply a clear, idea of contradiction and he 
then knows (in Leibniz*s terminology) a definition of the 
idea of contradiction, or (in Locke* s) a definition of any 
VTord used to signify the idea of contradiction or to mean con­
tradiction: in other words, the process of elucidation, ex­
plication, clarification, analysis. Thus, simply the iden­
tical form of a proposition.- as determined by what the words 
in the sentence used to express the proposition mean, as dis­
tinct from (in a sense) what the words in the sentence are 
used to mean^ - does not itself entail that the proposition 
is trifling.^
Leibniz definitely does not thinli that "trifling" iden­
ticals - notably the principles of identity or contradiction ■ 
are trifling in any sense which implies that they cannot be
The distinction which is possible and important to draw here 
is that between a word, as used by a particular person John, 
meaning such-and-such and John* s knowing that the given 
word means such-and-such. If there are appropriate senses 
in which this distinction holds, then I thinlc the argument 
given in the text - or one sufficiently like it - has some­
thing in it.
^Unless, of course, * identical form* simply has the trifling 
character of the given proposition written into it - e.g., 
something like: A proposition has an identical form if and 
only if the words used to express it are used (knowingly) 
to express a proposition of the form *A is A* or *AB is A*.
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fruitfully used in demonstrations,^ Indeed, as previously 
noted, lie feels that the principles of identity or contradic­
tion can in theory be used, in conjunction with suitable defi­
nitions, to demonstrate any necessary truth. A basic diffi­
culty in such a programme, however, is that an argument of a 
type which is particularly important in this context and which 
purports to employ solely identicals and "definitions" to demon­
strate the truth of a necessary proposition is either circular 
or invalid: e.g., consider the argument: (S^ _) A man is a
rational animal, (S2 ) A man is a man, (S^) Therefore a man is 
a rational animal. In this case either 8]_ is simply a contin­
gent statement concerning the meaning of the word * man * and
then the argument does not hold, or is a necessary truth
2
about a man and then the argument is circular. This is a 
point which could be at the back of Locke*s mind in his claim
He clearly admits that the principles of identity or contra­
diction are trifling in the sense of *lininstructive* : "The
primitive truths of reason are those which I call by thé 
general name of identical, because they seem only to repeat 
the same thing without giving us any information. " (ITE IV 
ii 1, p.405, G 3 4 3). There are dangers, however, in linking 
too readily the notions of repeating the same thing and 
being uninformative.
p
This is not to say that identicals - especially where the 
term is taken liberally to include, e.g., *Either it is the 
case that p or it is not the case that p* (indeed, Leibniz 
includes the stronger *It is impossible for a proposition 
to be neither true nor.false*) or * A proposition cannot be 
both true and false* (see N E -IV ii 1, p.405, G 343) - are 
of no possible use in (e.g.) formal logic. Thus, see NE 
IV ii 1, pp 406-10, G 344-47,
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that maxims are of no "use to help men forward in the advance­
ment of sciences, or new discoveries of yet unlmown truths"
(E IV vii 11, p.279). Unfortunately he does not restrict it 
to the axioms of identity or contradiction: "And I would be
glad to be shown where any such science, erected upon these or 
any other general axioms is to be found: and should be obliged
to any one who would lay before me the frame and system of any 
science so built on these or any such like maxims, that could 
not be shown to stand as firm without any consideration of 
them." (E IV vii 11, p.278; and see Leibniz’s comments, NE, 
p. 473, G 395-96; also NE IV vii 6,.pp 467-69, G 390-91).
And it is perhaps because Locke makes such an extreme claim 
that Leibniz does not consider the point as applied solely to 
arguments from *A is A* identicals and definitions.
Although Locke implies that all identical propositions 
(excluding disparates) are trifling and Leibniz admits that in 
some cases identical propositions are trifling, both men allow 
that trifling propositions 'can have their uses. For instance, 
both agree that contradictory propositions can be useful in 
reductio ad absurdum arguments (e.g., see E IV vii 11, pp 
283-84; m  IV viii 2-3, p.490, G 409; NE IV ii 1, p.4o6, G 344), 
And both point out that identicals may be used to teach someone 
how to use words (see E IV viii 4-7, pp 296-98; NE IV viii 9, 
p.493, G 4ll; in view of the preceding discussion, there is
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the possibility of an important ambiguity here). Leibniz also 
mentions the possible function of semi-identicals as reminders 
of what we know at a time when the application of such know­
ledge is pEirticularly useful (see NE IV viii 4-5, p.492, G 4l0) 
Nevertheless, the point can still remain that such propositions 
are trifling in the indicated sense - i.e., that they are in­
capable of being instructive on their own - and the question 
therefore still arises of whether all identical propositions 
(save disparates) are trifling, particularly in view of 
Leibniz’s suggestion that all necessary truths are identicals. 
Simply pointing out other uses of trifling propositions does 
not make them any less trifling in this sense.
Leibniz does not argue at any length for the view that 
all necessary truths have the form of identicals. He admits 
that any actual reduction of, e.g., geometry to the primitive 
principles of contradiction/identity is in practice at least 
beyond us at the moment. In this connection, he does show how 
a truth such as 2+2-4 can be demonstrated by using definitions 
and general principles:
Definitions: (l) 2 = 14-1
(2) 3. = 24-1
(3) 4 = 3+1
Axiom: Putting equals for equals, the equality remains.
Demonstration: 2+2 ^ 2 t(l4-l) Def. (l)
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(2fl)+l r 3+1 Def. (2)
3+1 = 4 Def. (3)
. ‘. 24 2 = 4 Axiom.
(î'TE IV vii 10, p.472, G 394; he does not, however, point out 
that the demonstration also invokes the principle of associa­
tion - which sanctions the step from 2t(ltl) to (2+1)11), But 
he does not expressly claim this as a demonstration of the 
identical form of 2+2-4 - i.e., as a pure demonstration from 
primitive identicals and definitions.
In view of the vast amount of literature which has 
emerged in this century on this and related points, and because 
Leibniz makes no attempt (at least in the New •Essa.ys) to de­
fend this thesis in any comprehensive or systematic fashion, 
and also because Locke makes no attempt to argue for the con­
trary viewr in any rigorous manner, even if I were able, it 
would be both imprudent and unfitting on my part to enter into 
a lengthy discussion of such a subject. Nevertheless, three 
brief points might be made: (a) Both Locke and Leibniz be­
lieve that mathematical truths are necessary truths demonstrable 
from premises (in Leibniz’s case, axioms) which themselves are 
necessarily true. They definitely do not hold any view of 
mathematical "truths" as theorems deducible from a given set 
of postulates, where such postulates are not necessary truths 
- indeed, are not truths at all in this sense - but are sub­
ject to alteration (thus the possibility, e.g., of alternative
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geometries), and "receive" a truth-value only in virtue of 
the calculus being interpreted in empirical terms.
(b) In considering definitions, Leibniz frequently makes the 
point that a real definition of x not only provides the appro­
priate differentiating properties of x but also makes knovm 
the possibility of x (e.g., see NE III iii 15, p.315, G 272- 
73; NE IV viii 12, p.497, G 413). Now, because of his view 
that necessary truths are reducible to identicals by introdu­
cing the appropriate definitions, he might have been expected 
to consider truths of the form ’x is possible* in this light - 
i.e., truths which for him can be revealed by definitions.
For, truths of this form seem both necessary and yet themselves 
not reducible to identicals.
(c) In examining Locke’s distinction between real and nomi­
nal essences, Leibniz does not consider as a possible inter­
pretation of this distinction the view that a proposition 
asserting the nominal essence of an x is simply an identical 
proposition (since ’E is the nominal essence of an x* only if 
’The abstract idea of an x is of E ’), whereas a proposition 
asserting the real essence of an x is not an identical propo­
sition but nevertheless is a necessary truth. Consequently, 
he does not reject real essences (in this - sense) - as he would 
consistently have to - but instead attacks Locke’s conjoined 
suggestion that essences can be variable or created by the 
mind - i.e., that they are merely man-made abstract ideas or
148.
the signification of words (see below, pp 209-16).
(d) Locke holds the view that general moral truths are 
necessary truths and, moreover, that "genuine" moral proposi­
tions are not simply identical in form (and therefore not 
trifling). Consequently, in discussing relations, he places 
"morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration: 
wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by 
necessary consequences, as incontestible as those in mathema­
tics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out, to 
any one that will apply himself with the same indifference 
and attention to the one as he does to the other" (S IV iii 
18, p.208; minus italics; see also E III xi 15-18, pp 156-58;
E IV iv 7-9, pp 232-35). Unfortunately, however - save to 
indicate reasons why morality has often been thought incapable 
of demonstrative certainty (viz., (l) one’s passionate in­
terests interfere too much; (2) one cannot use diagrams as in 
many areas of mathematics; and (3) ethical ideas are generally 
rather more complex and therefore more uncertain, confused, 
etc., than mathematical ideas) - he does not develop an ela­
borate defence of such a view*^ As .an example of a "genuine" 
moral truth, he introduces ’Where there is no property there 
is no injustice’, but in arguing for this, I'/rites, "for the
^Although see E I ii 4-13, pp 68-78, where he gives some in­
dication of how the idea of God is central to demonstrating 
moral truths.
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idea of property being a right to anything, and the idea to 
which the name ’injustice’ is given being the invasion or 
violation of that right" (E IV iii 18, p.208) - which implies 
that, as far as Locke is concerned, the illustration simply 
amounts to the identical ’inhere there is no right to anything, 
there is no violation of a right’. Similarly, the second 
example he introduces - ’No government allows absolute liberty* 
- on the definitions of * government* and ’absolute liberty* 
which he gives, becomes the at least virtually identical ’No 
establishment of society upon laws demanding conformity allows 
any one to do whatever he pleases’ (E IV iii 18, pp 208-09).
In discussing the use of trifling propositions to teach 
the use of words, Locke appears to overstate the case and 
suggest that a semi-identical trifling proposition simply 
amounts to an assertion of the meaning of such-and-such words. 
Thus, consider again the passage: "suppose a Roman signified
by the word homo all these distinct ideas united in one sub­
ject, coroorietas. sensibilitas, potentia se movendi, rationa­
litas, risibilitas: he miglit . . . universally affirm one, 
more, or all of these together of the word h omo, but did no 
more than say that the word homo, in his country, comprehended 
in its signification all these ideas." (S IV viii 6, p.297). 
Nevertheless, since Locke in this context is constantly making 
the point that a trifling proposition can only be used to
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teach the meaning of words,'to take without further reason 
"he did no more than say that . . ." as anything other than 
something like ^he taught no more than that . . . %  as dis­
tinct from ’he claimed or asserted no more than that . . 
would be treading on loose ground.^ And this is perhaps why 
Leibniz does not take up the point in this context.
In other contexts, Locke suggests in slig].itly stronger 
tones that at least certain kinds of necessary truth depend 
upon what such-and-such words mean, i.e., depend upon the 
truth of propositions describing the use of words. For in­
stance, "the doctrine of the immutability of essences proves 
them to be only abstract ideas; and is founded on the relation 
established between them and certain sounds as signs of them; 
and will always be true, a^ long as the same name can have the 
same signification. " (E III iii 19, p.31; my emphasis). And: 
"For names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same 
ideas, and the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes 
one to another, propositions concerning any abstract ideas 
that are once true must needs be eternal verities." (E IV xi 
14, p.340; partly my emphasis). But here again, the sugges­
tions are without elaboration and receive no attention from
But see also E IV vi 9, p.257, concerning ’All gold is mal­
leable*: "it is a very certain proposition, if nmalleable-
ness be a part of the complex idea the word gold stands for. 
But then here is nothing affirmed of gold, but that that 
sound stands for an idea in which malleableness is contained"
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Leibniz.
During the course of his discussion of essences, how­
ever, Locke adopts a general standpoint which supports in a 
more discernible fashion the view that necessary truths at 
least depend upon verbal truths. Although the standpoint it­
self is not presented in any crystal-clear fashion, it does 
seem to be one thread which weaves its slightly cluttered way 
through his thouglit.
Basically, it consists in the view not only that the 
(nominal) essence of a so-and-so is literally the abstract 
idea of a so-and-so^ but further that there is no important 
distinction to be drawn in this context between, e.g., the 
abstract idea of a ms/n and the abstract idea signified by the 
word ’man*.
Thus, he suggests that a (nominal) essence is "the work­
manship of the understanding" and variable, just as what ab­
stract idea a given specified word signifies depends upon 
human decision or habit and is variable from man to man or 
occasion to occasion: "Nor will any one wonder that I say
these essences, or abstract ideas (which are the measures of 
name, and the boundaries of species) are the workmanship of
Although this sometimes becomes the point that the (nominal) 
essence of a so-and-so is what the abstract idea of that 
so-and-so is an idea of - see especially E III iii 19, pp 
29-31 where he discusses the "immutability" of (nominal; 
essences and which ends with the passage quoted in the 
text, p.150.
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the understanding, who considers that at least the complex 
ones are often, in several men, different collections of simple 
ideas; and therefore that is covetousness to one man, which is 
not so to another. Nay, even in substances, where their ab­
stract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves, they 
are not constantly the same; no, not in that species which is 
most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate 
acquaintance: it having been more than once doubted, whether 
the foetus born of a woman were a man . . . which could not be, 
if the abstract idea or essence to which the name man belonged 
were of nature’s making; and were not the uncertain and various 
collection of simple ideas, which the understanding put to­
gether, and then, abstracting it, affixed a name to it." (E III 
iii 14, pp 24-25; see also E III iii 12-13, pp 22-24; E III vi 
26, pp 75-77)9
Now, for Locke, since essences are in a sense variable, 
therefore necessary truths are in a corresponding sense
^Broadly speaking, in developing his theory of essences, Locke 
fails to distinguish with sufficient force:
The abstract idea of an x.
What the abstract idea of an x is an idea of.
What the essence of an x is. Or, in a slightly special
sense of ’essentially’, what an x essentially is.
What (abstract idea) the word ’x ’ signifies.
What any word which signifies (the abstract idea of) an x 
signifies.
Criticism on this point, however, must be tempered by the 
fact that he is here working on what for him is something
"new and a little out of the way" (see E III v 16, pp 53-55)
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variable - I.e., their truth is subject to the meaning of the 
appropriate specific words. Consequently, their necessary or 
immutable or eternal character is a "conditional" one - i.e., 
is contingent or dependent upon "the same name having the same 
signification".
The point should be emphasised, however, that Locke does 
not adopt a nominalistic view in any clear-cut manner. That 
he does not do so can be seen, e.g., from: "But yet for all
this, the miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the 
usual signification of the words of that language, hinders not 
but that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of 
their several agreements and disagreements, if we will care­
fully, as in mathematics, keep to the same precise ideas, and 
trace them in their several relations one to another, without 
being led. away by their names. If we but separate the idea 
under consideration from the sign that stands for it, our know­
ledge goes equally on in the discovery of real truth and cer­
tainty, whatever sounds we make use of." (E IV iv 9, p.235)
Were he to develop the full implications of such a point in 
presenting his theory of essences or in his remarks about 
eternal truths and the signification of words, his nominalistic
^See also his praise of the mathematician’s practice of "ab­
stracting their thou^ts from names, and accustoming them­
selves to set before their minds the ideas themselves that 
they would consider, and not sounds instead of them" (E IV 
ill, 30,' p;223f: al8o E IV v 4, pp 245-46);
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tendencies would no doubt vanish.
Leibniz stands squarely opposed to any nominalistic 
position on essences (and therefore on necessary truth):
"the fact that men unite these or those ideas, or even that 
nature actually unites them or not, makes no difference as 
regards essences, genera, or species, since the question only 
concerns possibilities, which are independent of our thouÿit.'" 
(ILE III iii l4, p.314, G- 272). "l agree that the name serves 
to call attention to things and to conserve the memory and the 
actual knowledge of them; but that . . . [does not] render the 
essences nominal; and I do not understand why you gentlemen 
absolutely require that the essences themselves should depend 
upon the choice of names." (îIS III v 10, pp 328-29, 0 282; see 
also his criticism of the suggestion that ideas are arbitrary 
and the point that only the word-idea connection is arbitrary, 
I'JE III Iv 17, p.325, a 279; ÎÎE III v 2-3, p.326, G- 279-80^).
Indeed, he brings much the same point to bear on certain 
features of Locke’s theory of truth in general: "But what I
find least to my taste in your definition of truth is that 
you seek truth in words. Tlius the same sense expressed in 
Latin, German, English, French, will not be the same truth,
^For a sense of ’arbitrary’ in which Leibniz admits that ideas 
can be arbitrary, see lUL III v 9, p.328, G 281-82; I'JE III 
vi 27, P.353, d 300.
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and it will be necessary to say with Hobbes, that truth de­
pends on the good pleasure of men; which is to speak in a very 
strange manner. You attribute, indeed, truth to God, who 
. . . has no need of signs. Finally, I have been astonished 
already more than once at the disposition of your friends who 
are pleased to make essences, species, and truths nominal."
(ITE IV V 1-2, pp 4-50-51, G 377). After making this point, he
does go on to credit Locke with introducing mental as well as
verbal truths, but the fact that he still remarks; "it were 
then better to place truths in the relation between the ob­
jects of ideas which causes the one to be or not to be in­
cluded in the other. That does not depend upon languages, and
is common to us with God and the angels . . . .  It is, then, 
in this relation that truth must be placed, and we can distin­
guish between the truths which a,re independent of our good 
pleasure, and between the expressions which we invent as seems
good to us." (NE IV V 1-2, p.451,G 377-78) indicates he feels 
that Locke’s admission of mental truth does not invalidate 
the charge of "nominalism" (though it does seem to meet the 
charge of not admitting, e.g., ’The dog is black’ and ’Le 
chien est noir’ as the same (mental) proposition, as distinct 
from the same sentence or "verbal" proposition).
Roughly, then, Leibniz is accusing Locke of the following 
kind of mistaken reasoning; The proposition ’Opium is a nar­
cotic’ is (in fact) true. But if the word ’narcotic’ meant a
156.
liquid, then ’Opium is a narcotic’ would be false, or if 
’narcotic’ meant a crocodile, then ’Opium is a narcotic’ 
would be absurd. Therefore, the truth-value of the proposi­
tion ’Opium is a narcotic* depends upon the meaning of the 
word ’narcotic’.
Tlie mistake basically lies in concluding that the truth- 
value of the given mental proposition ’Opium is a narcotic* - 
as distinct from the sentence or verbal proposition ’Opium is 
a narcotic* - changes when the meaning of'’narcotic* changes. 
For it is the (mental) proposition expressed by the sentence 
’Opium is a narcotic’, and thus the proposition under consi­
deration, which changes when the meaning of ’narcotic’ is 
altered - e.g., when 'narcotic’ means a liquid, then the mental 
proposition is ’Opium is a liquid’, and when ’narcotic’ means 
a crocodile, then the mental proposition is ’Opium is a croco­
dile’ - and not the truth-value of the iriitally given mental 
proposition ’Opium is a narcotic* (where ’narcotic’ as I am 
in this instance using it means a soporific).
Now, in his discussion of truth and propositions (E IV 
V, pp 244-50), Locke says nothing which indisputably commits 
him to nominalism. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that he 
does not make it absolutely clear that a verbal proposition is 
simply a sentence or a sentence which is used to assert such- 
and-such a mental proposition, where the given mental propo­
sition is completely independent of what words are used to
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assert it (indeed, the very use of ’verbal proposition’ could 
easily obscure this point), and that he does adopt the indi­
cated position on essences and necessary truth, Leibniz’s 
criticism is not unfounded.
In general, then, for Locke, necessary truth - and per­
haps contingent truth as well - at times seems to depend upon 
the way words are used, whereas for Leibniz there is no such 
dependence in either case. But, for at least a Locke-like 
position, there is an important difference between necessary 
and contingent truths in this respect. For, in the case of 
necessary truth, it is also the case that, if the words are 
used in the appropriate way, then it follows that the given 
proposition is true (e.g., if the word ’man* means a rational 
animal, then 'A man is an animal’'is necessarily true), but 
in the case of contingent truths, if the words are used in 
such-and-such a way, it does not necessarily follow that the 
given proposition is true (or that the given proposition is 
false, as the case may be) because the way the world in fact 
is - in Locke’s words, the way "things agree or disagree" - 
must also be taken into account (e.g., if the word ’hostile* 
means being a war-monger, it does not necessarily follow that 
*A man is hostile’ is true; for it also depends upon the way 
things in fact are - in this case, whether or not a man in 
fact is a war-monger). And, if one objects that, in the case 
of necessary truth, one must take into account the way ideas
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agree or disagree, the Lockean reply on this tack would be 
that the way ideas agree or disagree is itself determined by 
what the words we use signify (e.g., whether or not the ideas 
of a horse and of an animal agree is determined by what ideas 
the words ’horse’ and ’animal’ signify).
Given this line of reasoning, it is then a very short 
step to conclude that our knowledge of necessary truth - as 
distinct from our knowledge of contingent truth - depends upon, 
or even solely consists in, the knowledge of what words signify 
or mean, and to claim that, at least from the point of view 
of what we know, the difference between ’A man necessarily is 
...’ and ’The word "man" signifies is of little signifi­
cance, particularly in,those cases where ’A man necessarily 
is ...’ is identical in form. And Locke’s position is not 
completely free from suggesting such a view - although certainly 
not to the extent that his philosophical practice is signifi­
cantly affected by it.
For Leibniz, on the other hand, there is no such depen­
dence between necessary truth and the use of words, running 
in either direction, and therefore,no tendency to limit in 
this way our knowledge of necessary truth in terms of our 
knowledge of the use of words.
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4. Existence
Locke restricts our knowledge of existence to three 
things: (a) oneself (intuitive, in the case of one’s present
existence) - where this can be understood broadly to include 
the existence of one’s own (past or present) ideas, and cer­
tain of one’s own mental operations: thus, in addition to
claiming, "As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly 
and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any 
proof." (E IV ix 3, pp 304-05), he also claims "There can be 
nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an ex­
ternal object is in our minds: this is intuitive knowledge."
(E IV 11 14, pp 185-86)9 and, "if I know I feel pain. It Is 
evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as 
of the existence of the pain I feel: or if I know I doubt, I 
have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting 
as of that thought which I call doubt." (E IV ix 3, p.305)^ - 
which implies that I can intuitively know that I feel a pain 
or that I am casting doubt on such-and-such a proposition, as
One must qualify this passage with the point that, on his
theory, we cannot intuitively know that the idea is received 
from an external object.
2
This also could be the point of the somewhat puzzling last 
sentence in the same paragraph - "in every act of sensation, 
reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our 
own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the 
highest degree of certainty" - i.e., that in every case of 
our being conscious of, i.e., perceiving, our own acts of 
sensation, reasoning, or thinliing, we are conscious of our 
own being.
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well as that I exist. On the other hand, my knowing, e.g., 
that I am poorer than most people in the Western world,or my 
intuitively knowing, e.g., that I am moving a pen at this 
moment, is presumably excluded on Locke’s account.
(b) God (demonstrative).
(c) Those objects which are (or have been) actually present to 
one’s own senses (sensitive).
Now, although Leibniz expresses full agreement with 
Locke’s position on existence (see NE IV iii 21, p.439, G 
368^), it is chiefly with the view that we know the existence 
of ourselves intuitively and the existence of God demonstra­
tively. For, Leibniz definitely does not thinlc that our know­
ledge, in the relevant ordinary sense of ’knowledge’, of the 
existence of other things is confined to those things actually 
present to the senses (see IIS IV ii l4, pp 421-22, G 355-56;
NE IV xi 1-10, pp 512-13, G 426).
For both Locke and Leibniz, my knowledge that I exist 
is intuitive - indeed, it is knowledge of a primitive or im­
mediate truth, in Leibniz’s sense of a truth which I cannot 
prove by anything more certain or evident as far as I am
In this particular section, he does not represent Locke as 
confining the knowledge of the existence of external ob­
jects to sensitive knovrledge, but has him simply claim 
that we ^  have sensitive knowledge of the existence of 
external objects.
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concerned and which therefore is, in this sense, incapable of 
being proven by me: "it neither needs nor is capable of any
proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our own 
existence" (E IV ix 3, p.305); "this proposition I exist, is 
of the highest evidence, being a proposition which cannot be 
proved by any other, or rather an immediate truth." (NE IV 
vii 7, p.469, G 391). Leibniz also extends a primitive status 
to truths of the form ’l am thinlcing of A* (see "Æ IV ii 1, 
p.410, G 347-48) and, although Locke does not expressly say 
so, since he seems to accept such truths as being self-evident 
or intuitive and in general suggests that all intuitive truths 
are primitive in Leibniz’s sense (or at least does not clearly 
allow for the possibility of an intuitive truth which is not 
primitive; see E IV ii 1, pp 176-78), he roughly implies agree­
ment on this point.
Tlius, both men adopt the position that any appearance of 
a demonstrative element in an ’I think therefore I am’ line of 
thought is misleading - for it is no more evident to me that I 
think than that I am; indeed, it cannot be evident to me that 
I think unless it is at first as equally evident to me that I 
am (see HE IV vii 7, P.469; and E IV ix 3, p.305).
Locke also refers to the infallible perception that I 
exist, but Leibniz does not take up this point. The latter 
explicitly classifies ’I exist’ as "a proposition of fact, 
based upon an immediate experience, and , . . not a necessary
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proposition, whose necessity is seen in the immediate agree­
ment of ideas" (NS IV vii 7, P.469, G 392), but he does not 
discuss the self-guaranteeing aspect of ’I exist* - i.e., the 
self-refuting character of * I do not exist* - nor, therefore, 
the point that although it is possible for there to have been 
no me and * I exist* is in this sense contingent, owing to the 
fact that the very assertion of *I exist * on my part secures 
the truth of what I assert because it is ^  assertion, I cannot 
mistakenly assert or perceive that I exist, and thus in this 
sense it is necessE.rily the case that the proposition * I exist* 
(i.e., where the expression * the proposition "Î exist"’ is 
confined to propositions with a reflexive element written into 
them - as opposed, e.g., to *Odegard exists*) is true. Con­
sequently, the so-called "infallibility" of my perceiving my 
own existence does not follow from demands made by the notion 
of perception but, rather, from the circumstances of percep­
tion in this type of case - and there are therefore no grounds 
for inferring a human power of infallible perception exercised 
in this situation. Indeed, the only "infallibility" that 
seems to be involved here is a conditional variety which 
amounts to *If I perceive that I exist, then I necessarily 
cannot be wrong*, and which is equally involved in the percep­
tion of a necessary truth - e.g., *If I perceive that 2+2-4 
then I necessarily cannot be ivrong* .
Leibniz does not introduce in this context an interesting
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point he makes elsewhere - viz., "that reflection suffices to 
discover the idea of substance within ourselves, who are sub­
stances" (llE I iii 18, p.105, G 96). For, Locke expressly 
asserts that "if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception 
of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought 
which I call doubt" (E IV ix 3, p.305) - and, since (a) he is 
talking of intuitive perception here, (b) the intuitive per­
ception of contingent truths entails the immediate presence of 
the object(s) involved, and (c) nothing further is prima facie 
written into the notion of a substance than that of a thing 
which is such-and-such, then, taken at face value, this claim 
implies that I reflectively experience a substance in ex­
periencing myself performing or undergoing certain mental” 
"operations". Thus, the claim excludes viewing the situation 
as mediately perceiving the existence of a substance which 
thinlis from the premises that (l) such-and-such thou^ts exist 
and (2) no thought can exist without some "support".
Both Locke and Leibniz feel we can have a demonstrative 
knowledge of the existence of God - Locke restricting himself 
primarily to a form which employs the empirical premises that 
I exist, think, and have certain intellectual powers, in addi­
tion to a number of purportedly necessary principles having to 
do with causes. Leibniz, on the other' hand, is prepared to 
accept a wider range of proofs - indeed "that nearly all the
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means which have been employed to prove the existence of God 
are good and m i ^ t  be of service, if we would perfect them"
(I'lE IV X 7, p.505, G 420).^
To defend his view, Locke tables (roughly) the following
proof (see E IV x 1-6, pp 306-10)::
A. (l) I exist.
(2) No thing can be produced by nothing.
(3) Wliatever has a beginning has a cause.
Therefore from eternity there has been something - i.e., 
there is an eternal cause of all being.
B. (l) A cause must contain at least as much perfection as
its effect.
(2) There is power.
(3) There is knowledge.
Therefore the eternal source of all being must be the 
most powerful and most knowing of all beings. Thus, 
there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing 
Being; i.e., God exists.
Leibniz (rightly) objects to this particular proof- 
’* solely in order to give (jLock^ . . .  an opportunity to fill
And thus note Leibniz* s transformation of the teleological 
argumentj traces of-which can be found in Locke, into an 
argument for God* s existence as the necessary omniscient 
and omnipotent author of a universe characterised by Pre- 
Established Harmony - a transformation which, according to 
him, changes, it from a morally certain to a metaphysically 
certain argument (NE IV x 9-10, pp 507-08, G 421-22).
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up the void" - on the grounds that Locke’s premises do not 
strictly entail that "there has always been a certain thing,
eternal oeing", as distinct from the broader conclusion 
"that there never has been any time in which nothing existed"
(ITL IV X 2-6, pp 500-01, G 417; minus italics).
As far as the Ontological argument is concerned, in the 
Locke is content^ with the point that it is vrrong to 
claim it as the only effective means of proving God’s existence, 
partly because the type of argument he himself presents is 
"evident and incontestable", provided one gives it suitable 
attention, and partly because the idea of God in many men’s 
minds is not adequate to the rigorous demands made on it by 
the Ontological argument (E IV x 7, pp 310-11). In the latter 
connection, however, it is interesting to note that he sug­
gests that arguing from the idea of God to His existence is 
impractical because some men have no idea of God and many have
See Aaron’s reference in John Locke, p.242, to a paper en­
titled Deus, in which Locke is apparently not so content. 
But see ,@,lso E II xxiii 34-35, p.420, where, in discussing 
the empirical origin of the idea of God, he writes: "The
degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence, power, 
wisdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any 
ideas of) to that sovereign Being, which we call God, 
being all boundless and infinite , and "For it is infinity, 
which, joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, 
&c., makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to our­
selves, the best we can, the Supreme Being. For, thougli 
in his own essence . . , God be simple and uncompounded; 
yet I think I may say we have no other idea of him, but a 
complex one of existence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c., 
infinite and eternal."
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very difierent ideas - the suggestion being that some men sig­
nify nothing, and many signify something different, by the
God’ (see also Z I iii 9-17, pp 98-106) - and if taken 
strictly, this point holds equally against the type of argu­
ment he himself presents. For, if the word ’God* means no­
thing to Peter or means something different to Peter than it 
does to Locke, then Peter will not understand, or not under­
stand correctly, Locke’s use of the word ’God’, and therefore 
cannot be convinced by Locke of God’s existence, at least so 
long as Locke uses ’God’ to conduct his argument. Now, if it 
is simply Peter’s ignorance of the use of the specific word 
’God’ which stands in the way, then Locke could either teach 
Peter what he means by the word ’God’ and then present his 
argument by using ’God’, or avoid the use of ’God’ and in his 
argument use whatever words which (a) mean what he in fact uses 
’God’ to mean and (b) Peter does understand. But this alterna­
tive is equally open to anyone employing the Ontological argu­
ment. On the other hand, if Peter cannot understand (correctly) 
any words which are used to signify what Locke is using ’God’ 
to signify - viz. God - i.e., if Peter is incapable of framing 
the idea of God, then neither Locke nor the ontologist can 
prove to Peter that God exists (’’knowledge is impossible with­
out ideas’’). As far as Locke’s discussion of proving God’s 
existence is concerned, the point is a relatively minor one, 
but it is connected with his "nominalistic’’ tendency to confuse
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the idea of x with the idea signified by the word *x*^ and 
is at least interesting in this respect.
Leibniz is an expressed advocate of the Ontological 
argument, but in an "improved" form - the amendment consist­
ing in an initial demonstration of the possibility of God, a
2
possibility which he does not demonstrate in the New Essays 
(see NE IV x 7, pp 502-05, G 4l8-20). The merits of such an 
argument aside, the fact that Leibniz holds that ’God exists* 
is a necessary truth is of some significance in view of his 
thesis that all necessary truths are identical in form. For, 
even admitting that ’God exists* is a necessary truth, and 
admitting that an identical proposition (in the appropriate 
wide sense which includes semi-identicals and does not demand 
that the sentence used to express the proposition has a "repe­
titive" structure - i.e., does not have to be a sentence like 
*A man is a man’ or ’If a boy is noisy and nasty then a boy 
is nasty’ or ’A cow is not a non-cow’) is not necessarily 
trifling, it is difficult to see how ’God exists* could be 
identical in form. For, if ’God exists* were a proposition of 
the form ’A being which exists and which is omnipotent,
as distinct from any nominalism which might attempt to re­
duce ideas simply to words - or to the uses of (specified) 
words where ’word-use’ excludes private mental objects.
^See Langley’s references, p.504, note 2; also "That the Most 
Perfect Being Exists" (Langley, pp 714-15, G vii 261-62), 
part of which Leibniz read to Spinoza,
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omniscient . . . exists’, then it is hard to see what this 
could amount to (remembering that, according to the claim 
being considered, it must be both identical and equivalent to 
’God exists’) save ’If there exists a being which is omnipo­
tent, omniscient . . . then such a being exists’ But then 
’God exists’ would be a conditional proposition leaving the 
question of the existence of such a being - indeed, the exis­
tence of any being - open. And whatever else ’God exists’ 
may be, in the sense of ’God exists’ which concerns us, ’God
exists’ does not leave the question of the existence of any 
2
being open.
On the other side of the fence, aside from any further 
question of the validity of his proof, if Locke were to adopt 
the position that ’God exists’ is only a contingent truth, 
and if he holds seriously to his claim that ’God exists’ is 
"so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, that all 
religion and genuine morality depend thereon" (E IV x 7, pp 
311-12; cf IIE IV viii 9, pp 495-96, G 4l3), then it is difficult
Alternatively, if ’An existing being which is omniscient, 
omnipotent, etc. exists’ is such that it is a categorical 
which presupposes ’There is a being which is omnipotent, 
etc.’, then it cannot be a necessary truth, since a neces­
sary truth cannot entail a contingent truth and ’There is 
a being which is omniscient, etc.’ is contingent,
^It should be kept in mind that this is not intended as an 
inquiry into the Ontological argument in general, but is 
only concerned with any version of it which represents 
’God exists’ as an identical proposition.
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to see how he can consistently hold that propositions of 
genuine morality" are all necessary propositions. To put 
the point in somewhat different terms, if there is no neces- 
sary agreement between the idea of God and the idea of exis- 
tence, and if the existence of God - as opposed to simply the 
idea of God - is a necessary ground for demonstrating "genuine" 
moral truths, then not all moral truths are truths which can 
be discovered simply by examining our abstract ideas.^ Now, 
in certain of his references to the possibility of a demon­
strative science of morality, he appeals only to the idea of 
God in indicating moral starting-points. Thus; "Tlie idea of 
a supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, 
whose wor liman ship we are, and on whom we depend; and the idea 
of ourselves, as understanding, rational creatures, . . . 
would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such 
foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place 
morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration." (E IV 
iii 18, p.208). Nevertheless, in discussing the innateness of 
practical principles, Locke argues: (l) where a moral rule is 
constantly being broken by someone, he does not know such a 
rule (and therefore it is not innate, since innateness entails 
universal consent) because if he did know such a rule, then
^Although it does not follow from this that we cannot, on 
Locke’s theory of knowledge, know moral truths. For, 
according to this theory, we can know that God exists.
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he would know that he would not escape God’s punishment for 
breaking it, and since it is unlikely that he would break the 
rule knowing the latter, therefore it is unlikely he knows the 
rule (see E I ii 13, pp 7 6-7 8 ). And, whatever else this argu­
ment might imply, it does suggest that the knowledge of a 
moral truth depends upon the knowledge of God’s existence and 
not simply on having the idea of God. Tlius, Locke prefaces 
the preceding argument with: ’’’Parents preserve your children’
. . . is no truth at all: it being a command, and not a propo­
sition, and so not capable of truth or falsehood. To make it 
capable of being assented to as true, it must be reduced to 
some such proposition as this: ’It is the duty of parents to 
preserve their children.’ But what duty is, cannot be under­
stood without a law; nor a law be known or supposed without a 
lavmiaker, or without reward and punishment;^ . . . [or, there­
fore. without supposing the ideas of God, of law, of obliga­
tion, of punishment, of a life a,fter this’’ (E I ii 12, p.76).
Locke restricts our knowledge of the existence of finite
things other than ourselves to those objects which are or have 
2
been actually present to the senses, where, being actually
^And hence, for Locke, the force of: "there cannot any one
moral rule be proposed whereof a man may not justly demand 
a reason" (E f  i f  4, p.68; minus italics).
^For his discussion of habitual sensitive knowledge, see E IV 
xi 11, pp 336-37. Henceforth, I shall ignore qualifications 
attendant upon including habitual sensitive knowledge.
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present to the senses is to be sharply distinguished from
being an immediate object. Roughly, the notion of being
actually present to the senses^ covers those objects which at
a given time have some effect on my sense-organs, nervous
system and brain processes and thereby produce a sensible idea
in my mind - an idea which is immediately present to me. And,
when an object does produce such an idea in my mind, I thereby 
2
notice the object and thus know that it at that time exists.
I can then be said to have a sensitive knowledge of its exis­
tence: "when our senses do actually convey into our under­
standings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth 
something aX that time really exist without us, which doth 
affect our senses, and by them give notice of itself to our 
apprehensive faculties, and actually produce that idea which 
we then perceive . . . .  But this knowledge extends as far as 
the present testimony of our senses, employed about particular 
objects that do then affect them, and no further." (E IV xi 9, 
pp 333-34; see also E IV xi 2, pp 326-27; E IV ii 14, pp 185-88)
For Locke’s use of this expression, see E IV iii 5, p.191: 
"Sensitive knowledge reaching no further than the existence 
of things actually present to our senses".
^Locke occasionally uses the term ’sensation’ to refer, or in 
such a way that it could be referring, to this type of no­
ticing (E IV iii 2, p.190; E IV xi 1, p.325) - a use which 
must be distinguished from its use to refer to a sensible 
idea, or to a physical impression on the brain, nervous 
system or sense-organs, or to the whole process of a sen­
sible idea’s being produced.
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Tlie point of central interest in this case is that, de­
spite the fact that external objects which are present to the 
senses are not immediate objects, and despite the fact that 
Locke initially confines knowledge to the perception of agree­
ment between ideas because only ideas (and the self and cer­
tain of its operations) are immediate objects, he nevertheless 
admits sensitive knowledge. And the question is, for what 
reasons? - reasons which (a) must justify such a move and (b) 
do not equally admit other forms of purported knowledge which 
Locke is unwilling to admit.
Before dealing with this question, however, there are a 
number of smaller points to get out of the way. In his de­
scription of sensitive knowledge, Locke gives the impression 
that not only do we thereby know the existence of other things 
but that we also know that the other things in any given situa­
tion are producing sensible ideas in our minds - though we do 
not know how they do it: "the actual receiving of ideas from
without . . . makes us know, that something doth exist at that 
time without us, which causes that idea in us; though perhaps 
we neither know nor consider how it does it" (E IV xi 2, p.
3 2 6; minus italics); "we cannot but be satisfied that there 
doth something at that time really exist without us, which doth 
affect our senses, . . . and actually produce that idea which 
we then perceive" (E IV xi 9, pp 333-34); "we may add to the 
two former sorts of knowledge [viz., intuitive and demonstrative
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this also, of the existence of particular external objects, 
by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual 
entrance of ideas from them" (E IV ii l4, p.188). Briefly, 
the problem with this suggestion is that: (a) from one view­
point, sensitive knowledge seems to be the knowledge of the
existence of x such that I am sensing an x at the time (al­
though this too is complicated by the theory of secondary 
qualities) and I therein notice or (in a sense) perceive an x
and thus take there to be an x or acquire a belief in the
1
existence of an x, i.e., in this sense perceive that there is 
an x; (b) while from another viewpoint, sensitive knowledge 
includes the knowledge that this particular object is pro­
ducing this particular sensible idea in my mind; (c) but I 
cannot be having a sensible idea of an object producing a
sensible idea in my mind; (d) nor does there seem to be any
form of experience - whether or not it can be correctly called 
’sensing’ - in which I experience an object producing a sen­
sible idea in my mind. On the other hand, if sensitive know­
ledge is intended to include a form of knowledge which is not 
guided so strictly by what we sense or otherwise experience, 
then it is not clear just what kind of thing it is intended to 
include in addition to this, and that what it does include:in 
addition to this does not fall into Locke’s category of mere
^"Bv sensation, perceiving the existence of particular things? 
- (E IV iii 2, p.190)
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"judgment of probability".
Another suggestion in Locke’s description of sensitive 
knowledge is that an external object’s operating on the senses 
to produce a sensible idea in our mind causes us to know that 
the external object exists in a sense which is stronger than 
the claim that the production of the sensible idea enables us 
to know that the external object exists. Hence, he uses the 
expression "the actual receiving of ideas from without . . . 
makes us know, that something doth exist at that time without 
u s "(E IV xi 2, p.3 2 6; my emphasis of ’makes us know’), and 
also writes; "we cannot so far distrust their testimony, as 
to doubt that such collections of simple ideas as we have ob­
served by our senses to be united together, do really exist 
together." (E IV xi 9, p.334; my emphasis of ’cannot*). In 
other words, his account seems to deny the possibility of, e.g., 
John sensing a spot of red but not taking there to be any red 
existing in front of him - i.e., in this sense, not noticing 
or perceiving a spot of red or that a spot of red exists - per­
haps because he believes that the situation he finds himself 
in is conducive to producing sensory illusions or hallucina­
tions with respect to colours and particularly with respect to 
red. Indeed, the very possibility of our not being misled by 
sensory illusions or hallucinations seems to be denied by this. 
Moreover, the possibility of seriously holding to a theory of 
secondary qualities, which demands that one does not believe
175.
in the existence of, e.g., red in the sense of *red* in which 
one senses red, is denied by Locke* s suggestion, on this point.
Now, I think it is because of his adherence to secondary 
qualities that he phrases his description of the following 
example in the way that he does: ”v.g. whilst I write this,
I have, by the paper affecting my eyes, that idea produced in 
my mind, which, whatever object causes, I call white; by which 
I know that that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance 
before my eyes always causes that idea) doth really exist, and 
hath a being without me. And of this, the greatest assurance 
I can possibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is 
the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges 
of this thing; whose testimony I have reason to rely on as so 
certain, that I can no more doubt, whilst I write this, that 
I see white and black, and that something really exists that 
causes that sensation in me," than that I write or move my 
hand” (E IV xi 2, pp 326-27). For he seems to want only to 
say that in having the sensible idea of white I know that the 
object (primary quality) which causes me to have the idea of 
white (secondary quality) - and which I therefore call * white* 
in a derivative sense - does exist, i.e., I know that there is 
such an object. But, as pointed out above, this is to turn 
sensitive knowledge into something quite different from per­
ceiving that an instance of white exists while sensing white 
(where * white* means the same in both cases). It then becomes
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a matter of believing that such-and-such a (primary) quality 
exists because one has such-and-such ideas and one knows that 
such ideas are produced by such a quality. And the testimony 
that the senses (at a given time) have to offer on this account 
is then diminished. Tliey can no longer be "the proper and sole 
judges of this thing”, for ex hypothesi one is not sensing 
what one perceives to exist. One either infers the existence 
of such an object or knows that it exists as a result of having 
made such inferences. Furthermore, in addition to this trans­
formation in the notion of sensitive knovfledge, it still is 
not the case that the production of the sensible idea of an x 
by a primary quality y will necessarily make anyone know that 
y exists - indeed, it is even less likely in this case, for 
(a) exponents of secondary qualities among ordinary men are 
relatively few and (b) even in the case of such exponents, 
they might not know what primary qualities produce what ideas 
of secondary qualities. Finally, in view of Locke*s own ex­
pressed disavowal of knowledge of the connection between pri­
mary qualities and ideas of secondary qualities (see E IV iii 
12-13, pp 201-02), it is difficult to see how he could con­
sistently view sensitive knowledge as the knowledge of the 
existence of the specific causes of our sensible ideas.
Tne final minor point to register is that Locke is not 
very tidy in this context about the question of knowing the 
existence of substances as distinct from qualities. In one
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of the passages quoted above, he does seem to restrict his
reference to the existence of a collection of sensible
qualities: ”we cannot . . . doubt that such collections of
simple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united
together, do really exist together” (E IV xi 9, p.334), but
even here he goes on to say ”For if I saw such a collection
of simple ideas as is wont to be called man, existing together
one minute since” (E IV xi 9, p.334), and one might reasonably
raise a question about the exact force of *as is wont to be
called man* and * collection, of simple ideas*. Furthermore,
he does say things like ”the confidence that our faculties do
not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable
of concerning the existence of material beings” (E IV xi 3,
p.328; my emphasis), without attending to the possibility of
distinguishing material substances from material properties.
Now if, in the face of such a question, Locke were to admit
sensitive knowledge of the existence of material substances
2
simpliciter. then, according to his position, he would be 
admitting knowledge of the existence of something which cannot
Remembering that, whenever he talks about the complex ideas 
of substances, he often uses *idea* in the sense of quality 
or power or property - a habit which he himself admits to 
in E II viii 8, p.169 and which Leibniz points out in NE II 
XXVi 1-2, p. 237, G- 212.
Q
Substances, for Locke, cannot be experienced: ”the idea of
substance; which we neither have nor can have.by sensation 
or reflection” (E I iii 19, p.107), where * sensation* means 
simply having sensible ideas.
178.
be sensed and, in doing so, would be extending the area of 
possible knowledge to a degree that could make it arbitrary 
or at least uncomfortable for him to exclude assurance on the 
basis of strong, but logically inconclusive, reasons. On the 
other hand, if he were to admit knowing that material substances 
exist but, in doing so, were to draw upon a principle which 
he himself suggests^ and employs more forcefully in his cor­
respondence with Stillingfleet - viz., that it is impossible 
for qualities to exist without some support - and claim that 
one perceives that substances exist when one merely senses
qualities because one knows that qualities must subsist in a 
2
substance, then sensitive knowledge takes on a significantly 
different shape than the one Locke paints in describing it.
For, the need to have such an a priori reason for what one be­
lieves, or comes to believe, in order to acquire sensitive 
knowledge of the existence of at least some kinds of object 
(viz., substances as opposed to qualities) receives no mention. 
And - aside from any question of the merits of the principle - 
it is^  perhaps then questionable whether sensitive knowledge 
of the existence of objects is as common as it might at first
In the Essay, the suggestion is a relatively tenuous one: 
"not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by them­
selves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum 
wherein they do subsist" (E II xxiii 1, pp 390-91).
2Presumably where one knows this by examining the abstract 
ideas of qualities and of subsistence in a substance.
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appear to be - In short, does not such a demand in fact limit 
the knowledge of the existence of material substances virtually 
as completely as denying the very possibility of sensitively 
knowing that material substances exist? Finally, as far as 
the existence of mental substances - as well as mental opera­
tions - other than ourselves is concerned, even manoeuvres 
such as appealing to the necessary dependence of qualities on 
substances cannot work; for we cannot sense mental operations 
nor can we otherwise experience any mental operations save our 
own. On the possibility of knowledge in this case, Locke has 
nothing directly to say, but by implication his position ex­
cludes it completely. Consequently, in the passage, "l presume 
it will be easily granted me, that there are such ideas in 
men* s minds; every one is conscious of them in himself; and 
men* s words and actions will satisfy him that they are in 
others** (E Intro. 8, p.33), the "satisfaction” he refers to 
falls short of knowledge. And a similar point applies to,
” That there are minds and thinliing beings in other men as well 
as himself, every man has a reason, from their words and actions, 
to be satisfied” (E IV iii 27, p.219).
I can now turn to the central question, viz., Vfnat 
justification has Locke for admitting sensitive knowledge but 
excluding the cases of apparent knowledge which he does exclude?
Locke does not defend his position by saying something
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like: "l admit sensitive knowledge but exclude other cases
of sense-perception because in the case of, e.g., SamiA per­
ceiving that there is an instance of motion which etc., where 
he senses an instance of motion;.which etc., if Sam is not 
suffering sensory Illusion or hallucination in this respect, 
then his perception is correct; whereas in the case of Sam* s 
perceiving that an automobile with thirteen passengers exists, 
where he cannot sense an automobile with thirteen passengers, 
even if his senses were impeccable in this respect, Sam can 
still be mistaken. Furthermore, I exclude cases where one 
non-deductively.infers propositions from premises which may 
or may not describe what I sense, because here again one may 
sense veridically and yet still be wrong (and, of course, the 
truth of such propositions cannot be perceived solely be exa­
mining my abstract ideas).’*
Rather, he chooses to justify his actions in the 
following way:
Although it is true that "men may have such [sensible] 
ideas in their minds, when no such thing exists, no such ob­
ject affects their senses", nevertheless "we are provided with 
an evidence that puts us past doubting." (E IV ii l4, p.l86).
For (l) there is an unmistakable : difference between 
seeing the sun and merely thinking about it, or smelling a 
rose and only thinking of such a smell. Similarly, there is 
a manifest difference between having a sensible idea of red
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and reviving the idea of red in our memories (see E IV ii 14, 
p.186; E IV xi 5, p.329). Leibniz replies to this point with: 
"you are right in saying that there is ordinarily some dif­
ference between feelings and imaginations; but the Sceptics 
will say that the more or less does not alter the species. 
Besides, although feelings are wont to be more vivid than ima­
ginations, it is nevertheless a fact that there are cases 
where imaginative persons are impressed as much or perhaps 
more by their imaginations than another is by the truth of 
things" (NE IV ii l4, p.422, G- 355). Basically the central 
criticism is that, althougli sensible ideas are discernible 
from, say, images or objects of thought, the question remains 
whether sensible ideas correspond with any external objects 
or have any external causes and whether we can know this on 
Locke* s theory - or, if the use of * sensible idea* itself has 
the idea’s being caused by an external object analytically 
written into it, whether those ideas we now refer to as sen­
sible ideas have any external objects to which they correspond, 
etc. For, it remains true to say that it is possible for such 
an idea not to correspond with any external object. Conse­
quently, when Locke remarks, "And therefore he hath certain 
knowledge that they [i.e., the two kinds of ide^ are not 
both memory, or the actions of his mind, and fancies only 
within him; but that actual seeing hath a cause without"
(E IV xi 5, p.329), he is to some extent assuming what he
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has to show,^ viz., that because sensible ideas are disting­
uishable from ideas revived in the memory or from thoughts or 
images, therefore they are not "fancies only within him".
Moreover, a type of question raised in the preliminary 
discussion might be introduced here. For, is Locke suggesting 
that sensitive knowledge itself either involves inferring the 
existence of an external object from the fact that we have a 
sensible idea of an x, as distinct from a thought or image, or 
involves having the principle or general point underivriting 
such an inference as a reason for believing that such-and-such 
an object exists? In this case, not only is the inference a 
shaky one, but sensitive knowledge becomes a relatively, infre­
quent possession. Or is he suggesting that sensitive knowledge 
involves no such thing, but that we know there are such-and- 
such external objects by such means and are therefore prepared 
to accept sensitive "perception" as knowledge, irrespective of 
what "evidence" such a form of perception brings along witli it? 
But then it is questionable whether sensitive knowledge could 
not be admitted if we simply believed unreservedly that what 
is taken to exist in a given case of sensitive perception does 
in fact exist. In other words, given that p is true, what
1 ,
I say to some extent because this particular conclusion 
also draws upon the argument that because sensible ideas 
are passive, i.e., are not made by us and cannot be avoided 
by us, therefore they have external causes - an argument I 
consider later.
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else has our knowing that p in this way got to do with whether 
or not sensitive perception that p is a genuine case of know­
ledge? Finally, in either case, the argument which Locke here 
presents by itself provides no "evidence which puts us past 
doubting" that sensible ideas correspond with external objects, 
and thus functions as a poor guide for extending his notion of 
sensitive knowledge.
He also introduces in his defence the point that many 
sensible ideas are accompanied by pleasure or pain (see E IV 
ii 14, p.188; E IV xi 3, p.328; E IV xi 6, p.330), but as an 
argument for the thesis that sensible ideas correspond with 
external things, it brings no more "evidence" than the pre­
ceding one, and as a justification for his admitting sensitive 
knowledge, is subject to a parallel set of questions. Con­
cerning the former point for instance, it is not impossible 
for a sensible idea which does not correspond with an object 
to be accompanied by pleasure or pain - e.g., in a "phantom 
limb" case. And, if the argument is that because pain is occa­
sioned by the bodily disorder caused by the external object, 
therefore a sensible idea accompanied by pain corresponds 
with the external object (see E IV xi 6, p.330) - waiving the 
point that all bodily disorders need not be caused by external 
objects - the objection remains that knowing that a bodily 
disorder occasions pain, or that such-and-such a bodily dis­
order occasions such-and-such a pain, itself poses just as
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much a problem as knowing that an external object produces a 
sensible idea. Moreover, even if the fact that pain accom­
panies such-and-such a sensible idea were an indication that 
the sensible idea corresponds with an external object - an 
indication which entitles us to the status of knowing there 
is an external object when we have the sensible idea and the 
accompanying pain - we still do not therein know what sort of 
external object exists. We are thus left with knowledge of 
the existence of other things but what these other things are 
we do not know. And if sensitive knowledge extends no further 
than this, then its limitations are much more severe than 
Locke generally acknowledges.
Tlius, regarding Locke’s notion of sensitive knowledge 
and his defence of admitting it as knowledge, two basic points 
are clear: (a) the arguments he gives on behalf of the claim 
that there are external objects themselves do not measure up 
to his standard of demonstrative knowledge, and, aside from 
such a standard, in themselves provide little ground for 
affirming an external world; and (b) even if they themselves 
had some plausibility it is not clear how they would justify 
his admission of sensitive knowledge - for they themselves 
seem to appeal to general considerations (i.e., ’A sensible 
idea is distinct from an idea revived In memory and therefore 
corresponds with an external object’, or ’A sensible idea is 
often accompanied by pain or pleasure and therefore corresponds
185.
with an external object*) and it is hard to see what part, if 
any, such considerations would have to play in the sensitive 
perception of external objects which for Locke constitutes 
sensitive knowledge.
In addition to the alleged "assurance we have from our 
senses themselves . . .  of the existence of things without us" 
(E IV xi 3, p.3 2 8), Locke introduces "concurrent reasons" to 
confirm our assurance on this point. In this case, then, he 
does not seem to be defending his admission of sensitive know­
ledge so much as giving arguments in defence of the general 
claim that there are external objects which operate on our 
senses to produce sensible ideas in us - arguments which pur­
portedly stand or fall independently of our perceiving the 
existence of external objects as a result of (though not solely 
as a result of) sensing such-and-such objects, and therefore 
arguments which support only in this way our claims to know 
that such-and-such an object exists on the basis of the sensi­
tive perception of such an object. It should be added, how­
ever, that this distinction is not applicable to Locke’s 
thought in any clear-cut way.
His first argument is: Since having sense-organs is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for our having sen­
sible ideas, and since we do have sensible ideas, therefore 
there must be external objects operating on our sense-organs
186.
to produce sensible ideas (E IV xi 4, p.328). But (a) the 
very reference to sense-organs incorporates a reference to 
external objects and (b) how do we know that sense-organs are 
necessary conditions of our having sensible ideas (unless, as 
mentioned previously, ’sensible idea* itself has this condition 
written into it and then the question becomes * How do we know 
we have sensible ideas?*). Granted, the force of * concurrent 
reasons* in this context suggests that Locke is not attempting 
to demonstrate the existence of external objects but is simply 
trying to provide good grounds for claiming an external world 
- at least one within the present and past causal range of our 
sense-organs - and that he is operating not in the field of 
knowledge as conceived by him but in the area of mere assurance 
and probability. Nevertheless, even if he is limiting himself 
to such a programme, it is still incumbent upon him to provide 
grounds for his non-demonstrative inference which consist in 
propositions that we either know to be true or can themselves 
be supported by us on grounds which we know to hold, etc. And, 
in the given case, (a) we do not know, on Locke*s theory, that 
there are sense-organs or that they are necessary for our 
having sensible ideas, and (b) the type of argument necessary 
to support such claims is the very type of argument he is 
attempting to give by using them as grounds.
The second reason is that because sensible ideas are 
unavoidable and cannot be made by us in the sense that thoughts
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and certain of our images can be made by us, therefore they 
are produced by external objects (E IV xi 5, pp 328-29; also 
E IV iv 4, pp 229-30) - a line of reasoning which comes close 
to introducing the principle, employed by Locke in his proof 
of God* s existence, that everything which has a beginning has 
a cause. Now, if this argument is accepted within the terms 
of reference^of what he is trying to do, it does no more than 
secure the point that external causes (or an external cause) 
exist(s) and has nothing to offer about what the nature of 
such causes is. Thus, if we introduce Leibniz*s point that 
"God has ideas before creating the objects of these ideas, and 
nothing prevents Him from being able also to communicate such 
ideas to intelligent creatures** (HE III iv 2, p.318, G 275) 
and shape it so that it applies in a suitable way to sensible 
ideas, in the given argument, Locke provides no reasons - 
logically conclusive or otherwise - for claiming that Leibniz * s 
supposition is not the case. Similarly, one might point out 
that certain types of images are in fact just as unavoidable 
and independent of our wishes as sensible ideas 'and (given 
that such images are produced by things other than oneself 
thou^i not necessarily things external to one* s own body) that 
Locke * 8 argument does nothing to exclude an external world 
composed solely of the kind of objects which produce such 
images. Now, there might be arguments available to single out 
what the character of the external world is - both from a
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general vievrpoint (e.g., arguments which support a primary- 
secondary quality distinction) and in particulan cases (e.g., 
arguments which show that there is at the moment a hard, brown, 
rectangular-shaped object in front of me) - but the point here 
is that Locke * s reasoning thus far fails to provide such argu­
ments.
Another reason Locke introduces is that, since sensible 
ideas are often accompanied by pleasure/pain, therefore they 
correspond with external objects - but I need add nothing to 
what has already been said on this point, A final reason he 
gives, however, does seem to come closer to satisfying the re­
quirements he intends his various arguments to fulfil. More­
over, it also directs attention to the course Leibniz himself 
adopts in claiming the existence of an external world. And, 
finally, it might even indicate - in a way the previous argu­
ments do not - some support for accepting sensitive knowledge.
Basically, the reason consists in: "Our senses in many
cases bear witness to the truth of each other* s report, con­
cerning the existence of sensible things without us. He that 
sees a fire, may, if he doubt whether it be anything more 
than a bare fancy, feel it too; and be convinced, by putting 
his hand in it." (E IV xi 7, pp 330-31). Thus, framing the 
example to avoid the difficulty that I cannot see heat or feel 
red, where seeing and feeling are forms of sensing, the point 
is that because I both see and feel a long thin object, there
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to this extent probably is a long thin object - i.e., the 
fact that I see and feel the same thing provides a reason for 
believing that there is such a thing. Now, in this case, the 
reason introduced does consist in something we can know to be 
the case according to Locke’s view of knovfledge - for I can 
know that I ami sensing such-and-such. Moreover, it offers 
something more than simply a reason for claiming there are 
external objects but of what kind remains unknown - thus, in 
the above example, it offers a reason for claiming the exis­
tence of a long thin object.
Finally, it approaches, though only approaches, a ;justi­
fication of Locke’s admission of sensitive knowledge; for in 
a case of sensitive perception I might well be sensing the 
same thing (an x) in two different ways and thereby have a . 
reason for taking there to be an x - and thus be entitled 
(when correct) to the tab ’knowledge’. But, because one who 
has sensitive knowledge need not be sensing something in two 
different ways, an appeal to the value of * corroboration cannot 
in itself justify sensitive knowledge. In this connection, 
however, he also suggests that in seeing and feeling the same 
thing, I have an additional reason for thinking there is such 
a thing - which implies that insofar as.I simply sense, e.g., 
a spot of red, I have a reason for thinliing there is a spot 
of red: i.e., that in this sense sensible ideas offer a 
"testimony" to the existence of external objects - though not.
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as Locke sometimes suggests, a testimony which in each parti­
cular case is the "sole judge"^ on the matter - for instance, 
one must allow for the possibility of different types of testi 
mony, the conflict of various testimonies, the assessment of 
conflicting testimonies in terms of stronger and weaker 
grounds, etc., and this would be seriously limited by any 
claim that having such-and-such a sensible idea of red at time 
T is the sole arbiter of whether or not there is (or was) an 
instance of red at T. Indeed, otherwise there would be no 
room for having an additional reason in sensing the same thing 
in two different ways.
As far as applying the point to sensitive knowledge is 
concerned, there are two considerations of particular impor­
tance: (l) If sensitive knowledge is accepted as such because 
in sensing an x one has a reason for believing that there is 
an X, if it is simply on the basis of the strength of this 
reason, or the strength of the evidence my sensing an x pro­
vides for the belief adopted, then it will be difficult for 
Locke to confine knowledge of the existence of externals to 
sensitive knowledge. For, it seems possible to have specific 
cases of other types of belief in existence (i.e., where such 
a belief is not confined to objects actually present to the
See also his remarks: "the assurance we have from our senses
themselves, that they-do not err in the information they 
give us of the existence of things without us" (E IV xi 3, 
p.323; my emphasis).
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senses^) where the reasons one has provide stronger grounds 
or evidence for the belief one holds than the grounds provided 
simply by one's sensing an x for the belief that an x exists. 
Indeed, sensitive knowledge thus conceived seems to stand on 
a relatively slim ground in general. And, if it be objected 
that sensing an x is not the only reason one must have in 
order to qualify for having sensitive knowledge of the exis­
tence of an X, then the problem remains of what else 
necessary and whether the necessary supplement can justify 
Locke's restriction of the knowledge of the existence of 
external objects to those actually present to the senses.
(2 ) If the point is to be applied to sensitive knowledge 
and if the notion of sensitive knowledge is to have any wide­
spread application, it must not be made a necessary condition 
that one actually goes through the process of inferring 'There 
is an x' from 'I sense an x*. Rather, the notion of having a 
reason, as opposed to that of giving a reason, would have to 
be emphasised, and even here the demands made by 'having a 
reason* should not be overly elaborate in terms of the ability 
to articulate one's reasons and therefore the ability to de­
scribe what one senses.
Leibniz, on the other hand, adopts a position (a) which 
accepts that the'connection between visible and tangible ideas, 
in those cases where I see and feel the seane thing, is important.
^Or, of course, to oneself and God.
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as one kind of connection among others, but (b) which claims 
the existence of external objects that are not actually 
present to the senses, and (c) which also claims that we can 
know that such objects exist. For him, "the truth of sensible 
things is justified by their connection" (lIE IV xi 1-10, p.512, 
G 426; al-soNE IV ii l4, pp 421-22, G 355-56; Œ  IV iv 1-5, 
p.445, G 373), the justification consisting in the fact that 
what we sense follows (for the most part) an orderly pattern 
the order of which we can effectively explain and predict by 
reference to external objects corresponding to our sensible 
ideas. This provides us with as much certainty as we need and 
can have on such matters: "And as these reasons and observa­
tions give us the means of judging the future as related to 
our interest, and as success corresponds with our rational 
judgment, we could not demand, nor have indeed, a greater cer­
tainty regarding these objects." (lIE IV xi 1-10, p.513, G 426).
1
Whatever such a view might amount to in detail, Leibniz 
introduces a related, but slightly different, approach in the 
following passage: "l believe that we might extend the appel­
lation of knowledge and of certainty beyond actual sensations.
Generally speaking, Leibniz does not provide the det8.il he 
might have been expected to on this point, either in the 
New Essays or, indeed, in his earlier discussion with 
Foucher to which he refers in the New Essays (l^ IV ii 14, 
p.420, G 354-55; and see Langley's references) or in "On 
the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Phenomena" 
(Langley, pp 717-20, G vii 319-22).
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since clearness and manifestness go beyond, which I consider 
as a species of certainty; and it would undoubtedly be folly 
seriously to doubt whether there are men in the world when we 
do not see any. To doubt seriously is to doubt in relation to 
the practical, and we might take certainty as a knowledge of 
truth which v;e cannot doubt in relation to the practical with­
out madness; and sometimes we take it still more generally, 
and apply it to cases where we could not doubt without deserving 
to be severely blamed. But evidence would be a luminous cer­
tainty, i.e. where we do not doubt because of the connection 
we see between ideas. According to this definition of cer­
tainty, we.are certain that Constantinople is in the world, 
that Constantine, Alexander the Great, and Julius Caesar lived. 
It is true that some peasant of Ardennes might justly doubt 
about these, for lack of information; but a man of letters 
and of the world could not do so without great derangement of 
mind" (IŒ IV xl 1-10, p.513, G 426).
Tlie basic and interesting point here is that, according 
to Leibniz, although it is true that we cannot strictly demon­
strate the existence of external objects corresponding to our 
sensible ideas - either those which are or have been actually 
present to the senses or those which are not or have not been 
so present - from premises which either refer only to the 
existence of immediate objects (i.e., oneself or one's own
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ideas) or are themselves necessary truths,^ we can have good 
reasons for believing in the existence of such objects, 
reasons which can ultimately be based in the "connections" 
there are amongst our sensible ideas, and thus reasons of the 
type Locke gives in pointing out that we often see and feel 
the same thing (as well as Implying the general point that, 
after all, having sensible ideas is to sense something). In­
deed, in this light, it is interesting to note Locke's con­
joined suggestion that because I can often tell beforehand 
what sensible ideas I shall have in those cases where I adopt 
some course of bodily action - e.g., to write such-and-such 
words on a piece of paper - I therein have a reason for claiming 
that the external objects involved in my succesfully performing 
such an action do in fact exist - i.e., that I have in fact 
written such-and-such words on a piece of paper (see E IV xi 
7, pp 331-32). Consequently, to doubt seriously the existence
Thus, see NE IV ii 14, p.422, G 355: "it must, however, be
admitted that none of this certitude is of the hipest de­
gree, as you have well recognized. For it is not impossible, 
metaphysically speaking, that there maj' be a dream continu­
ous and lasting like the life of a man ; NE III iv 2, pp 
318-19, G 275: "there is also no exact demonstration
proving that the objects of our senses and of the simple 
ideas which the senses present to us are outside us"; also 
"On the Method of Distinguishing Real from Imaginary Pheno­
mena", Locke's view that sensitive knowledge is "not alto­
gether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deduc­
tions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas 
of our own minds" (S IV xi 3, p.327; see also E IV ii l4, 
p.1 8 5) implies this, but during the course of his discussion 
of sensitive knowledge he sometimes seems to waver and try 
for something stronger.
195.1
of an external world - and therefore to doubt in any way that 
could affect one's behaviour - would simply be a case of mad­
ness, mental derangement, etc., i.e., a complete loss of 
reason. And, if the doubter has any control over his faculties, 
he is subject to heavy criticism for embracing such doubts. 
Furthermore, this point can hold for cases where the external 
objects involved are not (or have not been) actually present 
as well as for cases where the external objects are (or have 
been) actually present. Txius, it would be extremely unreason­
able for us to doubt of the existence of Constantinople, 
Alexander the Great, or Julius Caesar - though it would not be 
so for a peasant who lacked the information at our command.
Now, Locke himself urges not,only that we have good 
reasons for believing in the existence of external objects 
actually present to the senses, but also that we have good 
reasons for claiming the existence of external objects beyond 
such a radius: "And, therefore, thou^i it be highly probable
that millions of men do now exist, yet, whilst I am alone, 
writing this, I have not that certainty of it which we strictly 
call knowledge; though the great likelihood of it puts me past 
doubt, and it be reasonable for me to do several things upon 
the confidence that there are men . . . now in the world; but 
this is but probability, not knowledge.
"lO. Vfhereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a 
thing it is for a man of a narrow knowledge, who having reason
196.
given him to judge of the different evidence and probability 
of things, and to be swayed accordingly; how vain, I say, it 
is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable 
of it; and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and 
act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they can­
not be made out so evident, as to surmount every the least (l 
will not say reason, but) pretence of doubting." (E IV xi 9-10, 
pp 334-35; I quote at length because this passage represents 
certain elements in Locke's thoughts which are not always 
clearly brought out).
But, as this quotation shows, he apparently feels that, 
in any case of perceiving the existence of objects actually 
present to the senses, one has stronger reasons for adopting 
a belief in the existence of such an object than one can have 
in any case of believing in the existence of an external ob­
ject which is not actually present to the senses or in any 
case of judging on the basis of evidence that an external 
object exists - e.g., that Julius Caesar or Alexander the 
Great existed. And this is what Leibniz is not prepared to 
allow. Thus, not only is Leibniz bringing the point to bear 
that in the relevant ordinary sense of 'know', one can know 
of the existence of external objects, insofar as one can have 
good reasons for believing in the existence of external ob­
jects, but he is also suggesting that one can have just as 
strong a set of reasons for believing in the existence of an
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object which is not present to the senses as for believing in 
the existence of one which is present to the senses, and, 
therefore, that in admitting the possibility of sensitive know­
ledge, one can give no grounds, in terms of the relative 
strength of evidence attendant upon all cases of sensitive 
perception, for excluding the possibility of knowing the exis­
tence of objects not present to the senses.
From the viewpoint of Leibniz’s over-all philosophical 
position, however, the situation is somewhat more complicated 
than this - notably in view of his suggestion that the material 
world is only an appearance - albeit in varying degrees a 
"well-founded" one - and that the universe in reality consists 
in an infinity of immaterial, mental substances.^ For, in 
order to know this position to be true, one must, according to 
Leibniz’s views on knowledge, have reasons which are sufficiently 
strong to modify the evidence provided by the connections be­
tween our sensible ideas and the truths supported by such 
connections. Consequently, this would seem to be at least
For instance, see NE IV iii 1-6, p.428, G 359: "We must con­
sider that matter taken as a complete being (i.e. secondary 
matter in distinction from the primary, which is something 
purely passive and consequently incomplete) is only a mass, 
or that which results therefrom, and that every real mass 
supposes simple substances or real unities, and when we 
further consider what belongs to the nature of these real 
unities, i.e. perception and its consequences, we are trans­
ferred so to speak into another world, that is to say into 
the intelligible world of substances while before we have 
been only among the phenomena of the senses." (minus italics).
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part of the force of his adding, in his appeal to the connec­
tions between sensible ideas as a justification for believing 
in an existing external world, a clause like "insofar as they 
conform to the truths of reason"; "l think the true criterion 
concerning the objects of the senses is the connection of the 
phenomena, i.e. the connection of that which takes place in 
different places and times, and in the experience of different 
men who are themselves, each to the others, very important 
phenomena in this respect. And the connection of the phenomena 
which guarantees the trutlis of fact in respect to sensible 
things outside of us, is verified by means of the truths of 
reason; as the phenomena of optics are explained by geometry.** 
(NS IV ii l4, p. 422, G 355; unfortunately, he does not ela­
borate on the analogy with geometry and optics). This notion 
might have some connection with his view that sensible ideas 
are simply confused ideas which by analysis theoretically can
be broken down into distinct components (e.g., see NE II ii 1,
1
pp 120-21, G 109) - components which no doubt represent reality
much more effectively than the confused composites and the
sorting out of which is partly in the realm of truths of rea-
2
son. But it seems more easily connected with the fact that
^Kence, sensible ideas of Locke’s so-called secondary qualities 
have, for Leibniz, some correspondence with external reality 
See NE II viii 13, 15, 21, pp 132-34, G 118-20.
p
V/liatever the connections between this fact and his view that 
sensible ideas are confused complex ideas may be.
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a number of definite general propositions underline Leibniz’s 
views on what exists, propositions such as ’Nature makes no 
leaps’, or ’The difference between two individuals is always 
more than numerical’, or ’God creates in accordance with the 
richest possible variety combined with the simplest hypotheses’, 
and propositions which he sometimes offers as "truths of 
reason". Both points will be raised again in the next section.
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5. Co-existence
For the sake of convenience I shall divide the following 
discussion into two parts: A. Concerning the possibilities of
knowledge in ’^ natural philosophy", where the latter expression 
is used loosely to cover what would now be called natural 
science;^ and B. Concerning the possibilities of knowledge in 
metaphysics, where not too fine a point can be put on the use 
of ’metaphysics*. In a sense, however, they are not equal 
parts, primarily because Locke and Leibniz- have generally more 
to say about the possibilities of knowledge in natural philo­
sophy than in metaphysics,
A. Natural Philosophy
In general, Locke feels that the possibilities of human 
knowledge in this area are extremely slim. Indeed, the truths 
we can come to know in this case "are so few, and of so little 
moment, that we may justly look on our certain general know­
ledge of substances as almost none at all." (E IV vi 15, p.266) 
Basically, his reason for adopting such a view is that for the
Locke himself uses the word * science * in a more restricted 
way, such that science is impossible without knowledge or 
certainty (as conceived by him) - thus his claim that 
"natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science^ 
(E IV xii 10, p.350; minus italics). Leibniz occasionally, 
seems to use * science* in a rather less strict way, al­
though he does not sharply distinguish his use from Locke*s 
(e.g., see his comments in NE IV xii 9-10, p.525, G- 435).
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most part we cannot acquire the knowledge of necessary truth 
in natural philosophy - i.e., we cannot perceive a necessary 
connection between the ideas of qualities co-existing in cor­
poreal substances (e.g., see E IV iii 10, p.200). The examples 
which he gives (or suggests) of the few possible exceptions to 
our ignorance are * Figure necessarily supposes extension’,^ 
’Receiving or communicating motion by impulse supposes solidity* 
(E IV iii l4, p.203), ’No subject can in the same respect have 
more than one determinate of the same determinable, e.g., no­
thing can be both red and green in the same respect* (E IV iii 
15, p.204), ’Two bodies cannot be in exactly the same place’
(E IV vii 5, p.272), ’One and the same thing cannot simulta­
neously occupy two different places* (E II xxvii 1, pp 439-40), 
’Vrnatever has a beginning has a cause* (E IV x 3, p.308). Be­
yond these truths and some few more our faculties do not extend.
As indicated above, Leibniz does not share Locke’s 
narrow view of knowledge and therefore holds that, in the re­
levant ordinary sense of ’know', the human mind can know a 
great many truths in natural philosophy - althou^ he admits 
that, in many cases, we cannot perceive a necessary agreement 
between the relevant ideas, i.e., that we do not thereby
^Tiiis would, I thinlc, be more suitable for his purpose if re­
versed to read 'Extension supposes figure*.
2 ‘ ‘Leibniz raises a possible objection to this particular proioo
sition - see NE IV vii 5, p.466, G- 389; also i;iE II iv 1,
p.124, G 112-13.
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possess a knowledge of necessary truth (e.g., see NE IV vi 8, 
13, pp 460-62, G 385). Now, except for the fact that (a)
Locke does not clearly distinguish knowledge as conceived by 
him from knowledge in the relevant ordinary sense, and (b) in 
severing knowledge on his strict view from mere judgment or 
opinion, he tends to thinlc that we cannot have as strong a 
case for holding to any general contingent truth as we can for 
holding (as a result of perceiving it) to a necessary truth - 
i.e., except for such elements in Locke’s general view of 
knowledge, the non-verbal differences between him and Leibniz 
on the question of the extent of human knowledge in natural 
philosophy might seem very few. For, on occasion at least, 
Leibniz might seem to be claiming that the possibilities of 
the knowledge of necessary truth in natural philosophy (i.e., 
knowledge in Locke’s sense) are relatively slim, whereas the 
possibilities of knowledge in the relevant ordinary sense are 
wide open.
Moreover, if one takes certain remarks which Locke makes 
concerning the "judgment of probability" - viz., (l) "most of 
the propositions we thinli, reason, discourse - nay, act upon, 
are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth: 
yet some of them border so near upon certainty, that we make 
no doubt at all about them; but assent to them as firmly, and 
act, according to that assent, as resolutely as if they were 
infallibly demonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was
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perfect and certain" (E IV xv 2, p.364); and (2) "the mind, 
if it will -proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds 
of probability, and see how they make more or less for or 
against any proposition, before it assents to or dissents from 
it; and, upon a due balancing the whole, reject or receive it, 
with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the prepon- 
derandy of the greater grounds of probability on the one side 
or the other. For example . . . j^ if someon^ tells me he saw 
a man in England, in the midst of a sharp winter, walk upon 
water hardened with cold, this has so great conformity with 
what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed by the 
nature of the thing itself to assent to it; unless some mani­
fest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact.
But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics, 
who never saw nor heard of any such thing before, there the 
whole probability relies on testimony: and as the relators are 
more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to 
speak contrary to the truth, so that matter of fact is like to 
find more or less belief. lïiough to a man whose experience 
has always been quite contrary, and who has never heard of 
anything like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will 
scarce be able to find belief" (E IV xv 5, pp 366-6?) - know­
ledge in the relevant ordinary sense of ’knowledge* becomes 
indistinguishable from certain forms of so-called "judgment 
of probability",
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Thus, he himself considers the ability to perceive neces­
sary agreement between ideas, and the ability to estimate the 
strength of evidence for a general contingent truth, suffi- • 
ciently similar to v/rite: "in both these cases, the faculty
which finds out the means, and rightly applies them, to dis­
cover certainty in the one, and probability in the other, is 
that which we call reason. For, as reason perceives the neces­
sary and indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one 
to another, in each step of any demonstration that produces 
knowledge; so it likewise perceives the probable connexion of 
all the ideas or proofs one to another, in every step of a dis­
course, to which it will think assent due," (S IV xvii 2, p.387) 
In the relevant ordinary sense of ’knowledge’, then, the dis­
tinction Locke draws between "knowledge and non-knowledge’’ 
actually falls between "certain" knowledge or "true" knowledge 
- i.e., the knowledge of necessary truth - on the one hand, 
and other forms of knowledge, plus whatever else might fall 
under "judgment", on the other^ (although he himself does not 
clearly see this).
Tlierefore, in advocating the widespread search for
Indeed, the very fact that he often uses expressions like 
’certain knowledge’ or ’true knowledge’ - or, similarly,
’real certainty’ -.-indicates this. Thus, his use on one 
occasion of the expression "would serve us only for ex­
perimental (not universal) knowledge" (E IV vi 7, p.256) 
tends to represent his position more-accurately in terms 
of ordinary usage.
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probability via empirical methods in natural philosophy, he 
is in effect allowing for the possibility of widespread know­
ledge in the ordinary sense of ’knowledge’. Thus, note the 
following addition he makes in the second edition of the Essay, 
an addition which has a slightly "sore thumb" effect when set 
beside his general theory of knowledge: "Experience is that
which in this part we must depend on. And it were to be wished 
that it were more improved. We find the advantages some men’s 
generous pains have this way brought to the stock of natural 
knowledge. And if others . . . had been so wary in their ob­
servations, and sincere in their reports as those who call 
themselves philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance 
with the bodies here about us, and our insigiit into their 
powers and operations had been yet much greater." (E IV iii 
16, p.206). And given this point, his position in relation to 
Leibniz seems even closer still. Thus, there seems to be no 
reason for Locke not to agree with Leibniz’s suggestion that, 
in natural philosophy, one can frame hypotheses from which a 
wide variety of mutually independent consequences can be drawn, 
and, if the latter are verified by reference to empirical 
phenomena, then the given hypothesis is highly probable - and 
that one can in this sense explain observed connections (see 
NE IV xii 4-6, pp 520-21, G 431-32; NE IV irvii 5-6, pp 565-66,
G 466). Nor, presumably, would Locke object to the point that 
mathematical necessary truths can be extremely useful to the
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natural philosopher in developing his hypotheses. Nor does 
his position exclude the use that analytic points might have 
for a discipline such as psychology - although his views on 
trifling propositions might make him somewhat less enthusiastic 
than Leibniz would be in this respect.
Nevertheless, Leibniz does seem, at least on occasion, 
to differ from Locke’s view in one very important respect - 
viz., in suggesting that we can have more knowledge in natural 
philosophy than Locke is prepared to allow, where knowledge is 
to be understood Locke conceives it, i.e., as the knowledge 
of necessary truth. Before developing this point - in an ad­
mittedly tentative way because I- do not find the detail of 
Leibniz’s thought very clear in this respect and the fault is 
not necessarily his - the following observations are of some 
value.
Locke is concerned with the possibilities of real know­
ledge in natural philosophy not only in the sense of ’real 
knowledge’ whi'ch demands the knowledge of necessary truth, but 
also in the sense which demands that what is known is not 
simply an identical truth (see E IV vi 9, p.257). Indeed-, re­
presenting his concern as being one wûth whether or not we can 
perceive a necessary connection between the ideas of qualities 
co-existing in substances, itself implies such a view. Now, 
although he feels that, for the most part, the possibilities
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of our knowing such non-identical truths are nil, he often 
suggests that the propositions about substances which we do 
consider and which we can manage to confirm or disconfirm via 
empiricalmethods are in reality necessarily true or false.^ 
For, our not knowing p to be necessarily true does not entail 
that p is not necessarily true, or in Locke’s terminology, 
our not perceiving a necessary agreement between ideas does 
not entail that such ideas do not necessarily agree (and thus 
his distinction between certainty of knowledge and certainty 
of truth; E IV vi 3, p.252). And, he suggests, substances do 
(in a sense) have real essences from which their properties 
flow; but, from our limited vievjpoint, we simply cannot per-- 
ceive them.
Leibniz agrees with the point that in natural philsophy 
we often cannot know that a given proposition is necessarily 
true, although such a proposition is in fact necessarily true 
(e.g., see NE IV i 1-2, p.400, G 3 3 8 - 3 9 ) But, as indicated
Tiius a natural philosopher, in making his "judgments of pro­
bability", would often have to use ’It is probably the case 
that ...I in such a way that it does not imply ’It is pos­
sibly the case that not ...’, in order to be completely 
accurate.
2
Such a view could well receive support from the following re­
marks on truth: "it were then better to place truths in
the relation between the objects of ideas which causes the 
one to be or not to be included in the other" (ImE IV v 1-2, 
p.451, G 377). If taken to extremes, however, the possi­
bility of a contingent truth, and therefore the possibility 
of the necessary/contingent truth distinction itself, at 
least as applied to general truths, would be dismissed. 
Similarly, if his better known claim - ’A true proposition
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above, in theory at least, he is opposed to the view that a 
necessary truth can have a non-identical form (using ’non­
identical* in a reasonably wide and flexible sense). Now, 
waiving the points (a) that the examples which Locke gives of 
necessary truths which we do know in natural philosophy, and 
which Leibniz for the most part accepts, do not seem to have 
identical forms, and (b) that the propositions which according 
to Locke are necessarily true but which we do not know to be 
necessarily true, and which are accepted by Leibniz as such, 
are even more implausible as candidates for identicals, there 
seems to be a certain amount of friction between admitting 
that a given affirmative proposition in natural philosophy can 
be confirmed by empirical techniques and yet claiming that 
such a proposition has the form of an identicai>(butosee'below, 
pp 219-26). Moreover, if he is suggesting with Locke that a 
proposition which asserts that such-and-such qualities co-exist 
in substances (where *A co-exists with B* does not entail 
*A (or B) exists’) can be a necessary truth, then on this 
point too his "identicism" wobbles. In this light, consider: 
"We know almost as certainly that the heaviest of all bodies 
known here below is fixed, as we know certainly that it will 
be light to-morrow. Tliis is because we have tried it a hundred
is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject’ 
- were taken to extremes, the possibility of propositions 
which could be either true or false and therefore contin­
gent in this sense, also seems to be rejected.
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thousand times; it is an experimental certainty, and of fact, 
although we do not know the bond which unites the fixity with 
the other qualities of this body." (NE IV vi 8, p.460, G 385; 
my emphasis).
To see in what way and to what extent Leibniz seems to 
opt for the knowledge of necessary truth in natural philosophy, 
it is useful to consider Locke’s development of his argument
in terms of real essences and note Leibniz’s general reactions.
1In adopting a critical attitude towa,rds real essences, 
Locke appears to level his guns at a number of different things 
- things which he himself does not always carefully set apart. 
He does, however, distinguish real from nominal essences, such 
that the nominal essence of a so-and-so is the abstract idea 
of that so-and-so: "it being evident that things are ranlced
under names into sorts or species, only as they agree to cer­
tain abstract ideas, to which we have annexed those names, the
essence of each genus, or sort, comes to be nothing but that
abstract idea which the general, or sortal . . . name stands 
for." (E III iii 15, pp 26-27). Now, as previously indicated, 
his view of a nominal essence suggests not only that, e.g., 
what a man essentially is is the idea of_atman: but' also : that
i'/hat’ a-man essentially is is the idea signified by the word
^See E III lii-vi, pp 14-97.
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’man’ - views which are unacceptable to Leibniz and which are 
unacceptable full stop. To avoid such difficulties, then, it 
is worthwhile to consider Locke’s view as: the nqminal essence
of an X is N if and only if the abstract idea of an x is the 
idea of N. In this sense, the nominal essence of a so-and-so 
can be said to be "solely determined" by the abstract idea of 
that so-and-so rather than saying that it literally is such an 
abstract idea. Furthermore, the abstract idea of N is not to 
be confused with the abstract idea signified by the word ’N ’.
Locke also distinguishes "two opinions" concerning real 
essences (of corporeal substances at least): "The one is of
those who, using the word essence for they know not what, sup­
pose a certain number of those essences, according to which 
all natural things are made, and wherein they do exactly every 
one of them partake, and so become of this or that species.
The other and more rational opinion is of those who look on 
all natural things to have a real, but uniinown, constitution 
of their insensible parts; from which flow those sensible qua­
lities vrhich serve us to distinguish them one from another, 
according as we have occasion to rani-: them into sorts, under 
common denominations." (S III iii 17, pp 27-28).
Now, the first "opinion" which Locke introduces here 
seems to incorporate a number of different views, views which 
he himself rejects: (a) The (real) essence of a sort is created 
by nature and has nothing to do with what the idea of that sort
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is of (this is related to the claim to real meanings, where 
the meaning of a word is purported to be something created by 
nature and not something created by the human mind), (b) Tliere 
are only a relatively small number of such essences, in (at 
least) one of which any existing substance must "partake",
(c) There is no theoretical question of whether or not a given 
individual does or does not "partake" in such-and-such an 
essence, although in our ignorance we cannot in fact allocate 
individuals to their correct essences. (d) Indeed, such 
essences, instead of being of sorts of things, or perhaps in 
addition to being of sorts of things, are of particular things^ 
and even, perhaps, are had by particulars in the sense that 
particulars have properties (for Locke’s attack on such a set 
of views, see especially E III vi, pp 56-97).
The second notion of a real essence, and one which he 
finds "more rational", is that which considers the real essence 
of an X to be the "logical ground" of both the defining
And thus, perhaps, the initial reason for Locke to turn to a 
.consideration of essences. For he embarks on such a journey 
during the course of a discussion of general terms and ab­
stract ideas which is in part designed to secure the claim 
that all things that exist are only particulars (see E III 
iii 6, p.16; E III iii 1, p.l4). And if essences were ac­
cepted- in a sense in which they are not abstract ideas or 
determined by abstract ideas (which for Locke are particu­
lars in the relevant sense) and in which they are not- of 
sorts of particulars but are of particulars themselves and 
had by particulars, then they might well pose a threat to 
the claim that all things are particular.
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properties of an x and whatever essential properties an x 
might have other than its defining properties. Thus: "By
this real essence I mean, that real constitution of.anything, 
which is the foundation of all those properties that are com­
bined in, and are constantly found to co-exist with the nominal 
essence . . . .  But essence, even in this sense, relates to 
a sort, and supposes a species . . . . v.g. supposing the 
nominal essence of gold to be a body of such a peculiar colour 
and weiglit, with malleability and fusibility, the real essence 
is that constitution of the parts of matter on which these 
qualities and their union depend; and is also the foundation 
of its solubility in aoua regia and other properties, accom­
panying that complex idea." (E III vi 6, pp 61-62; see also 
E III vi 2-3, pp 57-58). In this sense of ’real essence*, the 
real essences of modes and simples are identical with their 
nominal essences and are therefore knowable by us (e.g., see 
E III iv 3, p.32; and thus the possibility of real knowledge 
in mathematics). In the case of substances, however, real 
and nominal essences are generally distinct and the real essence 
is generally unknown to us (and thus the relative impossibility 
of knowledge in natural philosophy). It is in this sense of 
’real essence’, therefore, that real essences concern us.
In this connection, it is important to bear two distinc-
In this connection, he does not consider the need for axioms 
and postulates, in addition to definitions, in geometry.
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tions in mind: (l) In referring to the real but unknown con­
stitution of a substance, Locke is referring to something 
distinct from the * I know not what’ character of substance in 
general (see E II xxiii 1-4, pp 390-95). For the real consti- 
tutiôn of a substance referred to here is of a sort of sub­
stance and not of. substance in general (although he might be 
prepared to make the point that the character of substance in 
general of which we are ignorant - namely, v/hat it is in non­
relational terms - does count as the real essence of substance 
in general).
(2) In discussing the real essence or constitution of a sub­
stance, Locke often refers to the internal, insensible struc­
ture of a substance, and, in the case of a material substance, 
eventually identifies it as the primary qualities of its minute, 
insensible parts, in accordance with "the corpuscularian hypo­
thesis" (see E IV iii 11, pp 200-01; E IV iii 16, p.205). Now, 
if we refer to the primary qualities of the insensible parts 
of a substance as its corpuscular structure, althougli he sug­
gests that the real essence of a (material) substance is its 
corpuscular structure, the real essence of a substance, in the 
sense of ’real essence* which concerns us here, is not logically 
identical with the corpuscular structure of that substance.
In other words, what he means by ’the real essence of a sub­
stance’ in this sense is not the corpuscular structure of a 
substance; i.e., the general idea of the real essence of a
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substance is not the idea of the corpuscular structure of a 
substance. For * the corpuscular structure of a substance* 
does not mean the logical ground from which the defining and 
non-defining necessary properties of such-and-such a sort of 
sulSstance follow, despite the fact that the corpuscular struc­
ture of a substance may well be just such a ground. Thus, the 
way is open for Locke to suggest that the real essence of a 
substance might be "yet more remote from our comprehension" 
than its corpuscular structure (E IV iii 11, p.200), and to 
write: "l have here instanced in the corpuscularian hypothesis, 
as that which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible ex­
plication of those qualities of bodies; and I fear the weak­
ness of human understanding is scarce able to substitute 
another, which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery 
of the necessary connexion and co-existence of the powers 
which are to be observed united in several sorts of them.
This at least is certain, that, whichever hypothesis be clearest 
and truest, (for of that it is not my business to determine,) 
our knowledge concerning corporeal substances will be very 
little advanced by any of them, till we are made to see what 
qualities and powers of bodies have a necessary connexion or 
repugnancy one with another." (E IV iii 16, pp 205-06). In­
deed, at one point he even suggests with considerable confi­
dence that the properties which constitute the real essence of 
an X may well not all be properties which contain no reference
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to other things: "This is certain Q  :: things, however ab­
solute and entire they seem in themselves, are but retainers 
to other parts of nature, for that which they are most taken 
notice of by us. Their observable qualities, actions, and 
powers are owing to something without them; and there is not 
so complete and perfect a part that we know of nature, which 
does not owe the being it has, and the excellences of it, to 
its nei^bours; and we must not confine our thoughts within 
the surface of any body, but look a great deal further, to 
comprehend perfectly those qualities that are in it." (E IV 
vi 11, p.2 6 2).
In passing one might also note that not only is Locke*s 
proposal of corpuscular structure as the real essence of a 
substance tentative because primarily designed to provide an 
example of what the real essence of corporeal substances might 
be, but his claim that the human mind is incapable of acquiring 
knowledge of such essences (a) is not made completely without 
reservation and (b) is intended as a general contingent state­
ment about human faculties - i.e., one which presumably 
asserts a factual but not a logical impossibility: "what
qualities and powers of bodies have a necessary connexion or 
repugnancy one with another; which in the present state of 
philosophy I think we know but to a very small degree: and I 
doubt whether, with those faculties we have, we shall ever be 
able to carry our general knowledge . . .  in this part much
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further'! (E IV ill 16, p.206); '|This way of getting and im­
proving our knowledge [of particular truths?] in substances 
only by e:{perience and history, which is all that the weelzness 
of our faculties in this state of mediocrity which we are in in 
this world can attain to, makes me suspect that natural philo­
sophy is not capable of being made a science . . . .  Experi­
ments and historical observations we may have, . . . but be­
yond this I fear our talents reach not, nor are our faculties,
as I guess, able to advance." (E IV xii 10, p.350),
Now, given the interpretation of real and nominal essences 
outlined above - viz., that a nominal essence of a sort is 
solely determined by the abstract idea of that sort, and that 
a real essence is the logical ground of both the nominal essence 
and "propria" of that sort - to be consistent, Leibniz ought 
to reject real essences and claim that all essences are nominal. 
For, admitting real essences entails admitting non-identical 
necessary truths. But, Leibniz does not view Locke*s position 
on essences in quite this way and, as I have indicated, he is
to some extent riglit in doing so. For, Locke’s notion of a
nominal essence also has a nominalistic thread woven in it, a 
thread which Leibniz cannot accept and one which therefore 
tends to obscure from his view the threads unravelled in the 
preceding discussion. Consequently, the thing to do now is to 
see to what extent he agrees or disagrees with Locke’s position
2 1 7 .
1
on essences as I have represented it and not precisely as 
Locke himself actually puts it or as Leibniz understands it, 
and to see whether he feels that the natural philosopher qua 
natural philosopher acquires, or can acquire, a knowledge of 
essences.
Leibniz proposes his own distinction between real and 
nominal definitions as more or less a reconstruction of what 
Locke calls ’real and nominal essences’; "it seems to me that 
our language makes extreme innovations in the method of expres­
sion, We have indeed spoken hitherto of nominal and causal or 
real definitions, but not within my knowledge of essences 
other than real . . . .  Essence is at bottom nothing less 
than the possibility of that which we thinlc. VJhat we assume 
as possible is expressed by the definition; but this definition 
is only nominal when it does not express at the same time, 
possibility; for then we may doubt whether this definition 
expresses anything real, i.e. possible, until experience comes 
to our aid to make us know this reality a posteriori, when the 
thing is actually found in the world; and this suffices for 
the defect of the reason, which made us know the reality a 
priori by exposing the cause or the possible generation of the 
definite thing. " (îIE III iii 15, p.315, G 272-73).
This statement suggests to me the following position:
^And in the sense of ’real essence’ appropriate to this dis 
cussion.
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(1) In the sense of ’definition’ relevant here, a defi­
nition is of a sort of thing and not of a word, and it there­
fore has a truth-value.
(2) The nominal definition of an x consists in a state­
ment of the distinguishing or defining properties of an x, but 
in such a way that it does not "express" the possibility of an 
X. On this view, the nominal definition of an x provides a 
statement of the nominal essence of an x.
(3 ) The real definition of an x consists in a statement 
of the distinguishing or defining properties of an x,^ but in 
such a way that it does "express" the possibility of an x. On 
this view, the real definition of an x also provides a state­
ment of the nominal essence of an x, but does it in such a way 
that we can see the possibility of an x.
But Leibniz says a number of things which seem, in vary­
ing degrees, to run contrary to such an interpretation. For 
instance: "there is only one essence of the thing, but . , .
there are many definitions which express one and the same 
essence, as the same structure or the same city may be repre­
sented by different scénographies according to the different 
sides from which it is regarded." (lŒ III iii 15, p,3l6, G 273) 
If Leibniz is here suggesting that, there may be a number of 
definitions of the same thing which differ as far as what they
^For the moment, I am ignoring any qualifications which might 
be demanded by the notion of a "real causal" definition.
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assert is concerned, then his use of ’definition’ becomes 
puzzling and the above interpretation does not hold. He mi^t, 
however, here have in mind differences with respect to the 
clarity of the definition, or with respect to the fact that 
one definition does, whereas another does not, display the 
possibility of the thing defined (see below, pp 220-22).
Or: "l should prefer to say, in accord with received
usage, that the essence of gold is that which constitutes it 
and which gives it these sensible qualities, which make it 
known and which make its nominal definition, while we should 
have the real and causal definition if we could explain this 
contexture or internal constitution." (NE III iii 18, p.316,
G 273). In this case, Leibniz seems to come very close to 
Locke’s position as I have represented it. For the essence 
or internal constitution of gold seems to correspond to Locke’s 
real essence of gold and the sensible qualities given by a 
nominal definition of gold seem to correspond to those quali­
ties which make up Locke’s nominal essence of gold. And if 
this _is the case, then the preceding interpretation of 
Leibniz’s position is clearly wrong. For then a real defini­
tion -no longer need state merely the nominal essence of a sort.
Some "resolution" of the friction in this respect migiit 
be achieved, however, by drawing upon Leibniz’s theory that 
sensible ideas - even apparently simple ones like those of 
colours or heat - are in reality all highly complex but
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confused ideas: "simple terms cannot have nominal defini­
tions; but . . . terms, when they are simple only as regards 
us (because we have no means of analysing them so as to reach 
the elementary perceptions of which they are composed), as 
heat, cold, yellow, green, can receive a real definition 
which would explain their cause. Thus, the real definition 
of green is that of an entity composed of blue and yellow 
thoroughly mixed, although green is no more susceptible of a 
nominal definition by which we may recognize it than blue or 
yellow." (NE III iv 4-7, pp 319-20, G 275; see also NE II ii 
1, pp 120-21, G 109). But such a "resolution" can be achieved 
only by dropping some of the assumptions which underly the 
real/nominal essence distinction drawn above.
Briefly, it might be developed along the following lines: 
On this view, the nominal definition, of an x (where x is a 
material object, or a property of a material object) seems to 
be a statement which provides the distinguishing characteristics 
of an X, but only in terms of observables, i.e., in terms of 
properties which are necessarily seen, heard, tasted, etc. in 
seeing or hearing or tasting etc. the thing defined. For ex­
ample, the nominal definition of gold might be ’Gold is a metal 
which is yellow and malleable’; in this case, in observing in­
stances of gold we necessarily observe a metal which is yellow 
and malleable. And, since we cannot provide such distinguishing 
properties in the case of green, therefore green does not have
-LThis also seems to clarify the sense of ’eause* relevant here.
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a nominal definition. A real definition of gold, on the other 
hand, is a statement of the distinguishing properties of gold, 
out in terms which take us beyond what is necessarily observed 
in observing instances of gold - whatever such terms might be - 
and presumably take us to the point where we can see the possi­
bility of there being gold.^ Thus, in the case of green, al­
though in observing green we do not in that respect observe 
blue and yellow and, therefore ’Green is blue and yellow’ is 
not a nominal definition, nevertheless, according to this view,
’Green is blue and yellow’ is a real definition of green be­
cause it provides the defining characteristics of green in 
"non-observable" terms. And by 'defining characteristics of 
green* in this context is meant characteristics which are con­
tained in the nominal essence of green - i.e., characteristics 
which are contained in what the abstract idea of green, given 
that it is a sufficiently distinct instance, is an idea of. 
Thus, on this view, green is logically identical with yellow
Such a view would seem to allow for the possibility of levels 
of "real definitions" - i.e., definitions which simply take 
us beyond observables but which do not yet disclose the pos­
sibility of the thing defined (e.g., ’Green is blue and
yellow’?) - before the "ultimate" real definition is reached 
where such a disclosure - is achieved.
^This use of ’ non-observable’ is not intended to exclude the 
fact that it is presumably through empirical observation 
that we are often provided with clues" as to what the real 
definition of a given sort of thing is, and also that ob­
served connections are useful in "confirming" the real 
definitions that one makes.
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and blue; or, any word, used to signify the idea of green is 
used to signify an idea which is of blue and yellow; or, any 
word used to mean green means blue and yellow (although the 
user might not know this; i.e., in this sense he is not using 
such a word to mean blue and yellow) - and this seems to under­
cut an important assumption which underlies Locke’s notion of 
a nominal essence, and, to my mind, is wrong in doing so. For 
sensible ideas do not seem to be confused in this sense.
Now, on this interpretation of Leibniz, it seems to be 
one of the natural philosopher’s tasks to uncover such real 
definitions - definitions the truth of which presumably can 
only finally be known via reason or a priori (for here the 
question is of necessary truth) but which can at least be sug­
gested or "confirmed" by empirical observation (in the way, 
e.g., that experience can be useful to the geometer). Thus, 
in reply to Locke’s complaint that we cannot perceive a neces­
sary connection between primary qualities and secondary quali- 
2
ties, Leibniz irrites: "these sensitive ideas depend in detail
upon the figures and movements, and express them exactly.
^And thus the friction indicated above concerning the empirical 
confirmation of identicals would be eased.
p
“Locke himself tends to run together the point that we cannot 
perceive a connection between primary and secondary quali­
ties and the point that we cannot perceive how primary 
qualities, or a body with such-and-such primary qualities, 
can produce sensible ideas of secondary Qualities in the 
mind (see E IV ill 12-13, pp 201-02; E IV ill 28, pp 220-21)
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although we cannot distinguish therein this detail in the con­
fusion of too great a multitude and minuteness of mechanical 
actions which strike our senses. But if we had reached the 
internal constitution of some bodies, we should see also how 
they must have these qualities, which would themselves be re­
duced to their intelligible reasons; although it would never 
be in our power to recognize them sensibly in these sensitive 
ideas which are a confused resultant of the actions of bodies 
upon us, as, now that we have the perfect [?] analysis of green 
into blue and yellow, and have scarcely anything more to ask 
in regard to it save as related to these ingredients, we are, 
however, incapable of analyzing the ideas of blue and yellow 
in our sensitive idea of green, for the very reason that it is 
a confused idea. It is much the same as we cannot analyze the 
idea of the teeth of the wheel, i.e. of the cause, in the per­
ception of an artificial transparency, which I have noticed 
among the clock-makers, made by the rapid rotation of a cog­
wheel, which makes the teeth disappear, and an Imaginary con­
tinuous transparency appear in their place, composed of the 
successive appearances of the teeth and their intervals, but 
in which the succession is so rapid that our phantasy cannot 
distinguish it. We find then, indeed, these teeth in the dis­
tinct notion of this transparency, but not in this confused 
sensitive perception, whose nature is to be and to remain con­
fused; otherwise if the confusion ceased (as if the .motion
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were so slow that we could observe its parts and their suc­
cession) this notion, i.e. this phantasm of a transparency 
would no longer exist." (îîE IV vi 7, pp 458-59, G 383-84).^
Now, one of the central points in this passage is that 
we can explain the transparency which we sense in terms of the 
rapid rotation of the teeth of the watch’s cog-wheel and, pre­
sumably, can therefore give a real definition of this sort of 
transparency in such terms, and that to ask for greater know­
ledge than this - notably, to ask that our confused sensible 
idea of the transparency be the relatively distinct idea of 
rapidly rotating teeth on a cog-wheel - is to ask for what is 
logically impossible, Tlius, he ends the passage with the point 
that to make such a request and bemoan the fact that it cannot 
be satisfied is to create mythical difficulties: "these suc­
cessive things [i.e., movements of the teeth on a cog-whee:^ 
are confounded in an apparent simultaneity; it is thus easy to 
think that it will be the same as regards other sensitive 
phantasms, of which we have not as yet so perfect an analysis,
See also NE IV iii 8-I6, p.432, G 363-64, re the use of this 
method of "analysis" in physics and the possibility of em­
ploying it in medicine: "Tlie ideas of sensible qualities
are confused, and the powers which should produce them fur­
nish in consequence only ideas into which some confusion 
enters: thus the connections of these ideas can bê kno\m 
otherwise than by experience only as they are reduced to 
the distinct ideas which accompany them, as has been done 
(for example) in regard to the colors of the rainbow and of 
prisms. And this method presents a beginning in analysis 
which is of great use in physics; and by following it I doubt 
not that medicine in time will find itself considerably more 
advanced".
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as of colors, tastes, etc. For, to speak the truth, they de­
serve this name phantasms rather than that of qualities or 
even of ideas. And it would suffice us in all respects to 
understand them as well as this artificial transparency, with­
out its being reasonable or possible to claim a further know­
ledge of them; for to desire these confused phantasms to abide, 
and yet to distinguish therein their ingredients by the 
phantasy itself, is a contradiction, is a desire to have the 
pleasure of being deceived by an agreeable perspective, and to 
desire that at the same time the eye see the deception, which 
would destroy it . . .  . But it often happens that men seek 
nodum in sciroo and make difficulties where there are none, by 
demanding the impossible, and afterwards complaining of their 
impotence and of the limits of their light. " (l\Z IV vi 7, pp 
459-60, G 334-85). Now, for me, this passage both throws a 
great deal of light on Leibniz’s philosophical viei-rpoint and 
is characterised by a high degree of imaginative appeal. But 
the cold fact remains that the complaint which Locke’s position 
expresses is not that our sensible ideas^ cannot be non­
sens ible ideas but that, even granting that the sensible idea 
of green could be a confused idea of blue and yellow, or that
^Or "sensitive phantasms". The fact that Leibniz withdraws the 
term ’idea’ is itself significant. For.to say (e.g.) that 
the sensitive phantasm of green is a confused idea of blue 
and yellow seems less paradoxical than to say that the 
sensible idea of green is a confused idea of blue and yellow.
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this in fact is the case, we in fact cannot perceive that green 
is (really) blue and yellow - or that the indicated trans­
parency is (really) the rapid rotation of the teeth on a cog­
wheel - via examining the relevant abstract ideas. In short, 
we cannot, in the relevant sense, "find these teeth in the 
distinct notion of this transparency". And Leibniz’s argument 
does nothing to ease the force of such a point. Consequently, 
the possibilities of human knowledge in this respect remain 
just as slim as before.
I have already mentioned, however, that the interpreta­
tion of Leibniz given here is only a tentative one. One 
reason for this is that, on a number of occasions, he clearly 
makes the point that nominal definitions are often provisional 
and thereby suggests that they a.re contingent statements:
"Gold may be defined nominally in several ways; you may say 
that it is the heaviest of our bodies, that it is the most 
malleable, that it is a fusible body.which resists the cupel 
and aqua fortis, etc. Each of these marks is good and is suf­
ficient for the recognition of gold, at least provisionally 
and in the present state of our bodies, until a heavier body 
is found . . . .  Thus you may say that in matters which we 
know only empirically, all our definitions are merely provi- 
sional" (NE III iv 16, p.324, G 278-79). But if nominal defi- 
nitions are contingent statements, then they cannot be state­
ments of the nominal essence of the thing defined. Rather,
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they then seem to be statements which provide contingent ob­
servable criteria for our recognising or identifying instances 
of the thing "defined", and then (a) the use of ’definition’ 
in ’nominal definition’ becomes somewhat misleading, and (b) 
the notion of a nominal definition becomes less effective as 
a reconstruction of Locke’s notion of a nominal essence.
Indeed, in discussing nominal definitions in this sense, 
Leibniz even suggests the possibility of our using words - 
e.g., ’gold’ - to mean merely something with an unlmown real 
internal constitution, that we can know things like ’The body 
with the greatest weight has the greatest ductility’, and that 
we can know - empirically and provisionally - (e.g.) that gold 
is the body with the greatest weight and thereby know that 
gold has the greatest ductility (see NE IV vi 4, pp 454-57,
G 380-83; NE III vi 14-17, pp 359-40, G 290-92). And this 
seems to be doing the very thing that Locke is in part working 
so hard against, viz., roughly, to allow the possibility of 
someone using a word-to mean simply an unknown something or 
other, and in doing so, to know something about what that v/ord 
refers to. For, in this case, how can anyone know, evèn pro­
visionally, that gold is the body with the greatest weight; 
and how could anyone discover that some body other than gold 
has the same weight as gold and thereby find out that the pro­
visional nominal definition is inadequate? (see E IV vi 4-6, 
pp 252-55; also E III x 17-18, pp 135-38 and Leibniz’s
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comments). But perhaps I am being unfair to Leibniz through 
failing to understand him on this point. At any rate, however 
this particular problem might sort itself out, I think the 
account of real definitions given above in relation to his 
notion of confused sensible ideas, and of the way he conceives 
the "analytic" task of the natural philosopher in this respect, 
is basically a sound one, and that is sufficient for this 
particular discussion.
B. Metaphysics
Neither Locke nor Leibniz devotes the detailed attention 
to the possibilities of knowledge in metaphysics.which this 
and related questions have subsequently received. Consequently, 
the following discussion is not intended to be comprehensive 
in this respect. For I am working primarily on what they have 
to say on or near the subject and not, for example, conducting 
a careful examination of Leibniz’s various metaphysical 
manoeuvres in order to find out what a typical metaphysician 
of a given sort is doing, or trying to do.
Both men criticise the often misguided practice of meta­
physics, where such a practice at best simply generates a host 
of trifling propositions (see S IV viii 9, pp 299-300^ and
^See also E III x pp 122-47, "Of the Abuse of Words" - a 
chapter in large part devolved to linguistic abuses found 
in philosophical literature.
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Leibniz’s comment s, pp 493-94, G- 411-12). But they differ 
widely on the possibilities of real knowledge in this area, 
Locke holding to the view that we can perceive very few of 
the relevant necessary connections, and Leibniz to the posi­
tion that: "As for real metaphysics, we are beginning, as
it were, to establish it, and we find important truths 
grounded in reason and confirmed by experience, which belong 
to substances in general," (NE IV viii 9, p.495, G 412).
Leibniz does not elaborate to any extent on just how
experience can be used to confirm metaphysical propositions.
For him, possibly one way is through the findings of natural
science, which depends on metaphysics for its general prin- 
%
ciples. For, insofar as the scientific hypotheses (in part) 
derived from metaphysical principles are confirmed by experi­
ence, so the metaphysical principles themselves are confirmed: 
"Such a metaphysic was the demand of ilristotle, it is the 
science . , . which must be as regards the other theoretic 
sciences what the science of happiness is to the arts which 
it needs, and what the architect is to the workmen. This is 
why Aristotle said that the other sciences depend upon meta­
physics as the most general science and must derive from it 
their principles, demonstrated by it." (NE IV viii 9, p.495,
Tliis could provide another reason for ascribing to Leibniz 
the view that the knowledge of necessary truth is more 
prominent in natural philosophy thah Locke allows.
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G 412-13). Examples of such principles would be ’Nature pro­
ceeds by the shortest paths, or at least by the most definite* 
(see NE IV vii 15, p.484, G 4o4) or, perhaps, ’Atoms and the 
void are impossible’ (see NE IV iii 18, p.433, G 364), or even 
’Other things being equal, the simplest hypothesis lies closest 
to the truth’. One should not, however, over-emphasise the 
role experience can have in confirming principles from Leibniz’s 
viev/point; thus, he v/rites concerning Boyle: "who, to speak
the truth, stops a little too much to draw from a great number 
of fine experiments no other conclusion than this which he 
might take as a principle, viz.; that everything in nature 
takes place mechanically, a principle which can be rendered 
certain by reason alone, and never by experiments, whatever 
their number." (NE IV xii 13, pp 526-27, G 437). And this sug­
gests the general point that, if metaphysics is to be relatively 
independent of natural science - i.e., if natural science is 
to depend (to some extent) on metaphysics and not vice versa - 
then, in determining the truth of his propositions, the meta­
physician must rely primarily on means other than confirmation 
provided by the natural scientist. And, for Leibniz, the a 
-priori examination of one’s own ideas appears to provide such 
means. To this extent, then, experience plays only a strictly 
secondary role in metaphysics.
There is apparently another way in which experience can 
be useful to the metaphysician, viz., in providing models for
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describing the general structure of the universe: "And in
matters more general you will find that my views concerning 
the Monads diffused everywhere, their unending duration, the 
conservation of the animal with the soul, the perceptions un­
distinguished in a certain condition, such as the death of 
simple animals, the bodies which it is rational to attribute 
to genii, the harmony of souls and bodies, which causes each 
to follow perfectly its own laws without being disturbed by 
the other and without the necessity of distinguishing therein 
the voluntary or the involuntary: you will find, I say, that 
all these views are entirely conformed to the analogy of the 
things which we observe and which I merely extend beyond our 
observations, without limiting them to certain portions of 
matter or to' certain kinds of actions, and that the only dif­
ference therein is from the great to the small, from the 
sensible to the insensible. " (NS IV xvi 12, p.553, G- 455-56). 
Now, even if the point simply that he is using empirical 
models in constructing his system, it is open to some criticism 
on the grounds that, as far as our ordinary observations are 
concerned, we do not observe soul's and bodies acting in har­
mony and independently according to their respective laws, but, 
rather, observe ourselves moving our own bodies and other 
objects, and feel the effects of other bodies on ourselves or 
of disorders in our own bodies on us, etc. Thus, the models 
he employs in this part of his system are intthisVsènse not
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empirical. Nevertheless, the notion of a world, of monads 
acting in accordance with a pre-established harmony is empiri­
cal to the extent that it draws on certain features of what we 
experience, shapes them, and then extends them to the far 
reaches of the universe. The other important point here, how­
ever, is that constructing a system which in some respects is 
analogous to the world we experience is different from intro­
ducing such analogies in support of such a system, and if 
Leibniz is suggesting anything like the latter point, his state­
ment is even less convincing. For instance, it is no argument 
on behalf of immortality simply to point out that the soul 
which endures ^ after "death" is similar in such-and-such respects 
with the "living" soul we experience. Consequently, in this 
capacity, experience does not provide confirmation.
Finally, another way in which experience migjit be of use 
to the metaphysician, as far as Leibniz is concerned, is sug­
gested by his notion of the a posteriori knowledge of the 
"reality" (possibility) of something. For, such a notion might 
be developed in the following way: in certain cases, we are
unable to see the possibility of something a priori - i.e., 
simply by examining the relevant abstract ideas - but need to 
be shown, or reminded, that such a thing does exist, and thereby 
see its possibility. An example of this procedure - basically, 
that of giving a certain kind of counter-example to a purpor­
tedly necessary truth - might be provided by Leibniz’s intro-
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duction of our knowledge that there was a Julius Caesar as a 
counter-example to Locke’s claim that we cannot know the exis­
tence of any external object not present to the senses. Or, 
consider the following remarks as an attempt to show the pos­
sibility of unnoticed sensible ideas in part by drawing on 
experience: "Thus it is that habit makes us take no notice of
the motion of a mill or a waterfall when we have lived quite 
near it for some time. It is not that the motion does not al­
ways strike our organs, and that something no longer enters 
into the soul corresponding thereto, in virtue of the harmony 
of the soul and the"body, but these impressions which are in 
the soul and the body, being destitute of the attractions of 
novelty, are not strong enough to attract our attention and 
our memory, attached to objects more engrossing. " (-NS Pref., 
p.4-7, G 47; as seen above, Leibniz takes his notion of petites 
perceptiones much further than this). In showing the possi­
bility of something by an empirical appeal, however, one is 
not giving simply an empirical argument. For one thing, the 
step from ’ Tnere is an x ’ to ’An x is possible’ is not itself 
an empirical step. Moreover, in drawing on experience, in 
order to make the argument as strong as possible, one generally 
provides reasons for accepting the purported case of an x as 
an x; and once such reasons are effectively introduced, the 
particular example and'therefore the empirical appeal become 
unnecessary. Thus, e.g., in claiming knowledge of the existence
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of Julius Caesar, one might point out that the fact that there 
was a Julius Caesar is not in dispute, that there are good 
reasons for holding that he existed, and therefore, that if 
one firmly believes on the basis of such reasons that he existed, 
then one knows that he existed; in this case, one is moving 
away from the particular case of knowing Caesar’s existence to 
the general position that anyone who firmly holds vrith good 
reason that p, where p in fact is the case, knows that p.
This suggests another way in which experience m i ^ t  be 
useful to the metaphysician, as far as Leibniz is concerned.
For, as a metaphysician, he is not simply concerned with tabling 
a set of universal and necessary propositions, but is also 
concerned with providing a general picture of the way things 
actually are, i.e., a description of the actual world, created 
by God from a set of alternative possible worlds. And to this 
end an appeal to what we empirically observe might have some 
confirmatory function - where in this case the ’we’ is not re­
stricted to the natural scientist in a laboratory or on a 
field study. For instance, his introduction of petites 
perceptiones to a certain extent involves this type of appeal, 
not simply to help demonstrate the possibility of this sort of 
perception but also to secure its existence. And, to the 
extent that Locke’s claim re the origin of ideas can be called 
metaphysical - or his claim that the mind does not always 
think, or that our ideas are not innate, or even that it is
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(factually) impossible for us to acquire much knowledge in 
natural science - then they can be said to be metaphysical 
claims which in part draw upon experience in this way; for 
they seem to be claims with existential presuppositions, i.e., 
claims which are in this sense concerned with the way things 
in fact are. In Leibniz’s. case, however, it is again true to 
say, I think, that the empirical dimension in his arguments - 
even thosedirected in part to describing what actually exists 
- is strictly secondary to what for him are a priori considera­
tions. Thus, for example, even in his argument for -petites 
perceptiones, he takes the notion to such an extreme that the 
empirical appeal above no longer works for him, and, indeed, 
begins to work against him. For instance, according to his 
view, we have such perceptions even while sound asleep - i.e., 
sound sleep is like inattentive perception vrrit large: "for
we always have objects which strike our eyes and ears, and, as 
a result, the soul is touched also, without our taking notice 
of it, because our attention is bent upon other objects, until 
this object becomes strong enough to draw it to itself, by re­
doubling its action or by some other means; it is like a par­
ticular sleep with reference to that object, and this sleep 
becomes general when our attention ceases to regard all objects 
together." (NE II i l4, p.115, G 105). Of course, conceptual 
considerations enter into an effective reply to such a point; 
but an important part of such a reply - if it is to satisfy
236.
the requirements of the metaphysician in this sense - is to 
introduce empirical facts which count against claiming that 
we perceive in any way while we are ■^ rhat* is ûsually called 
sound asleep. And, in order to counter such a reply, Leibniz 
appeals to general considerations - considerations which, al­
though perhaps (for him) confirmed to some extent by other 
phases of experience, are for him largely a priori. Tlius, in 
the case of defending minute perceptions, a reference to the 
pre-established harmony between souls and bodies often crops 
up, as well as the point that the fully developed doctrine of 
minute perceptions coheres nicely with general principles such 
as ’Nature makes no leaps’ or ’Tnere are no indiscernibles’
(see NZ Pref., pp 48-53, G 48-52). To this extent, then, the 
differences between Locke and Leibniz on the possibilities of. 
knowledge in metaphysics seems more than verbal. One important 
question, however, is whether the general considerations which 
for Leibniz concern the metaphysician and are a priori are in­
tended to be (all) considerations of necessary truth, i.e., 
considerations of agreement between abstract ideas. With this 
question partly in mind, I shall consider briefly the major 
test case introduced by Locke in this connection and taken up 
by Leibniz - viz., the question of whether or not a material 
substance can think.
Basically, Locke’s line of reasoning on this point'is;
As far as we can tell, it is possible for a material substa.nce
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to have mental powers - e.g., the power of perception or the 
power of thought, Tnus, as far as we can know, it is as pos­
sible -to have a substance which has both mental and material 
properties as it is to have a solely material substance to 
which an immaterial mental substance is somehow "joined or 
fixed". If we allow the possibility of motion producing mental 
effects - e.g., the sensation of pleasure or pain - then we 
should not réfuse to allow the possibility of a material sub­
stance which has mental properties; for the latter is no more 
incomprehensible to us than the former. Indeed, the very 
notion of an unextended substance has its difficulties. Con­
sequently, given such limitations, \ie cannot know which alter­
native is true, although we can have assurance in terms of 
probability and faith that the human soul is both immaterial 
and immortal, and this adequately meets the demands of morality 
and religion. Thus', I know by experience that there is some­
thing that thinks, but whether it is material as well I cannot 
tell. And all that examining my abstract ideas on this question 
provides me with is the conclusion that either answer is 
possible (see E IV iii 6, pp 196-97).
Leibniz does not take up at any length^ the suggestion 
that we can see the improbability of a, thinking material sub­
stance - a suggestion which Locke bases on arguments he himself
^See NEy Pref., p.63, G 6l, and below, pp 243-44.
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gives to show that God cannot be a system of matter which 
thinks (see E IV x 16-17, pp 318-19), but one which he does 
not elaborate.
Another preliminary comment ; Leibniz does not point out 
that, if it were possible for a material substance to thinlc, 
and if we could reach a stage where we could perceive this 
clearly, then, in such a case we would possess an important 
bit of metaphysica.1 truth - particularly if it were reached 
after a series of carefully considered arguments. In reply to 
such a suggestion, however, Locke would probably say that we 
are concerned with the possibilities of real knowledge in meta­
physics - the implication being that the perception of such 
possibilities falls into the same class as the perception of 
identity/diversity as far as its instructive character is con­
cerned. Thus, we are concerned not simply with perceiving
(
whether or not such-and-such a set of properties (in this case 
’being extended and solid’ and ’thinking’) are compatible in 
the same subject, but with perceiving that a subject’s having 
one property necessarily involves or necessarily excludes its 
having another property - where the involvement and exclusion 
are not simply the type illustrated respectively by a sub­
stance ’s being material involving its being extended, and by 
a substance’s being immaterial excluding its being extended. 
Examples of the type of connection we are concerned w^ith, as 
far as Locke is concerned, would be ’Whatever has a beginning
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has a cause’, ’Cogitative substances cannot be created by in- 
cogitative substances’, and ’A cause contains at least as much 
perfection as its effect’ (see his argument for God’s existence, 
E IV X 1-11, pp 306-I6 ). Nevertheless, such a reply supposes 
that identical and semi-identical propositions, as well as 
propositions concerning mere possibilities, are necessarily 
trifling, and this is the point which Leibniz’s position on 
the knowledge of necessary truth - as distinct from what he 
necessarily expressly says - seems to be unwilling to admit.
For, taking ’analysis’ in a broad sense, it seems to be part 
of the task of analysis to weed out such possibilities and the 
fact that they can be "weeded out" implies that they need not 
be so trifling as Locke might suggest. Further, the meta­
physician’s programme, at least as conceived by Leibniz, often 
requires establishing analytic truths in this sense. For, if 
I understand his viewpoint anywhere near correctly, the meta­
physician is not simply concerned with the fact that there ane 
so-and-so’s, but also to some extent with what such so-and-so’s 
are; and the investigation of possibilities is integral to 
such a project, where the force of ’investigation’ in this 
context must be respected*
Leibniz devotes the greater and more interesting amount 
of his attention to ’Can material substances think?’ in the 
Preface to the New Essays (pp 56-63, G 54-61), where he
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considers Locke’s restatement of his position in his corres­
pondence with Stillingfleet. Locke’s position remains sub­
stantially the one I have outlined above, and Leibniz attacks 
it in basically the following way;
(a) Although the comprehensive powers of creatures are 
not the measure of God’s power, the natural order^ (as opposed 
to the miraculous) is fully comprehensible to man. Consequently, 
to claim that thinking matter is incomprehensible but never­
theless possible is to tread dangerous ground.
(b) A material substance which thinks, just like incogi- 
tative matter creating cogitative beings, incomprehensible 
and therefore no part of the natural order. Similarly, the 
inter-action of immaterial and material substances is equally 
incomprehensible (and this leaves the door open for his system 
of pre-established harmony).
(c) Leibniz is thus in a position to support Stilling­
fleet’ s view that man’s immortality is in accordance with the 
natural order. Religion and morality, therefore, do not depend 
solely upon articles of faith in this respect; indeed, the 
soul’s mortality, not its immortality, would then be the 
miracle; "thus the immortality of our souls follows from what 
is natural, since their extinction can be maintained only by
a miracle, whether by exalting matter or by annihilating the
^3ee also IŒ IV ix 1, p.498, G 4l4-15.
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soul." (NE ?ref.\ p.62, G 60).
Now, what is of particular importance here is that, in 
admitting that God could - albeit by a miracle - confer mental 
powers on a material substance, Leibniz is admitting the logi­
cal possibility of a thinking material substance. He is there­
fore admitting that matter in this sense can thinlc. Consequently, 
strictly speaking he is giving Locke^ his central point that 
we do not know that mental substances are necessarily imma­
terial or that material substances are necessarily not mental. 
Granted, Locke often refers to substances which have both 
mental and material properties as being incomprehensible, un­
intelligible, or inexplicable, or inconceivable, but by this 
he does not mean to imply that the notion of thinking material
substances is self-contradictory. Rather, for him, it is in- 
2
conceivable in the sense that how a. ' material body can pro­
duce an idea in an immaterial mind is beyond his comprehension, 
or how, in the case of gravitation, one body can act upon 
another body from a distance is inconceivable to him. He can­
not see how such things can occur, but he does see that they
^Note that, at one point, Locke himself writes: "matter
(which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and 
thou^it)" (E IV iii 6, p.193).
^Tlie fact that expressions such as ’ a mere material being 
which thinks* or * a system of matter which thinks* are 
often used, rather than the more neutral * a substance which 
has both material and mental properties*, tends to promote 
the disturbance on the conceptual side.
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can occur; or at least does not see that they cannot occur.
Consequently, if the knowledge that material substances 
cannot think is an example of the type of knowledge Leibniz is 
introducing against Locke * s point that we have very little 
general knowledge of substances, then he is not introducing 
the knowledge of logically necessary truth and therefore not 
entirely meeting Locke*s point. Nevertheless, the way is then 
open for Leibniz to claim that, although the knowledge that 
material substances cannot think is not of necessary truth, 
nevertheless it is a form of a priori knowledge in the sense 
that it does not draw (entirely) upon experience for its sup­
port; for it involves knowing what must be the case save for 
the intervention of God, and this is not (solely) an empirical 
matter. Now, such a claim would certainly shake up a, basic 
assumption underlying Locke*s account of knowledge and Judg­
ment - namely, that the way to truth as far as we are concerned 
is, roughly speaking, either through perceiving necessary truth 
or through experience or through faith grounded on reasons.
For Leibniz’s suggested form of knowledge in this case is not 
covered by such a set of alternatives.
In this connection, one migîit also introduce our general 
knowledge of what exists as envisaged by Leibniz; since he 
holds that any existential proposition save * God exists* is 
contingent and yet suggests that we can acquire knowledge of 
what exists other than God by non-empirical means, i.e., by
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discerning a priori the general principles which guide God* s 
creative activity. Tnus, we know in this way that God creates 
in accordance with the following design: "you cannot think
nature too liberal; she is so beyond all that we can invent, 
and all advantageous compatible possibilities are found realized 
upon the grand theatre of her representations. There were 
formerly two axioms among philosophers: that of the Realists 
seemed to make nature prodigal, and that of the Nominalists 
seemed to declare her stingy. The one says that nature suffers 
no vacuum, and the other that she does nothing in vain. These 
two axioms are good provided you understand them; for nature 
is like a good economist, who saves where it is necessary in 
order to be grand at times and places. She is grand in effects, 
and sparing in the causes she employs." (NE III vi 32, p.356,
G 303). If this an epistemological view he would be pre­
pared .to _accept, however, he does not develop the suggestion, 
and gives one virtually nothing to go on for the purposes of 
developing it effectively on his behalf. For example, concerning 
Locke*s suggestion that it is highly probable that the soul is 
immaterial, he writes: "he attributes to the immateriality of
the soul a probability in the highest depree. which could con­
sequently pass for a moral certainty, so that I think that 
. . . he could easily accommodate himself to the doctrine which 
I have just set forth, and which is fundamental in every 
rational philosophy. " (l-E Pref., p. 63, G 6l). Does he mean to
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imply by this that the way we acquire certainty about the 
soul* s immateriality is completely the same as the way we come 
to see the probability or improbability of a given proposition? 
For, according to Locke, the only way we can do the latter is 
through experience. And, if this is the case, just what are 
the empirical grounds which support the conclusion that the 
soul is immaterial? Or is Leibniz suggesting that Locke*s 
position approximates his because he (Leibniz) holds that, in 
addition to being able to discern the improbability of a mater­
ial soul, we are able to see a priori the "incomprehensibility" 
of a material soul - a point which Locke also admits - and are 
thereby able to see by non-empirical means that a material 
soul is "unnatural" and therefore that, since God has no reason 
to alter the natural order in this respect, there can be - no 
material souls? Leibniz does not readily provide answers to 
such'questions; nor does he discuss at length the key notions 
of incomprehensibility or being unnatural - notions which are 
put under considerable pressure in such-a context. And, given 
the position on knowledge he is discussing, this is a disturbing 
omission.
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IV' EMPIRICIST AND RATIONALIST
Instead of giving a straightforward summary, I propose 
to see how the terms ’empiricist* and ’rationalist’ might be 
applied to Locke and Leibniz in view of central points made 
in the preceding discussion. Generally, Locke is viewed as 
the empiricist and Leibniz the rationalist, although in many 
cases the classification is heavily qualified.
The most notable way in which Locke fits the title of 
’empiricist’ and Leibniz ’rationalist’ is in relation to their 
views on the origin of ideas. Locke holds that all our ideas 
originate in experience, whereas Leibniz - even given (a) a 
special sense of ’provided by experience’, and (b) that the 
point is restricted to consciously perceived ideas - denies 
that all our ideas are originally provided by experience.
Some doubt m i ^ t  be expressed in Leibniz’s case, however, in 
view of the fact that he traces many so-called unempirical 
ideas to reflection and, in doing so, in effect seems to 
ground them in experience in the sense in which Locke grounds 
all ideas in experience. Nevertheless, I think it is true to 
say that not all "unempirical" ideas can be traced to reflec­
tion for Leibniz - e.g., the idea of God, the idea of eternity, 
and apparently even ideas of the so-called common sensibles - 
and at least to this extent he stands opposed to empiricism.
This particular division of Locke as empiricist and
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Leibniz as rationalist is reinforced by their views on the 
innateness of ideas (either consciously or unconsciously per­
ceived); for Locke rejects, and Leibniz supports, innateness. 
Indeed, Leibniz takes his position still another step further 
than Locke and in some sense "grounds" our distinct ideas, 
along with necessary truths, in the eternal mind of God;
"This leads us finally to the ultimate ground of truths, viz.: 
to that Supreme and Universal Mind, which cannot fail to exist, 
whose understanding . . .  is the region of eternal truths, as 
St. Augustine has recognized and expresses in a sufficiently 
vivid way . . . .  Thus these necessary truths being anterior 
to the existence of contingent beings, must be grounded in the 
existence of a necesssjry substance. Here it is that I find 
the original of the ideas and truths which are graven in our 
souls, not in the form of propositions, but as the sources out 
of which application and occasion will cause actual judgments 
to arise." (NE IV xi 13-14, pp 516-17, G 429). Whatever else 
such a view might amount to, it places Leibniz solidly in the 
rationalist’s camp on the origin and innateness of ideas.
Some care must be exercised, however, in determining 
just what part of the empiricist’s camp Locke occupies in this 
respect. For he does not hold that it is logically impossible 
to have ideas which do not originate in experience. Nor does 
he restrict his claim to abstract ideas or the meaning of 
words, to the exclusion of, say, images. Moreover, he is not
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satisfied with the claim that all our ideas are such that it 
is possible for us to experience what they or their components 
are of; his view demands the temporal, as well as the logical, 
priority of experience. Finally, of course, experience for 
him is not confined to sense-experience but includes reflection 
as well. Consequently, in any specific sense of ’empiricism* 
in which the preceding views run contrary to empiricism, Locke 
is not an empiricist.
The situation is far less straightforward once one moves 
away from the origin and innateness of ideas to certain points 
concerning knowledge.
According to Locke, the knowledge of general truth must 
be of necessary truth, and - aside from sensitive knowledge - 
the knowledge of particular truth is necessarily restricted to 
objects of immediate experience.^ Granted, he is to some 
extent simply using ’knowledge’ in a special restricted sense 
in adopting such a position. Nevertheless, (a) he does not 
clearly distinguish knowledge in this sense from knowledge in 
the relevant ordinary sense, and (b) attaches far greater value 
to what he accepts as knowledge than to what he excludes, as 
far as the ground, or reason, or evidence, for one’s belief is 
concerned. Consequently, in this particular respect, Locke’s
^Or, to a truth demonstrable from premises falling into the 
indicated categories - e.g., ’God exists’.
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position can be said to show a rationalist bias - a bias which 
Leibniz does not share, or at least does not share completely.
Thus, Locke certainly does not adopt the view that all 
knowledge is empirical. On the contrary, he suggests that no 
knowledge of general truth is empirical, and that the knowledge 
of particular truth - which is empirical - is for the most 
part confined to the knowledge of intuitive truths about one­
self and one’s own ideas and to sensitive knowledge concerning 
objects actually present to the senses. In this sense, then, 
Locke is definitely not an empiricist.
Although Leibniz holds a more liberal view of knowledge 
and is prepared to allow the knowledge of general truths on 
the basis of empirical evidence, or knowledge concerning par­
ticulars other than oneself which are not, or have not been, 
actually present to the senses, he does not claim that all know­
ledge is empirical. Indeed, not only does he allow for the 
knowledge of necessary truth, but he feels that the practical 
possibilities of our acquiring such knowledge are generally 
more widespread than Locke is prepared to admit. • Nevertheless, 
insofar as he is entirely willing to accept the possibility of 
empirical knowledge of general truths or of particular truths 
concerning objects neither immediately nor actually present, 
Leibniz shows a sympathy towards empiricism in this respect 
which Locke lacks.
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Both men hold that many propositions in, e.g., physics 
are in reality necessary propositions, although the limited 
human mind can only assess their truth-value in terms of pro­
bability or improbability, i.e., cannot discern their necessary 
truth or falsehood. But Leibniz takes his position one stage 
further and suggests that we can have the knowledge of the 
necessary truth or falsehood of such propositions, and intro­
duces his special theory of confused sensible ideas to support 
such a view, especially in a discipline like physics. In this 
respect, then, Leibniz is clearly operating from the rational­
ist’s camp, not only in the sense that he opts for the knowledge
of "truths of reason" in natural philosophy, but also in the
\
sense that he views (at least certain kinds of) sensible ideas 
as being highly confused instances of what he considers to be 
non-sensible or intelligible ideas - a view which radically 
opposes an empiricist’s picture of experience.
Similarly, in the case of metaphysics, Leibniz defends 
the possibility of our knowing truths of reason - a possibility 
which Locke, save for the principles involved in his argument 
for God’s existence and against God’s being material, generally 
rejects. In this case, however, Leibniz does not seem to be 
defending the knowledge only of necessary truths, but also of 
truths which can be known a priori and yet are not necessarily 
true - truths which appear to be intimately connected with 
God’s purposes in creating the universe. His position on the
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place of reason (in this strict sense) in metaphysics, or in 
natural philosophy, is not such that it excludes the relevance 
of empirical evidence; still, (a) in the case of metaphysics 
at least, the value of an empirical appeal seems to be strictly 
secondary to that of the findings of reason, and (b) the empiri­
cal appeal is certainly not the only relevant one. To this 
extent, then, Leibniz can be viewed as a rationalist resisting 
the limitations imposed by Locke*s empiricism^ as far as areas 
such as physics and metaphysics are concerned.
Confining our attention to the knowledge of necessary 
truth, in one sense of *(logical) empiricist vs. rationalist*, 
Locke tends towards rationalism and Leibniz towards (logical) 
empiricism, since Leibniz holds, and Locke denies, that all 
necessary truths are identical in form. This distinction it­
self is a variable one, depending upon the force of * identical 
in form*, or even upon whether or not the empiricist demands 
that all necessary truths are identical in form or simply that 
they are all formally true, where * formally true* is looser
Although Locke is no empiricist in this respect in anv sense 
which is incompatible with his appealing to, e.g., ^What­
ever has a beginning has a cause as a necessary truth in 
arguing for G-od* s existence, or to *Mere matter cannot 
create a thinking being* in arguing-that matter cannot be 
the eternal source of all being. Furthermore, he is no 
empiricist in any sense incompatible with advocating the 
knowledge of necessary non-trifling truths in ethics - a 
view he shares with Leibniz.
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than 'identical in form*. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
Leibniz seeks to restrict necessary truth to identical truths 
in some sense of * identical truths* in which Locke feels that 
not all necessary truths are identical. Their divergence 
comes out most clearly in connection with affirmative subject- 
predicate propositions; for in this case, Locke holds that 
there are propositions which are necessarily true and yet are 
not such that (the ideas of) their predicates are contained 
in (the ideas of) their subjects, and mentions geometrical pro­
positions as examples. Leibniz, on the other hand, thinks 
that such propositions (including geometrical propositions), 
if they are necessarily true, do really have a form such that 
their predicates are contained in their subjects, and that it 
is at least in principle possible for us to analyse the ideas 
involved in making such propositions and thereby reveal their 
identical form (indeed, for Leibniz this seems to be demonstra­
tion par excellence - a reduction to primitive truths). Con­
sequently, he does not carry his position to the point where 
the knowledge of an identical truth is necessarily of a trifling 
truth - i.e., to the point where the discovery of necessary 
truth is impossible.
In this connection, however, Locke tends to take a step
!
back into the empiricist* s camp in another sense, since, at 
least in the case of those propositions which do have an iden­
tical form, he suggests that necessary propositions depend
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for their truth-value on what the linguistic units used to 
express them mean - a suggestion which Leibniz strongly 
opposes. In this sense, the empiricist attempts to ground 
necessary truth in the contingent and empirically discernible 
uses of words in his efforts to get away from purported mys­
teries surrounding the notion of a non-empirical perception 
of truth. Thus, the perception of a necessary agreement be­
tween abstract ideas becomes the perception of what one means 
by the words one is using, and, depending upon whether the 
meaning of the given words sanctions it, the ideas agree or 
disagree and the proposition is true or false. Consequently, 
the line between the so-called non-empirical perception of 
necessary truth and the empirical perception of contingent 
truth in effect becomes a line between the perception of the 
correct or incorrect uses of words and the perception of truth 
on the basis of empirical evidence which does not (or at least 
need not) consist in contingent facts about language - i.e., 
a line between two significantly different kinds of empirical 
knowledge. On occasion, Locke suggests such a view in the 
case of necessary truths identical in form - indeed, he even 
suggests that such necessary propositions are themselves con­
cealed propositions about how words are used - and says little 
to intercept extending the point to necessary truths which are 
not identicals. On other occasions, however, he seems to be 
opposed to such a view, applied to any sort of necessary
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agreement between abstract ideas. Leibniz, of course, is 
clearly against this form of empiricism - i.e., is against 
nominalism in the corresponding sense. In this respect, then, 
one might describe Leibniz as standing squarely in the 
rationalist * 8 camp, and Locke as drifting towards the empiri­
cist's position, but with one foot lingering behind with the 
rationalists.^
Now, one might loosen the sense of 'reason' relative to 
this context and view reason as follows: "The greatest part
of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate 
ideas: and in those cases where we are fain to substitute as­
sent instead of knowledge, and take propositions for true, 
without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, 
examine, and compare the grounds of their probability. .In 
both these cases, the faculty which finds out the means, and 
rightly applies them, to discover certainty in the one, and
Such a picture might also gain some support from the fact 
that Locke's is a relatively new and growing interest in 
language - an interest which does not seem to be exhausted 
totally by a desire (a) to remove linguistic abuses - e.g., 
uttering meaningless words; using words ambiguously or in 
a confused manner - or (b) to remove certain mistaken views' 
about the use of words - e.g., that to every word there 
must correspond some thing, or that words signify real 
things rather than ideas [see E II xxxiii 19, p.535; E III 
V 16, pp 53-55; E III ix 21, pp 118-19; E IV vl 1, p.251). 
Even here, however, he seems to be investigating language 
partly in order to separate words from ideas. The question 
is, how sharp a separation does he want?
254.
probability in the other, is that which we call reason." (E IV 
xvii 2, p.387; see also E IV xvii 23, pp 412-13). Moreover, 
if one loosens the demands made on 'knowledge* in a correspon­
ding way to bring it more in line with ordinary usage, then in 
this sense of 'knowledge' and in this sense of 'reason', Locke 
continues to be a firm advocate of reason as far as knowledge 
is concerned. Waiving the point that he does not see clearly, 
if at all, that in the relevant ordinary sense of 'knowledge', 
much of what he describes as 'judgment of probability' counts 
as knowledge, one can say that, for Locke, knowledge of truths 
which are not self-evident can only be acquired via reason, ^  
where presumably the only self-evident truths are necessary 
truths or (some) truths about oneself and one's own ideas. In 
a corresponding sense of 'rationalist*, then, Locke is definitely 
a rationalist: "whefce the mind does not [at least) perceive
this probable connexion, where it does not discern whether 
there be any such connexion or no; there men's opinions are 
not the product of judgment, or the consequence of reason, but 
the effects of chance and hazard, of a mind floating at all 
adventures, without choice and without direction." (E IV xvii 
2, p.388). Thus, he brings faith and revelation in line with 
this view by (a) establishing reason as a negative check - 
i.e., any purported article of faith which is contrary to 
reason is unacceptable, and (b) demanding that the claim that
% e  himself might tend to emphasise the need for giving, 
rather than simply having, reasons.
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the given proposition came, or comes, from God must itself be 
supported by reason and certainly must not be contrary to 
reason (see E IV xviii 4-11, pp 418-27). Further, he devotes 
a whole chapter to criticising religious enthusiasm, where an 
enthusiast is one who makes claims devoid of any reason what­
soever, where such claims are neither self-evident necessary 
truths nor intuitive truths about himself. As far as Locke 
is concerned, such a man has and offers nothing but "the 
strength of his own persuasions" (see E IV xix, pp 428-41).
In this sense, then, Locke stands firmly behind the principle 
that "Reason must be our last judge and guide in everything."
(E IV xix 14, p.438).
Generally speaking, Leibniz shares Locke’s rationalism 
in this sense. He approves of Locke’s attempts to ground faith 
in reason; "l commend you strongly, sir, when you wish faith 
to be grounded in reason: without this why should we prefer 
the Bible to the Koran or to the ancient books of the Brahmins?" 
(NE IV xvii .23, p.580, G 477); and he takes a dim view of 
enthusiasts in the sense of "those who believe without founda­
tion that their movements come from God." (NE IV. xix l-l6, 
p.598, G 487).
In this sense of 'rationalism', of course, rationalism 
is not relevant to this particular context in quite the same 
way as most of the preceding forms of rationalism, since there 
is no readily available sense of 'empiricist' in which a
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rationalist in this sense and an empiricist would be neces­
sarily opposed. Rather, the opposite of a rationalist in 
this case might be more aptly called "an irrationalist". 
Nevertheless, I have introduced the point here in order to 
emphasise the fact that Locke does not completely abandon 
general contingent propositions, or propositions about exter­
nal objects not actually present to the senses, to the vagaries 
of unfounded opinion. As far as he is concerned, one can have 
very good reasons for making general contingent claims, or 
claims about external objects not actually present to the 
senses, and therefore can in this sense acquire knowledge on 
such matters. He is a rationalist to the extent that he de­
mands reasons and to the extent that he believes such reasons 
can be provided over a wide range of human inquiry - much 
wider than the range given to knowledge in his strict sense. 
Thus, part of his general reply to the sceptic consists in the 
point that, although we cannot have "real" knowledge in such- 
and-such an area and it is foolish of us to keep trying to ac­
quire it, we are capable of acquiring well-founded views on 
various matters in the given area and are equally foolish not 
to conduct our investigations with this aim in mind. Leibniz 
disagrees with this sentiment only to the extent that he 
generally gives more room to "real" knowledge.
Setting aside the latter, rather special sense of
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'rationalist* and concentrating on the preceding senses in 
which rationalism is opposed to some form of empiricism, one 
might summarise the situation as follows:
For the most part, Leibniz remains in the rationalist's 
camp. Granted, he does not carry rationalism to the point 
where the knowledge of general truth is restricted to necessary 
truth; nor does he, at least in any clear way, set the know­
ledge of necessary truth on a level higher than other forms of 
knowledge in the way that Locke tends to. Moreover, in addi­
tion to admitting the possibility of forms of empirical know­
ledge not restricted to immediate or actual objects, he allows 
that an appeal to experience can play an important part in 
promoting knowledge in natural philosophy and even in meta­
physics, Nevertheless, (a) he does not reject the knowledge 
of necessary truth - i.e., not all knowledge is empirical; and
(b) he allows far greater room than Locke for our discovering 
necessary truth, or at least a priori truth, in natural philo­
sophy and metaphysics. Granted too, he does adopt a logical 
empiricist's slogan that all necessary truths are identical in 
form; but in this case, the empirical sting is taken out of 
the claim because he definitely does not think that necessary 
truths are in any way dependent upon the uses of words, or 
that the knowledge of necessary truth is in any way reducible 
to the knowledge of linguistic facts.
In Locke's case, however, the situation is rather more
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complex. He drifts towards an extreme form of rationalism in 
his general stand on knowledge, and is opposed to the logical 
empiricist's view of necessary truth. He does make some over­
tures to empiricism in suggesting that the knowledge of neces­
sary truth - at least in the case of identicals - consists in 
knowing verbal facts. But such overtures largely remain the 
undeveloped consequences of his theory of essences, set within 
a discussion of knowledge dominated by references to intuition 
and the apparently unempirical perception of agreement between 
abstract ideas. Indeed, aside from his position on the origin 
and innateness of ideas, about the only clear way in which 
Locke helps to support empiricism (as far as the respects 
covered above are concerned) is (i) by allowing that experience 
provides us with reasons for making judgments concerning 
general connections or concerning particulars neither immedi­
ately nor actually present, and (ii) by rejecting the possi­
bility of widespread knowledge of necessary (instructive) truth 
in natural philosophy or metaphysics. Otherwise, he generally 
stands amongst the rationalists, albeit with an occasional 
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Indlscernlbles
1. In Its logical form, the principle of the Identity of
Indlscernlbles can be stated as follows: It Is logically
Impossible for two particulars to be indiscernible. I.e., 
to have all their properties In common. Or, any two parti­
culars must be discernible, I.e., have at least one property 
not In common. Or, again. It Is logically Impossible for two 
(i.e., numerically different) particulars not to be qualita­
tively different, I.e., to be qualitatively Identical. 
Henceforth, I shall call the logical principle of the Identity 
of Indlscernlbles simply * the Principle*.
There Is a so-called weaker form of the Principle 
which commands some plausibility In areas where the corres­
ponding so-called stronger form Is rejected. I shall call the 
so-called weaker form * the "weaker" form *, and the so-called 
stronger form * the "stronger" form*. The "weaker" form Is 
distinguished from the "stronger" form by some In such a way 
that, within the terms of reference of the Principle, the 
former admits, whereas the latter excludes, numerical Identity 
and numerical difference as properties. For example, on the 
"stronger" Interpretation, although It logically follows 
that one particular (x) and another particular (y) are dis­
cernible If X has, and y does not have, the so-called 
property of being numerically Identical with the snake which 
bit a queen, the fact that x has, and y does not have, this
2.
so-called property does not itself make x and y discernible.
In his "The Identity of Indlscernlbles",^ Max Black 
briefly considers the "weaker" version, and criticises it 
for amounting to nothing more than an uninteresting truism 
(p.82). He then goes on to argue primarily against using 
the verlflcatlonlst*s theory of meaning to defend the 
"stronger" form. I do not agree that the "weaker" form Is 
an uninteresting truism. On the contrary, I think It stands 
(or, rather, falls) on all fours with the "stronger" form, 
and, therefore. Is In this sense no weaker. The following 
defence of this claim, however, depends In part upon points 
of the kind Introduced by Black himself In the second portion 
of his paper. Consequently, with reference to his general 
position, my argument might be taken as more of an attempted 
"ironing out" than a straightforward criticism.
Hereafter, unless otherwise Indicated, the form of the 
Principle under consideration Is the "weaker" one.
2. Consider the following argument on behalf of the
Principle:
^Problems of Analysis. Ch. v (London, 1954), pp 80-92. Ori­
ginally published In Mind. LXI (1952). All page references 
are to the former.
In his notes (pp 292-93), Black quotes a passage from 
Prlnclpla Mathematica (l:5l), In which the "weaker" form 
of the Principle Is defended.
3.
Given two allegedly indiscernible particulars, A and B, 
then
A is numerically identical with A and numerically dif­
ferent from B, 
and B is not numerically identical with A and is not
numerically different from B. (Principle of Identity). 
Therefore, A and B are discernible, insofar as À has, 
but B does not have, the property of being numeri­
cally identical with A and numerically different from 
B.
And, therefore, any two particulars are discernible, 
since what holds here for A and B, holds for any two 
particulars, (cf. Black, pp 8O-8I).
Instead of criticisng this argument for generating an 
uninteresting truism, one can criticise it as follows:
The argument consists in an attempt to demonstrate the 
Principle via a reductio ad absurdum. It postulates the al­
legedly possible case of two completely indiscernible parti­
culars and then attempts to demonstrate the logical impossi­
bility of such a case. Consequently it begins: * Given two 
allegedly indiscernible particulars, A and B . .
But, using *A* and *B* to refer to the given particu­
lars is in effect an attempt to use different names to refer 
to each of them - a move which is ex hypothesi impossible 
because it contradicts the indiscernibility condition of the
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hypothetical case. For the successful use of different names 
in this manner presupposes the possibility of qualitatively 
distinguishing the given particulars, i.e., the possibility 
of saying truly *A is g m  particular which ...* and *B is the 
particular which ...*. And, ex hypothesi. there are no pos­
sible grounds for so distinguishing them. The exponent of 
the Principle must here prove the discernibility of the given 
particulars, not assume it; and the use of different names to 
refer to each of them simply assumes it. Black clearly recog­
nises the force of this point (see pp 83-87), but fails to 
apply it, at least in any recognisable way, to the argument 
for the "weaker" form of the Principle,
If, on the other hand, *A* and *B* are not being used 
as different names in this context, then they must have some­
thing of the force of variables. In this case, however, the 
claim that, e.g., A has the property of being numerically 
identical with A and numerically different from B, reduces 
(roughly) to the claim that one of the given particulars is 
numerically identical with itself and numerically different 
from the other one - a claim which holds for either of the 
given particulars and which does not support the conclusion 
that the two particulars are discernible (of. below, section 
5).
3. A modified argument for the Principle might then be
introduced.
5.
Granted, one cannot actually use different names to 
refer to each of the given particulars. But, if one of the 
particulars were called A and the other called B, then the 
particular called A would be identical with the particular 
called A, and the particular called B would not be identical 
with the particular called A. Consequently, the two parti­
culars are discernible, since the particular which would be 
called A has, whereas the particular which would be called 
B does not have, the property of being identical with the 
particular which would be called A.
This argument, however, is clearly just as futile as 
the former one - and for the same type of reason.
Three points are especially relevant:
(a) It is impossible for only one of the particulars, as 
given, to be called A, and for only the other one to
be called B. If one of the given particulars is called 
A, then ex hypothesi the other one must also be called 
A. Consequently, one cannot refer to the given parti­
culars as * the one called A* and’the one called B*.
(b) One can, of course, say, ’If only one of the given 
particulars were called A and only the other B, then 
the particular called A would be etc.*. But, in saying 
this, one cannot conclude that only one of the particu­
lars, as given, is called A and only the other i^ 
called B. Logically, it amounts to a specific case of
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saying 'If one of the given particulars were qualita- 
tively different from the other particular in respect 
X, then the two particulars would be qualitatively dif­
ferent in respect x*. This is analytically true, but 
offers no grounds for saying that the two particulars, 
as given, do qualitatively differ in respect x.
(c) Further, one cannot say, ’One of the given particulars 
would alone be called A and the other would alone be 
called B, under conditions y ’, unless conditions y 
include a "trivialising" condition with the force of 
’If one of the given particulars were alone called A 
and the other were alone called B . , Consequently,
one cannot use ’the particular which would be called A 
under conditions y* to distinguish one of the given 
particulars from the other one. For, the only sense in 
which this expression is applicable to either of the 
given particulars is that of ’a particular which would 
alone be called A under such-and-such conditions, if 
it were alone called A under such-and-such conditions’. 
And, in this sense, it is equally applicable to either 
of the given particulars (indeed, to any particular). 
Similarly, although one can in a sense say, ’It is 
logically possible for one of the particulars to be 
alone called A*, or ’one of the particulars could alone 
be called A* (though not as given), this offers no
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grounds for qualitatively distinguishing the given par­
ticulars, because such statements are equally true of 
either particular (cf. Black, p.84).
4. It must be clearly understood that the claims for the
ex hypothesi impossibility of, e.g., using names, or referring 
to the given particulars as ’the one called A ’ and * the one 
called B*, are not circular claims. I am not arguing that 
the two given particulars must be indiscernible simply because 
they are postulated as such. For, whether or not two parti­
culars can be indiscernible is the very point at issue. What 
I am claiming, rather, is that since the exponent of the 
Principle has assumed, for the purposes of a reductio. that 
two particulars are indiscernible, he is therefore responsible 
for showing the impossibility of such a case. And he cannot 
be allowed to do this by introducing features which (a) would 
entail that the given particulars are discernible but (b) are 
not entailed by any conditions governing the hypothetical 
case. For one of the conditions governing the hypothetical 
particulars that they are indiscernible. Consequently, 
any claims about the given particulars vhich introduce fea­
tures satisfying both (a) and (b) are claims for ex hypothesi 
impossibilities (cf. Black, p,92).
5, Still another argument for the Principle might take the
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following line - although the chances of finding its actual 
presentation in any clear form are perhaps slim.
Let the two given particulars, and only the given par­
ticulars, each have the property P. Also, let *P-particular’ 
mean a particular which has the property P. One of the given 
particulars is then numerically identical with one of the two 
P-particulars and numerically different from the other P- 
particular. And the other particular is numerically identical 
with one of the two P-particulars and numerically different 
from the other P-particular. Now, for each of the given 
particulars, the property of being numerically identical with 
one of the two P-particulars (or being numerically different 
from the other P-particular) is different because, in each 
case, ’one of the two P-particulars’ (or ’the other P-parti- 
cular’) refers to numerically different particulars. There­
fore, the two given particulars are discernible, since they 
each must have (a) some property and therefore (b) some 
property not in common.
This argument no more holds than the claim that, for 
each particular, being numerically identical with itself is 
a different property because ’itself’ in each case refers to 
a numerically different particular. For, if it were true, 
then it would be necessarily false to claim, e.g., that each 
of the given particulars is numerically identical with it­
self (or numerically different from the other particular, or
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numerically identical with one of the two P~particulars, 
etc.), or that one of the given particulars is numerically 
identical with itself and the other particular is equally 
identical with itself, etc.
To take another example, consider a universe in which 
there are two green swans and a man called Paul. Initially, 
Paul is standing beside one of the green swans; after a few 
minutes, he then moves to a position beside the other green 
swan. Now before Paul moves, one can say ’Paul is standing 
beside one of the green swans’. After he moves, one can 
then say ’Paul is still standing beside one of the green 
swans*. And the force of ’still* in the latter statement 
suggests that Paul has the same property in each case, de­
spite the fact that the green swan in each case is numeri­
cally different.
Or, consider the same universe with the addition of 
another man, called Peter, such that =Peter and Paul each is 
standing beside one of the green swans. Being able to say 
’Peter and Paul each is standing beside one of the green 
swans’ in such a context suggests that Peter and Paul each 
has the same property, although the particular green swan 
beside Peter is numerically different from the green swan 
beside Paul. Again, under such conditions, if someone asked 
* In what respects are Peter and Paul the same’, the reply 
’Each is standing beside one of the green swans in the
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universe* would be perfectly acceptable as part of the 
answer, despite the fact that each is standing beside a 
numerically different swan (cf. Black, p.85 re the property 
of occupying the same place as itself).
8. This whole discussion is intended to be neutral re­
garding any questions in connection with "universels". Thus, 
if a "resemblance-theory" is deemed in any way superior, the 
various points could be made with the appropriate forms of 
discourse. Expressions such as ’property’, ’have some pro­
perty in common*, ’has the same property’, ’is a different 
property’ have been generally employed here for the sake of 
verbal economy and because of their greater familiarity in 
such a context. On the other hand, if one wanted, for some 
reason or other, to distinguish between the property P and 
a particular instance of the property P, and then claim that, 
given two P-particulars, although each has the same property 
P, the particular instancesof P had by each particular are 
numerically different, such a position is by intention not 
contravened by anything said in this discussion. Alterna­
tively, if there are no genuine problems in this connection, 
then obviously nothing said here contradicts such a view.
7. For the foregoing reasons, then, from the viewpoint
of knowing its truth, the "weaker" form of the Principle
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seems on no better ground than the "stronger" form. For, 
from this viewpoint, the "weaker" form makes no fewer demands 
than the "stronger" form, inasmuch as the arguments necessary 
to establish the latter - if there are such arguments - are 
equally necessary to establish the former.
In contrast, however, it might prove instructive to 
examine Black’s attempt to show that the "weaker" form is an 
uninteresting truism. His argument reads roughly as follows: 
’A has the property of being numerically identical with A ’ 
means ’A is A ’.
’B does not have the property of being numerically iden­
tical with A ’ means ’B is not A ’.
Therefore, *A and B have one property not in common* here 
means ’A and B are numerically different’.
And therefore, the Principle simply becomes the vacuous
’Numerically different things are numerically different’ 
(see pp 81-82),
Now, although ’A has the property of being numerically 
identical with A ’ is logically equivalent to *A is A*, nothing 
said by Black’s imaginary advocate of the Principle involves 
the view that the sentences used to make the foregoing state­
ments are equivalent in meaning. Furthermore, under the 
apparent given conditions of this case, if ’A* and ’B* are 
used as names of numerically different particulars, then 
either the property of being identical with A i^ a property
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which B cannot have, or, perhaps, from the fact that A is, 
but B cannot be, identical with A it follows that A and B 
are discernible. Consequently, if there are (were) two 
such particulars, A and B - where *A* and ’B* are used as 
names - then A and B are (would be) necessarily discernible.
This point might be sustained from a slightly different 
viewpoint by arguing that, under the apparent given hypothe­
tical conditions, ’The two particulars, A and B, are indis­
cernible' is internally inconsistent insofar as it denies 
the uniqueness conditions presupposed by the use of *A’ and 
'B'. Nevertheless, although it is true that, under the given 
conditions, if there were two particulars, A and B, then A 
and B would be discernible, it does not necessarily follow 
that any two particulars are discernible. For it has not yet 
been shown that names can be successfully used by us to dis­
tinguish any two particulars. And it is my contention that, 
under the conditions of the previously indicated hypothetical 
case (see above, section 2), names cannot be used by us to 
distinguish particulars without presupposing their discer­
nibility - one obvious consequence of which is that names 
cannot be used by us to distinguish indiscernible particulars 
under such conditions (l shall return to this point in the 
next two sections).
On the other hand, if 'A' and *B' are not intended as 
names of the different particulars in this context (and, since
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Black constructs his own opposition, this is his privilege), 
then to claim that A is qualitatively different from B insofar 
as the former is, whereas the latter is not, numerically iden­
tical with A, simply amounts to claiming that one of the 
given particulars is, whereas the other is not, identical 
with itself - which is absurd. In this case, without intro­
ducing any further considerations, the only way to "save" the 
Principle would indeed be to admit that ’One particular 
qualitatively differs from another particular* means ’One 
particular is numerically different from another particular’ 
(or something very much like it), and thereby trivialise it. 
But, if this Black’s point, then (a) the way he puts it 
is somewhat misleading, and (b) the imaginary exponent of 
the Principle would take on a h i ^ l y  straw-like texture,
8, An apparently more serious objection might now be con­
sidered, the central tenet of which is that the preceding 
argument takes a much too facile view of the use of proper 
names. For, in suggesting that names could not be used to 
distinguish two particulars without presupposing their dis­
cernibility, one overlooks the role which demonstratives, 
token reflexives, or indicator words, can and do play in the 
use of uniquely referring expressions. Thus, for example, 
we can without contradiction suppose a world in which there 
are two descriptively indiscernible (see footnote 1, p,17)
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spheres spatially related to me such that one of the spheres 
is on my right and the other sphere is on my left. For in­
stance, suppose that such a world consists in myself, the two 
spheres, each ten feet in front of me, and another man 
descriptively indiscernible from me, standing ten feet behind 
each of the spheres (relative to me); and suppose any other 
specific duplications which are necessary in this case. In 
such a world, I could use the expressions, ’the sphere on my 
right* and * the sphere on my left* to distinguish the two 
spheres - and, indeed, use such expressions as a basis for 
giving them different names (provided, of course, that my 
counterpart is doing descriptively the same thing), Further­
more, in the world in which I am now actually writing, I can 
use the expressions, * the sphere which is (strictly, would be) 
on my right in such a world* and * the sphere which is (would 
be) on my left in such a world*, to distinguish the two 
hypothetical spheres. Suppose I call the sphere which is on
my right in such a world ’Virtue* and the sphere which is on
my left ’Vice*. I can then make such statements as ’Virtue
is numerically identical with Virtue, and numerically different
from Vice, whereas Vice is not numerically identical with 
Virtue and not numerically different from Vice’, Conse­
quently, so the argument runs. Virtue is qualitatively 
different from Vice insofar as Virtue has, whereas Vice has 
not, the property of being identical with Virtue, And,
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therefore, Virtue and Vice are discernible. Furthermore, in 
this case, the use of the names ’Virtue’ and ’Vice’ has not 
presupposed the discernibility of the given hypothetical par­
ticulars.
It is presumably to take into account considerations of 
this sort that Ayer, in his "The Identity of Indiscernibles",^ 
suggests that only properties the ascription of which contains 
no ("non-descriptive") unique reference are to be accepted 
within the terms of reference of the Principle - for other­
wise it "easily becomes trivial" (p.29). As opposed to Black 
(though not expressly in opposition to Black), Ayer points out 
that excluding numerical identity and difference as properties 
is neither necessary nor sufficient to save the Principle 
from triviality. Not sufficient because analogous points can 
be made concerning properties such as ’being spatially co­
extensive with* or ’being at no distance from* (i.e., for 
particulars which can have spatial properties), and not neces­
sary because admitting only "generalised" properties secures 
the objective (and at the same time allows, e.g., ’An auto­
mobile is numerically identical with itself’ to count as the
^Philosonhical Essays (London, 1959), 26-35. Ayer’s discus­
sion is set within the context of an "anti-substance" view 
of individuals (see also "individuals". Philosophical 
Essays. 1-25). This viewJand its peculiar consequences 
for the question of indiscernibles are not Considered here 
- not because they are not interesting or important, but 
because they raise a somewhat different set of questions.
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ascription of a property).
On this view, then, the "weaker" form is distinguished 
from the "stronger" form insofar as the latter admits, whereas 
the former does not admit, properties the ascription of 
which involves a ("non-descriptive") unique reference to 
some particular. Thus, for example, 'being 20 feet from 
Nelson's Column' does not count, whereas 'being 20 feet from 
a column which is ...', or even 'being 20 feet from the 
column which ...' (where '... ' contains no "non-descriptive" 
unique reference), does count, as a property on the "stronger" 
form. And, therefore, from the viewpoint of the "stronger" 
form, the argument given above for the discernibility of 
Virtue and Vice is unacceptable - for 'being identical with 
Virtue' does not count as a property,
9. Even presented with this somewhat sounder distinction
between "weaker" and "stronger" forms of the Principle, how­
ever, I still think it subject to criticism.
(a) For one thing - though this is a point I see no way of 
proving, save perhaps indirectly from (b) below - it seems
The ascription of this property instantiates the notion of 
a property-ascription containing a "descriptive" unique 
reference. The possibility of qualifications attendant 
upon the distinction between descriptive and non-descrip­
tive unique reference is not considered by Ayer, and, 
although interesting in itself, is of little consequence 
in this particular context.
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doubtful that, if (e.g.) a particular, x, were equi-related 
to two descriptively^ indiscernible spheres such that I 
could distinguish the spheres as this sphere and that sphere, 
then the statement 'x is R to this sphere' would be considered 
as ascribing a different property to x than the statement 
'x is R to that sphere' - within the terms of reference of 
the Principle, as ordinarily conceived and as ordinarily 
affirmed'or denied. Rather, within such a frame of reference, 
one's first reactions would be along the lines of 'Well, is 
this sphere really indiscernible from that sphere?*, in an 
effort to determine whether or not x*s being R to this sphere 
and being R to that sphere involves its having the same or 
different properties - with the implication that, if this 
sphere and that sphere truly are descriptively indiscernible, 
then being R to this sphere and being R to that sphere does 
not involve having different properties - at least within the 
conceptual frame of reference of the Principle.
Now, if this suggestion is true, it follows that sepa­
rating the "weaker" from the "stronger" form constitutes an 
alteration in the concepts of property and of difference of 
properties - but an alteration in the opposite direction 
from that initially suggested. For, the initial suggestion
^Two particulars are descriptively indiscernible if the de­
scription of each in purely general terms is the same.
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seemed to be that, as the Principle ordinarily stands, it 
only makes the demands of the "weaker" form, and therefore, 
in order to "strengthen" it and avoid the accusation of 
triviality, one must introduce the indicated alterations.
On the contrary, however, it now turns out that the Prin­
ciple as ordinarily conceived is the "stronger" form and an 
alteration is necessary in order to "weaken" it. Conse­
quently, given the way 'It is impossible for two particulars 
to be indiscernible' is ordinarily used, it is true - and 
not simply the result of stipulation - that, e.g., x*s being 
R to this sphere and being R to that sphere does not involve 
x's having different properties if this sphere and that 
sphere are descriptively indiscernible. And furthermore, if 
the "weaker" form of the Principle is defined as that form 
of the Principle in which to contra-ordinary alterations are 
made to the concept of a property and which thereby remains 
trivial, then there is no "weaker" form of the Principle.
(b) More seriously, admitting the indicated alterations to 
the concept of a property does not secure the truth of the 
Principle. For, one is only able to use uniquely-referring 
expressions involving demonstratives, token reflexives, in­
dicator words, etc., within certain limited contexts - viz., 
roughly, in those contexts where the particulars are, or have 
been, in one's "immediate presence", or are uniquely related 
to such particulars. The Principle, on the other hand, is
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designed to be a logically necessary statement covering any 
particular - and therefore its application cannot be re­
stricted to particulars satisfying such conditions. Thus^ 
in making the point above that, in the hypothetical cases 
introduced in sections 2 and 7, the use of proper names pre­
supposes the discernibility of the given particulars, I was 
invoking the point that, since the conditions governing the 
given particulars apparently do not allow the use of "non- 
descriptive" uniquely-referring expressions (e.g., 'this so- 
and-so') to distinguish particulars, the only way a uniquely- 
referring expression can be used is by using a "descriptive" 
uniquely-referring expression (e.g., 'the so-and-so which 
...') and therefore by presupposing the descriptive discerni­
bility of the given particulars. And, unless this gap - 
between conditions under which "non-descriptive" referring 
expressions can, and conditions under which they cannot, be 
used - is somehow bridged, the "weaker" form of the Principle 
is still no weaker than the "stronger" form.
(c) Finally, even if this gap could be shown to be somehow 
bridgeable, the very process of arguing for such a bridge 
would show, I thinlc, that the "weaker" form of the Principle, 
if true, is anything but a trivial, uninteresting truism.
10. For the preceding reasons, then, I think the introduc­
tion of a so-called weaker form of the Principle is mistaken.
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Moreover, the further claim, that the "weaker" form is 
trivial, is, if anything, in a worse position.
As far as the question whether the Principle is true
is concerned, it receives no direct attention here, save for 
the following brief points:
(i) If one purports to argue "for" the Principle by ap­
pealing to a verifiability criterion of meaning, one must be
prepared to admit that, if 'There are indiscernibles' is 
meaningless, then 'There are no indiscernibles' is equally 
meaningless - and therefore that the Principle itself is 
meaningless.
(ii) It seems conceivable to have a world in which indis- 
cernibles could be observed as such.
(iii) More directly, a world in which there are indiscernibles 
seems intuitively quite conceivable to me, and, for anyone 
for whom this is equally so, any defence of the Principle 
must present arguments which are sufficiently strong to over­
throw its prima facie implausibility.
(iv) In introducing, e.g., a world consisting in an infinite 
series of sounds ... ABCDABCDAB ... (see Ayer, p.32) as an 
example of a universe containing indiscernibles, certainly I 
believe that, in such a case, there is a plurality of indis­
cernible A's, a plurality of indiscernible B's, etc. - i.e., 
a plurality of indiscernible instances of the sound A, of the 
sound B, etc. - and to that extent, "assume" that it is
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possible to refer to a plurality of indiscernible objects.
In introducing such an example, I thereby hope to get my 
opponent to see the general point - for if he accepts the 
example, then he must accept the general point - and this is 
an acceptable mode of philosophical argument. I am not, 
however, arguing for the possibility of such a universe by 
appealing to the general point; in this case, the example 
must stand or fall on its omi merits - on threat of circu­
larity. If the Principle's advocate finds the Principle still 
more convincing than any of my purported counter-examples, 
he is, of course, free to do so. But he himself must admit 
that simply rejecting my examples on the basis of the Prin­
ciple itself does not consist in an argument for the Principle 
And, any argument against such examples which relies on a 
premise such as, "it is only where there is discernibility 
that it makes any sense to talk of the plurality of objects" 
(Ayer, p.34), seems little more than the rejection of counter­
examples on the basis of the Principle itself.
(v) In claiming that the very reference to a plurality of 
particulars presupposes their discernibility, one must be 
careful to distinguish between the senses of 'reference to a 
plurality of particulars' in which the statements, *A number 
of men are attacking the walls', 'The tallest man is not 
wiser than the oldest man but is stronger than the fattest 
man', and 'The sphere on my right is the same distance from
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the sphere directly in front of me as the latter is from the 
sphere on my left', might be said to involve a reference to 
a plurality of particulars.
To be published in The Philosophical Quarterly,
D. A. Odegard. Ph.D.
Absurdity and Types
Through a mild mist, it appears that the notion of a 
type can be employed and examined in a variety of contexts. 
For instance, one m i ^ t  employ it in "typically restricting" 
the values of variables in an artificial language to fore­
stall Russellian paradoxes. Or, one might use it to reveal 
type-confusions of a less specialised kind, particularly as 
the source of mistaken philosophical theories. One might 
investigate the notion in order to understand the logical 
structure of certain statements - either for the purposes of 
constructing languages or to clarify the structure of natural 
languages. Alternatively, an aspiring metaphysician might 
employ the notion to disclose general features of the way 
L things are and/or of our conceptual scheme, or possible al­
ternatives; or he miglit examine the notion as a preliminary 
to the metaphysical inquiry proper.
Proposed definitions, or analyses, or criteria, of a 
type often follow at least one of v.V- two related lines:
(a) That which views a type as the range of significance of 
such-and-such a predicate or set of predicates.
(b) That which appeals to the only possible truth-value(s) 
of a significant type-predication.
Under heavy pressure, however, neither approach offers much 
hope for its prospects, in one important sense of 'type' - 
viz., that in which the notion of a type is blended with the 
notion of a category and in which types attract the eye of
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the metaphysician. Partly to show this, and partly because 
of the material's own interest, I intend to consider certain 
points raised by Arthur Pap in his "Types and Meaninglessness".
1. In order to lay some sort of foundation for under­
standing the discussion of typehood, consider a point made by 
Pap near the end of his paper: "the line between the false
and the meaningless is not only fuzzier than it is according 
to the Russell-Carnap theory, but even fuzzier than it ap­
pears in the liberalized conception of types. The meaning­
lessness illustrated by 'the philosophy of logical atomism is 
a rose* and * the theory of relativity is a good swimmer* 
could, after all, be called * a priori falsehood* by those who 
do not wish to call a sentence meaningless unless at least 
one constituent term is meaningless." (p.52).
He explains *a priori falsehood* by distinguishing 
limited from unlimited negation: The negation *S is non-P*
is limited if * non-P * "is equivalent to the disjunction of all 
the other members of the predicate family to which P belongs" 
(p.53). In other words, a limited negation is one which 
asserts that S is not P, where P is a kind of Q, but implies 
that S is some other kind of Q; e.g., *A fire engine is not
^4ind, LXIX (i960), 41-54. Page references to Pap are to 
this paper.
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blue* implies *A fire engine is some colour other than blue*. 
An unlimited negation, then, is a negating statement which has 
no such limiting implications. And an a priori falsehood is 
a statement the unlimited negation of which is necessarily 
true, i.e., is an "unlimited necessary falsehood** (p.54).
Conjoined with the blurring of the distinction between 
meaninglessness and falsehood is the claim that it is largely a 
"verbal" question whether a statement such as * The number 5 is 
red* is meaningless or false: "Such a priori falsehood is
very different from formal contradiction, but the question 
whether * false* or *meaningless* is the right word to use is 
just as verbal as the question whether formally contradictory 
statements are false or meaningless." (pp 52-53)•
2. In the relevant ordinary sense of * false*, a statement
is false if and only if its negation is true (There is an 
ordinary, though less customary, use of * false* in the sense 
of * not true*. But since Pap is not trying to diminish the 
line between meaningless and false statements in this sense 
of * false*, it is of no relevance to this discussion). Now 
I doubt very much that Pap would want to claim that 'negation* 
in this context means what he means by 'unlimited negation*.
For one thing, if a statement were false if and only if its 
unlimited negation were true, then 'The number 5 is red* 
would necessarily be false and therefore could not be neither
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true nor false. Also, he himself says that a (non-categorial) 
negation "is ordinarily construed as a limited negation"
(p.54) and suggests that limited as well as unlimited nega­
tions rightfully count as kinds of negation - which would be 
impossible if * negation* meant an unlimited negation.
Rather, his view seems more like the following: Al­
though * The number 5 is red* is not a limited falsehood - 
i.e., its limited negation is not true - it is nevertheless 
an unlimited falsehood - i.e., its unlimited negation is 
true - and is therefore false. In other words, although * The 
number 5 is red* is not one kind of falsehood, viz., a 
limited falsehood, it is another kind of falsehood^ viz., an 
unlimited falsehood.
But, in the relevant ordinary sense of 'negation* and
* falsehood*, can a given statement have more than one kind 
of negation? Cërtainly, it is possible to differentiate 
kinds of negation in terms of * limited and unlimited*, but 
in the case of a given statement, is it possible to produce 
two negations, one, falling into one class and the:other 
falling into another class? For example, the negation of
* Trie number 5 is red* is * The number 5 is not red* and it is 
limited or unlimited, depending upon what statement the sen­
tence * The number 5 is red* is used to make. If it is used 
in such a way that *The number 5 is red* presupposes *The 
number 5 is coloured*, then * The number 5 is not red* implies
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*The number 5 is coloured* and is therefore a limited nega­
tion. On the other hand, if the sentence * The number 5 is 
red* is used in such a way that * The number 5 is red* has no 
such presuppositions, then * The number 5 is not red* is an 
unlimited negation. Thus, in the first instance, the 
unlimited * The number 5 is not red* is not the negation of 
*The number 5 is red*; for otherwise * The number 5 is red* 
would be false in the event that the number 5 is not coloured 
and therefore could not presuppose * The number 5 is coloured*. 
And in the second instance, the limited * The number 5 is not 
red* is not the negation of * The number 5 is red* because 
then * The number 5 is red* would presuppose * The number 5 is 
coloured*.
Thus, in Pap * s sense of * negation* and * falsehood*,
* 8 is an unlimited falsehood if and only if its unlimited 
negation is true* becomes something like *8 is an unlimited 
falsehood if and only if non-8 in the unlimited sense is 
true * ; whereas in the relevant ordinary sense of such terms,
*8 is an unlimited falsehood if and only if its unlimited 
negation is true * either amounts to *8 is an unlimited false­
hood if and only if the negation of 8 is unlimited and true* 
or presupposes that the negation of 8 is unlimited. In Pap* s 
sense, a given statement necessarily has an unlimited (as well 
as a limited^) negation; in the ordinary sense, a given
^Or, perhaps, limited negations at variable levels.
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statement necessarily has a negation but it might not be 
unlimited.
For these reasons, I think the sense of * false’ in 
which one can say that a statement is an unlimited false­
hood if and only if its unlimited negation is true, and from 
this infer that, e.g., ’The number 5 is red* is an unlimited 
necessary falsehood, must be a special one. For, in the 
relevant ordinary sense of * false*, it is not the case that 
* The number 5 is red* (where the sentence * The number 5 is 
red* is used in such a way that the statement * The number 5 
is red* is meaningless) is an unlimited falsehood, because 
its negation is not unlimited.
3. The preceding observations support the following con­
clusions: The line between the false and the meaningless,
in the relevant ordinary sense of * false * and the sense of 
’meaningless* in which a statement is meaningless if and 
only if it is (necessarily) neither true nor false, is not 
blurred to the extent that a meaningless statement can be 
false or a false one meaningless. The line can be blurred 
in this way only by introducing a technical sense of * false* 
- viz., one in which a statement S is an unlimited falsehood 
if and only if its "unlimited negation" (i.e., non-8 without 
any limiting implications) is true. In this special sense 
of ’false*, a meaningless statement is indeed necessarily
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false; but it does not follow that the distinction between 
meaningless and false statements, in the relevant ordinary 
senses of these terms, is no sharper than the distinction 
between meaningless and *‘a priori false" statements.
On the other hand. Pap could be simply pointing out 
that the analogies between meaningless and necessarily false 
statements are greater than is pre-analytically evident. For, 
in the case of a necessarily false statement, its negation 
must be necessarily true; and in the case of a meaningless 
statement, a statement with its "negative form" but without 
its limiting implications must be necessarily true. If this 
is the case, his point is of some merit; but even here one 
feels he at least tends to overestimate such analogies.
Similarly, in claiming it is a "verbal" question whether 
* The proposition p is red* is meaningless or false, if he is 
suggesting that within the terms of reference of the (rele­
vant) ordinary and his special sense of ’false*, it depends 
upon how ’false’ is used, then his claim is unobjectionable.
On the other hand, if he is suggesting that within the terms 
of reference of relevant ordinary usage it is in this sense 
a verbal question whether * The proposition p is red* is false, 
then his claim is mistaken. Alternative interpretations 
could be introduced, but the basic point remains that in the 
relevant ordinary sense of * false * and ’meaningless*, false 
statements are necessarily not meaningless and meaningless
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statements are necessarily not false, and any remark like 
"This is merely a verbal matter" which implies otherwise is 
wrong.
4. Althou^ the points made in the foregoing discussion
are at least substantially true, considerations of the sort 
introduced by Pap in "justifying" his "preference" for calling 
(so-called) type-confusions * a priori falsehoods’ might pose 
certain difficulties. For instance, since ’Whatever is red 
is extended* is necessarily (althou^ non-formally) true, 
therefore its negation must be necessarily (althou^ non- 
formally) false. Now, according to Pap, ’Some unextended 
entity is red* can count as the negation of ’All red entities 
are extended*. But, * Some unextended entity is red* is en­
tailed by the conjunction of *No numbers are extended* and 
"the supposedly meaningless" * The number 5 is red*. There­
fore, * Some unextended entity is red* can be called either 
meaningless or a priori false (p.53).
Taking the first part of the point first, if ’Some 
unextended entity is red* is such that it presupposes ’Un­
extended entities are coloured*, and if ’All red things are 
extended* is necessarily true, then ’Some unextended entity 
is red* is not (logically equivalent to) the negation of 
’All red entities are extended*. For, if ’Some unextended 
entity is red* presupposes the necessarily false ’Unextended
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entities are coloured*, then the former statement’s negation,
No unextended entity is red*, equally presupposes ’Unextended 
entities are coloured* and therefore cannot be logically 
equivalent to ’All red things are extended*. On the other 
hand, if * Some unextended entity is red* and *No unextended 
entities are red* have no such presuppositions, then they 
car be taken as, respectively, (logically equivalent to) the 
negation of, and logically equivalent to, * All red things are 
extended*.
In the former case, then, * Some unextended entity is 
red* is meaningless, whereas in the latter case it is neces­
sarily false. But in neither case does a meaningless state­
ment become a false statement or a false statement meaningless, 
in the relevant ordinary sense of ’meaningless* and * false*.
Concerning the second part of the point, one m i ^ t  
readily admit that the conjunction of ’No numbers are extended* 
(Si) and ’The number 5 is red* (82) entails ’Some unextended 
entity is red* (S3) in the sense in which a statement v^aich 
is necessarily not true entails any statement. But in this 
case the truth-value of ’Some unextended entity is red* is 
irrelevant. On the other hand, I can see some point in claiming 
that S1.S2 entails S3 in a different sense of ’entails* only 
if S3 is necessarily neither true nor false, i.e., presupposes 
’Unextended things are coloured*. Even given this, however, 
for the reasons given above, it does not follow that the
10.
statement entailed by SI.32 Is logically equivalent to the
negation of the necessarily true 'All red entities are 
extended*,
5* has been said above that there are significant ana­
logies between meaningless statements and necessarily false 
statements. One might object to this, however, on the 
grounds that the very reference to such purported analogies 
incorrectly presupposes an analogy between, e.g., the meaning­
less * The proposition p is red* and the false *A dog is not 
an animal* - namely, that they can both be considered as 
statements. For, according to this line of reasofiing, only 
sentences, or other types of expression, can be said to mean 
anything or to be without meaning. Consequently, * The state­
ment "The proposition p is red" is meaningless* itself 
involves a type-confusion.
I disagree with this line of criticism and feel that a 
position approximating that suggested by Pap is the right one. 
According to this position, in one important ordinary sense, 
a statement (and therefore a sentence in a derivative sense) 
can be contingently true, contingently false, necessarily 
true, necessarily false, contingently neither true nor false, 
or necessarily neither true nor false. For one thing, it 
seems true to say that 'The proposition p is red' is neces­
sarily neither true nor false (where I am using the expression
11.
The proposition p is red" is necessarily neither true nor 
false* to mean something other than that the sentence *The 
proposition p is red* is necessarily not the sort of thing 
which can be true or false in a non-derivative sense). But 
in this case, if one were simply referring to the sentence 
The proposition p is red* and describing its unsuccesful 
use, then the claim could not be true. For it can only be a 
contingent matter whether a specified sentence has a truth- 
value or is used to make a statement.
Consider the following arguments: (a) *x is a bright
shade of fed* entails *x is not the number 5* (unlimited 
sense) because if x is the number 5, then the number 5 is a 
briÿit shade of red - which is meaningless. (b) *The propo­
sition p is red* is necessarily neither true nor false 
because both it and its negation, * The proposition p is not 
red*, entail *The proposition p is a colour*, and *The propo­
sition p is a colour* is necessarily not true. In each of 
these arguments, the claim is rightly made or implied that a 
meaningless S is lop^ically related to such-and-such a state­
ment in such-and-such a way. But sentences can only be 
logically related to statements in a derivative sense; and 
they can only enter into logical relations in a derivative 
sense if they are used to make statements. Consequently, 
the validity of the above arguments depends upon the possi­
bility of referring without contradiction to statements \Æiich
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are necessarily neither true nor false, i.e., to meaningless 
(in this sense) statements.
It seems quite conceivable to have a discussion in 
which someone says with conviction that sentence SI entails 
sentence 82, but does not mean by this that the statement 81 
is used to make entails the statement 82 is used to make.
And it seems more plausible to view such an occurrence as 
itself the making of a statement, even though such a statement 
is necessarily neither true nor false, than to accept the 
general thesis that a statement cannot be necessarily neither 
true nor false - just as I find it more plausible to view
* The pork in the sausage is sweet* as a statement even where
there is no pork in the sausage, than to, accept the general 
thesis that a statement must be either true or false.
' In admitting the possibility of meaningless statements, 
however, one must carefully distinguish meaninglessness in 
this sense from meaninglessness in any sense in which *8 is 
meaningless’ entails *8 is not used to make a statement*.
Thus, during the course of a discussion one of the partici­
pants m i ^ t  intelligibly point out, *If you mean by the 
sentence **8 is R" that the number 5 is red, then your claim 
is meaningless*. And if another participant then denied 
that the sentence *8 is R* means that the number 5 is red on 
the grounds that *8 is R* does not mean anything, he would be
ascribing meaninglessness to *8 is R* in a sense distinct
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from that in which the first participant accused the user of 
*S is R* of meaninglessness.
Because the customary use of ’meaningless* is unsteady 
in this respect, I shall use * absurd* in place of ‘meaning­
less* in the following discussion. Thus, * absurd* is to be 
confined to statements which are necessarily neither true nor 
false and does not cover logical contradictions or highly 
probable falsehoods, unlike some phases of its ordinary use.
II
6. Despite his effort to show otherwise, it is hard to
see how Pap* s definition of * type * does not allow many more
classes to qualify as types than we would normally and rea­
sonably be prepared to admit. His definition reads; **a type 
is a class such that there are families of predicates which 
can be significantly, i.e. correctly or falsely, ascribed to 
all and only members of it.** (p.48, minus italics).
The definition is proposed as a replacement for 
Russell* s **a class such that the assertion that something is 
a member of it is true provided it is significant , or a 
class of all entities that are of the same type as a given 
entity; where x and y are of the same type if x and y 
are inter-substitutable in any significant sentence without 
producing nonsense". The consequent re-definition of ’type-
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predicate’ is also offered as a replacement for Carnap’s 
criterion of ’universal word* (his synonym for ’type-predi- 
cate ), the latter being: if is a universal word, then 
all admissible (i.e., significant) substitution instances 
of *Px’ are analytic.
One of Pap’s principal reasons for rejecting the 
Russell-Carnap view of types is that it excludes the possi­
bility of false type-predications (i.e., false predications 
of a type-predicate, e.g., *A proposition is a number*) and 
thereby excludes the possibility of true negative type- 
predications (e.g., *A proposition is not a number*). For, 
other considerations aside, any successful proof that a state­
ment is absurd requires an appeal to the truth of just such 
a negative type-predication (p.43; for his criticism of any 
attempt to resolve this difficulty via recourse to the formal 
mode of speech, see pp 43-46). Furthermore, the prohibition 
against the use of unrestricted variables demanded by 
Russell’s theory disallows the possibility of making general 
statements about types - one consequence of which is that the 
theory Itself is self-refuting (p.44). I think Pap’s criti­
cism of the Russell-Carnap position is basically sound. 
Nevertheless, his re-definition of ’type' seems far too loose.
7  ^ He himself considers this objection as a result of Max
Black's c'alling his attention to the possibility of predicates
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of the form ’has relation R to every other member of K*. 
Predicates of this form are predicable without absurdity of 
all and only members of K (or possible members of K^), where 
K can have an almost unlimited range of values, including 
such apparent non-types as the class of logicians, of golf 
balls or of frying pans.
Pap attempts to meet the objection with respect to this 
form of predicate as follows: Letting K be the class of
logicians and R the relation of being admired by, "let us 
analyse what we assert about x in saying *x is admired by 
every other logician': for every y, if y is a logician and y 
is different from x, then y admires x (that x is himself a 
logician is presupposed rather than asserted). It then ap­
pears that the range of values of x extends far beyond the 
class of logicians." (p.50).
Now, in one possible sense of ’the range of values of 
X* (or ’the range of significance of x* or ’the range of 
significant values of x ’), the range of values of x in a 
statement of the form *x is P* covers any class to which x 
must belong in order that ’ x is P ’ is not absurd. For 
instance, in ’x is b r i ^ t ’ the range of values of x in this 
sense includes both the class of colours and the class of
^The need for qualifications in this respect is subsequently 
generally ignored.
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first-order properties, since *x is bright* presupposes both 
*x is a colour* and (therefore) *x is a first-order property*. 
In this sense, then, the range of values of x in *x is P* is 
not determined solely by what * x is P* asserts about x, to 
the exclusion of what it presupposes about x. Rather, it is 
because x is P * presupposes *x is 0* that the range of values 
of X includes the class of 0*s.
One can tighten the sense of * range of values *, however, 
to the point where the range of values of x in *x is P* is
the class of 0*s if and only if *is P* is predicable without
absurdity of all and only O ’s. For example, in this sense 
the range of values of x in *x is bright* is restricted to
the class of colours and does not include the class of first-
order properties; for x could be a first-order property such 
that *x is bri^it* is absurd (to take Pap* s example, triangu­
larity). Still, in this sense too, the point holds that the 
presuppositions of *x is P* are vital in determining the 
range of values of x.
Thus, in a sense. Black is right in suggesting that the 
range of values of x in *x is admired by every other logician* 
is restricted to the class of logicians - viz., in either of 
the two senses, or at least in the first sense, indicated 
above. And he is right partly because *x is admired by every 
other logician* presupposes and does not assert *x is a 
logician*. Now, on Pap* s analysis of ’type*, to admit that
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the range of values of x in *x is P*, in either of the above 
senses, is restricted to the class of 0*s is not to admit 
that the tjj>e "associated" with the predicate * is P* is 
necessarily the class of 0*s. Nevertheless, in order that 
the class of 0*s counts as the type "associated" with *is P* 
on his analysis, the range of values of x in *x is P* must be 
restricted to the class of 0*s in either of the two preceding 
senses of * range of values*. Consequently, it is at least 
dangerously misleading to suggest that what *x is admired by 
every other logician* presupposes about x is irrelevant to 
the question of vfhat type is "associated" with the predicate 
* is admired by every other logician*.
Thus, something more effective might be done with a 
predicate of the form *is R to every other K* by taking a 
closer look at Pap* s notion of a family of predicates: "A
predicate family is a set of predicates such that one and only 
one member of it must be true of anything of which some 
member of the set is true or false." (p.48). For instance, 
if a colour-predicate *is brown* is true or false of x, then 
one and only one colour predicate is true of x. For if x is 
brown, then x is brown and in that respect no other colour, 
and if X is not brown, then x must be some colour and only
that colour other than brown.
Now his analysis of ‘type* requires that there be a 
family (indeed, families) of predicates which are predicable
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without absurdity of all and only members of C, in order 
that C can count as a type. Therefore, one might argue that 
a predicate of the form ‘is R to every other member of K* is 
not a member of a family of predicates predicable without 
absurdity of all and only members of K (as distinct from, say, 
a family of predicates predicable without absurdity of all 
and only things related in such-and-such a way to members of 
K), and therefore does not delineate K as a type. Certainly, 
what *x is R to every other member of K* presupposes about x 
merely in virtue of the use of ‘other* is not jji itself suf­
ficient to render K a type on Pap* s criterion,
8, Whether or not the preceding considerations offer a
successful counter to Black*s specific objection is of 
relatively minor importance. For the general point in defence 
of which predicates of the form *is R to every other K* are 
introduced - viz., that Pap*s definition allows (virtually) 
any class to bear the title of typehood - holds and can, I 
think, be defended in terms which more readily come to grips
with his definition.
To get the definition as clear as possible, consider 
its application to the class of coloured things; A statement 
like * The proposition p is red* is absurd because both it and 
Its negation entail 'The proposition p is coloured', and the 
proposition p is necessarily not coloured. Thus, colour-
19.
predicates such as *is red', 'is blue' or 'is pink', are 
predicable without absurdity only of coloured things. Further- 
more, since any coloured thing necessarily satisfies all the 
presuppositions generated simply by predicating a colour- 
predicate of it, therefore predicates such as 'is red', 'is 
blue*, or 'is pink' can be predicated without absurdity of
coloured thing. Finally, colour-predicates form a family 
in the relevant sense (see preceding section). Consequently, 
there is a family of predicates "associated" with coloured 
things - i.e., each of a number of predicates can be ascribed
without absurdity to all and only members of the class of 
coloured things, and such predicates form a family. There­
fore tlie class of coloured things constitutes a type.
With one exception this attempt to show the typehood of 
the class of coloured things has remained true to Pap's defi­
nition. The exception consists in the fact that his defini­
tion demands more than one "associated" predicate-family as 
a condition of typehood. The reasons I have omitted such a 
condition are (a) I do not clearly see why it is necessary 
from his viewpoint, and (b) if it is necessary, I think points 
made below could be altered where necessary to take it into 
account.
In order to qualify a given class as a type on his 
definition, then, all that is necessary is to find a family 
of predicates predicable without absurdity of all and only
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members of that class. And I think such a family can be 
found for (virtually) any class. For instance, consider the 
class of things which have hind feet and forefeet, and the 
predicates has hind feet which are larger than its forefeet*, 
'has hind feet which are smaller than its forefeet*, and 'has 
hind feet which are the same size as its forefeet*. Is it not 
possible to use these expressions in such a way that the 
resulting predicates are predicable without absurdity of all 
and only things having hind feet and forefeet? And do not 
such "hind feet/forefeet" predicates form a family in the 
relevant sense? Indeed, if one wanted to meet the need for 
more than one such family in this case, one might introduce 
predicates such as 'has hind feet which are darker than 
(lifter than, the same shade as) its forefeet*. Again, take 
the class of ducks.(horses, cows, pigs, etc.) and the predi­
cates * is a white duck*, * is a black duck*, * is a purple 
duck*. Such "coloured duck" predicates are predicable without 
absurdity of all and only ducks; for in a sense, *A horse is 
a red duck* is equally as absurd as 'The number 5 is red*.
And they form a family in the relevant sense.
Thus, in searching for a family of predicates to qualify 
a given class as a type, one rough pattern to follow is: if 
a given class is the class of K's, then the required predi­
cates are of the form * is a K which is P', vftiere P is a kind 
or determinate of Q and K is necessarily Q. And this pattern
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or acme suitable replacement can be used to uncover a family 
of the required predicates for any class.
One might object that this argument takes its eye off 
the logical structure of ordinary language and weaves a web 
of specially constructed predications to secure its object- 
tives. The ascriptions and predications which occur as we 
actually use language are such that the families of predicates 
"associated" with classes are much more restricted than the 
foregoing theory suggests. Consequently, keeping one's feet 
on the ground and attending to the way language is in fact 
used will disclose that far from any class qualifies as a 
type on the criterion in question.
Now, as a matter of fact, the presuppositions of the 
statements we actually do make are probably much more varied 
and operate at many more levels than is uncritically thought 
to be the case. As noted above, of course, not all presup­
positions are of the sort sufficient to pigeon-hole a given 
class as a type on Pap's analysis. Nevertheless, the diver­
sification of even the relevant kind of presuppositions in 
language as we actually use it would probably surprise many 
subscribers to the belief that at least the majority of such 
presuppositions are to be found in the generic stratosphere.
Moreover, the whole objection is misconceived since 
the question here is whether, for any given class, there are 
predicates which (i) are predicable without absurdity of all
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and only members of that class and (ii) form a family, but 
not whether such predicates are in fact predicated in the 
actual ordinary, or extraordinary, use of language. In this 
sense, we are concerned with possible predications and there­
fore artificial, specially constructed predicates are just as 
relevant in this context as ones found in any natural language
9. The sense of 'type* appropriate to this discussion,
however, is not always as neat and tidy as it might be. If 
A says to B that a bullet has longer hind legs than forelegs 
and B criticises A for committing a type-confusion, we would 
not normally object to B's criticism on the grounds that A's 
presuppositions do not delineate a type. And this is not 
because we have not yet seen that an absurdity of this kind 
does not necessarily indicate a type-difference. Rather, it 
is because, in one sense of 'type', a type-confusion is 
adequately illustrated by just such an absurd statement.
Thus, under such conditions, if B went on to say 'A bullet 
is not the type of thing which can or cannot have longer hind 
legs than forelegs, because a bullet cannot have legs , in 
one important sense of 'type', B 3^ indicating the type of 
thing a bullet is not.^
^Througjbiout this discussion I pay little attention to dis- 
tion are of minor importance.
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Nevertheless, in such a context another, and to some 
extent competing, notion of a type often emerges, usually in 
the form of the notion of a class at the relatively general 
end of a chain of classes and subclasses - and thus the link 
with categories. Tension is created because in the former 
case a type is rougjily the range of significant predication- 
of a given set of predicates, and then any class becomes a 
type relative to some such set, and in the latter case types 
are restricted to only certain classes. I shall refer to the 
latter as a type in the restricted sense and to the former as 
a type in the looser sense. Confusion of the two arises 
partly because in most recognised cases of type-confusion, 
and certainly in many of the examples usually given of type- 
confusions, the kinds of thing involved belong to different 
types in both the restricted and the looser sense: e.g.,
'The number 5 Is red', 'The atomic theory is hungry', 'Cycling 
to work logically entails "No swans are black"',
In denying that types consist In classes with which 
families of predicates are "associated", I am therefore using 
'type' In a restricted sense. This Is not simply an arbitrary 
stipulation on my part, however, since (l) Pap's attempts to 
defend his definition against the charge that any class 
would then count as a type shows that a type In the restricted 
sense Is the relevant analysandum In this context, and (ll) 
many philosophers who have discussed and/or attempted to
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uncover types or categories have been concerned with them in 
a restricted sense.
Thus, wbien Ryle claims the revelation of a host of type- 
confusions or category-mistakes in connection with the philo­
sophy of mind and concludes that the mind, knowledge, percen- 
tion, and the emotions are therefore not the type of thing 
tney are often thought to be, in at least one important sense 
of 'type* his conclusions are quite justifiable, given the 
relevant absurdities. Moreover, in the immediate context of 
the philosophy of mind the question of typehood raised here 
is of secondary importance, since the absurdities remain ab­
surdities even if they do not point to type-differences in 
the restricted sense. Nevertheless, if Ryle's claims are to 
be understood against the background of his theoretical views 
concerning types, then they are subject to some criticism.
For the theory in accordance with which they are made suggests 
a concern with types in a restricted sense and yet views a 
type as the range of significance of a given prepositional 
frame or set of prepositional frames. Admittedly, one of his 
objectives is to loosen the restrictions placed on types by, 
say, Aristotle or Kant; but he does not clearly indicate that 
he is prepared to admit every class as a type.
K.. see "Categories", Logic and Language, second, series, 
ed. A. Flew (London, 1953), 6 5 - Ü 1 . Originally In Prgc^ed- 
ings of the Aristotelian Society. 1937-38. For a criticlsi 
of Ryle along such lines, see Ch.7 of John Passmore s 
Phil n.qnphical Reasoning (London, 1961), especially pp 131-w.—
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The situation is certainly not straightforward in Ryle's 
case, however. He has at least come to view the notion of a 
category with a characteristic grain of salt and is content 
to use the word ' category ' in a r o u ^  and ready fashion: "l
think it is worth while to take some pains with this word 
' category', but not for the usual reason, namely, tha,t there 
exists an exact, professional way of using it, in which, like 
a skeleton-key, it will turn all our locks for us; but rather 
for the unusual reason that there is an inexact, amateurish 
way of using it in which, like a coal-hammer, it will make a 
satisfactory knocking noise on doors which we want opened to 
u s . A n d  from a theoretical viewpoint, his primary conten­
tion is: "The truth is that there are not just two or just
ten different logical metiers open to the terms or concepts 
we employ in ordinary and technical discourse, there are in­
definitely many such different metiers and indefinitely many 
dimensions of these differences." (Dilemmas, p.10), Thus, he 
comes very near to allowing expressly that virtually any class 
qualifies as a category relative to some prepositional frame 
or set of proposltlonal frames. But If he Is using 'category' 
in this way and if he is prepared to accept such a consequence, 
is he being entirely fair to Aristotle or Kant?
^Dilemmas (Cambridge, I960), p.9.
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^ type in the restricted sense is concerned, 
can anything more interesting he found than the rather vague 
a class at the relatively general end of a chain of classes 
and subclasses'? At the moment, I can see nothing approaching 
an effective reply to this question. As an account of the 
way 'type' is generally used in the restricted sense, such a 
view probably comes closer to the truth simply because it 
makes the concept no more refined than it actually is. If so, 
the interesting problem then is whether, in the rough area 
covered by 'type* in its present sense, one can uncover an 
important but sharper distinction which could be marked by 
'type* and 'non-type', either between certain kinds of classes 
or concealed within the elasticity of the use of 'class'.
One can, of course, confine 'type' to the uppermost 
peak of a hierarchy of classes and subclasses, i.e., to any 
class which is not a subclass. But from the viewpoint of the 
concept's application, it seems of relatively little philoso­
phical interest and attended by practical difficulties. Fur­
thermore, in the usual restricted sense of 'type', a type is 
not necessarily a class which is not a subclass - e.g., 
consider the classes of relations and of qualities with 
respect to the class of properties. Consequently, in this 
light there seems little to say in favour-of using type to 
mean a class which is not a subclass. Nevertheless, if type 
is thus strictly confined, certain theoretical consequences
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appear to follow which are of some interest, at least within 
the boundaries of this paper.
In this very strict sense of 'type*, an altered version 
of Russell's criterion might appear acceptable: a type is a
class such that the assertion that something is a member of it 
is either necessarily true or necessarily false, provided it 
is either true or false. Indeed, one might even be tempted 
to come closer to Russell by claiming: a type is a class such
that the assertion that something is a member of it is either 
necessarily true or necessarily false, provided it is not 
absurd. The second claim crumbles, however, in the face of 
an assertion like 'John is a member of T' (where T is a type), 
an assertion which is contingently neither true nor false in 
the event that there is no John, i.e., is neither absurd nor 
necessarily true nor necessarily false. Furthermore, the 
possibility of such an assertion also forces at least a clari­
fication of the first amended criterion. For, if a type- 
predication can be contingently neither true nor false, then 
it is not necessarily either a necessary truth or a necessary 
falsehood. Indeed, if a given kind of assertion is necessarily 
either a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood, then it is 
necessarily either true or false and the 'provided that' 
rider renders the amended criterion incoherent.
A distinction must therefore be drawn between claiming 
that a type-predication is either a necessary truth or a
28.
necessary falsehood provided It is either true or false, and
claiming that if a type-predication is either true or false 
then either necessarily such a type-predication is true or 
necessarily such a type-predication is false. In other words, 
in order to have at least some initial plausibility, the 
amended criterion must amount to; a type-predication is an 
assertion which is either necessarily not true or necessarily 
not false.
11. Another objection to the amended criterion might be
voiced on the grounds that, e.g., even if John exists, the 
statement 'John is a T' cannot be "necessarily true" or 
"necessarily false" because - to introduce a view which is 
sometimes uncritically traced to Locke throu^ Mill's eyes - 
there is "nothing essential to particulars". But, although 
there are important differences between the use of uniquely 
referring expressions and the use of other referring expres­
sions, I can see no good theoretical grounds for denying 
that, if the statement's 'John Bright was a person', ' The 
Great War was an event", and 'Mount Everest is a material 
object' are either true or false, then it necessarily follows 
that such statements are true. If, using Locke's terminology, 
one claims that particulars such as John Bright, the Great 
War, and Mount Everest, cannot have essences, I admit that 
strictly speaking this is so - for allowing the essence of
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John Bright would commit one to allow a statement of the form 
'John Bright necessarily is ...* to be true. But admitting 
that particulars cannot have essences in this sense does not 
involve denying that, under such-and-such conditions, it 
necessarily is the case that the statement 'John Bright was 
a person' is true.
Moreover, given that something is a member of a speci­
fied type, it is impossible for it to become a member of a 
different type - this is a necessary truth, dictated by the 
concepts of change and of the same particular. Consequently, 
one cannot-argue from the possibility of a particular's changing 
its type to the possible "contingency" of a type-predication 
in any sense which allows that althou^ ' John is a T' is 
true(false), it could be false (true).
Although such counter-objections are interesting in 
themselves, however, the class of entities actually related^ 
to some other entity seems to provide a valid counter-example 
to the amended criterion. For it seems only a "contingent" 
matter, for some particulars, whether a given particular is 
actually related to some other particular. In this connection, 
one might also introduce the possibility of "intentionally 
determined" classes - e.g., the class of entities perceived
^If X is actually related to y, then there is a y (using '3s' 
in the tenseless sense); e.g., a spatial, temporal, or 
causal relationship.
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by men, or the class of entities thought of by philosophers - 
and then tender 'Anything perceived by a man is a T' or 'Any­
thing thought of by a philosopher is a T' as "contingent" 
type-predications. Such a move is attended by dangers of 
reification, but if developed properly, I think it forces at 
least a qualification on the amended criterion - a force which 
is not lessened by an appeal to the so-called systematic 
ambiguity of the operative intentional terms.
12. Thus, even where a type is a class which is not a sub­
class, in order to preserve a criterion of typehood formulated, 
in terms of the possible truth-values of a type-predication, 
one must exclude the class of things actually related to 
other things from being a type and even, perhaps, the class 
of entities "intentionally related" to something. Further, 
one must also exclude "intentionally determined" kinds as 
possible values of x in type-predications of the form 'x is 
a T'; indeed, there seems to be a need for excluding "rela- 
tionally determined" kinds in general.
Now, even if such a duly qualified point about the 
truth-values of a type-predication can be made out, the 
necessary qualifications are so numerous that at the very 
least it provides an unbearably cumbersome criterion of type­
hood - if it can be properly called a criterion in terms of 
the truth-values of .a type-predication at all. And if 'type'
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is loosened beyond the unusually strict 'class which is not 
a subclass*, any attempt to provide a corresponding criterion 
becomes hopeless. Furthermore, if one conjoins this fact 
with points introduced by Pap against the Russell-Carnap 
theory and with arguments used above in criticising Pap's re­
definition, one has good grounds, I think, for being sceptical 
about the possibilities of providing a satisfactory criterion 
of typehood either in terras of the possible truth-value(s) of 
a type-predication or in terms of the range of significance 
of such-and-such a set of predicates.
To be published in Mind.
D. A. Odegard. Ph.D.
The Correct Use of a Sentence
1- In a critical notice^ of Alan R. White's G. E. Moore:
A. Grit leal Exposition (Oxford, 1958), Noi*man Malcolm re­
states his interpretation of Moore's defence of Common Sense 
*'as being in reality a defence of ordinary language", an 
interpretation which purportedly describes Moore's view "in 
so far as it is an interesting and tenable philosophical 
position" (p.97).
As an example of Moore's defensive manoeuvres of the 
relevant kind, he cites the following argument against 
Hume; "if Hume's principles are true, then, I have admitted, 
I do not know now that this pencil - the material object - 
exists. If, therefore, I am to prove that I 6^ know that 
this pencil exists, I must prove, somehow, that Hume's prin­
ciples, one or both of them, are not true. In what sort of 
way, by what sort of argument, can I prove this?
"it seems to me that, in fact, there really is no
stronger and better argument than the following. I dp know 
that this pencil exists; I could not know this, if Hume's 
principles were true; therefore Hume's principles, one or 
both of them, are false, I think this argument is as strong 
and good a one as any that could be used: and I think it 
really is conclusive".
% i n d . LXIX (i960), 92-98. Page references to Malcolm are 
to this paper.
^as quoted by Malcolm, pp 96-97; originally in Some Main 
Problems of Philosophy (London, 1953), pp 119-120.
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Malcolm ri^tly feels that in a case such as this 
Moore is not appealing to common sense in the sense of 
what is universally or generally held to be the case.
Rather, he takes Moore to be pointing out (indeed, reminding 
us) that a sentence like 'I know this is a pencil' has a 
correct use in ordinary discourse. From this it follows, 
for Malcolm, that the sentence 'I know this is a pencil' is 
not self-contradictory. And therefore the notion of our 
knowing a material object proposition to be true is not 
self-contradictory. Consequently, since the philosophical 
claim that we do not know material object propositions to 
be true is a purported necessary truth, the philosophical 
claim is mistaken. He thus concludes that, in this type of 
case, Moore's so-called defence of Common Sense is really 
"a defence of ordinary language" (see p.97 for this argu­
ment),
2. Exposition of Moore for the most part aside, I want
to consider Malcolm's contention that the view he here 
ascribes to Moore is a "tenable philosophical position".
One preliminary point: strictly speaking, it seems to me 
that the line of reasoning introduced by Malcolm, rather 
than being a defence of ordinary language in the sense of a 
justification for using certain expressions in such-and-such 
a way, is a defence of a non-linguistic point - in this case.
3.
that it is possible for me to know that a pencil, and there­
fore a material object, exists - by aonealinR to ordinary 
language.
Does the inference from 'The sentence "l know this is 
a pencil" has a correct use in ordinary discourse' to 'The 
sentence "l know this is a pencil" is not self-contradictory' 
hold? If 'The sentence "l know this is a pencil" has a 
correct use in ordinary discourse* means (roughly) that the 
words composing the sentence * I know this is a pencil* have 
a correct or proper use, or have a meaning in ordinary lan­
guage, and that the syntax of the given sentence is correct, 
then it is quite possible for a sentence both to have a 
correct use in ordinary discourse and to be self-contradictory, 
For instance, in this sense of 'correct use of a sentence', 
each of the sentences, 'All boys are non-boys*, 'A brother 
is not male', and * If John is Peter's father, then Peter is 
not John's son', has a correct use in English; for in each 
case the component words have a correct use and the sentence 
is syntactically sound. Nevertheless, each sentence is also 
self-contradictory; or, strictly speaking, when used cor­
rectly each is used to make a statement which is self­
contradictory. Consequently, in this (first) sense of 
'correct use in ordinary discourse', the inference from a 
sentence's having a correct use in ordinary discourse to its 
being used to make a statement which is not self-contradictory
4.
does not hold.
The inference does hold, however, if * correct use in 
ordinary discourse* is understood in a rather more special 
(second) sense - viz., one given in terms of the possible 
truth of the statement the sentence is in the first sense 
correctly used to make. For example, * The sentence "l know 
this is a pencil" has a correct use in the second sense* 
amounts to * The sentence "l know this is a pencil" is in 
the first sense correctly used to make a statement which 
could be true *. In this second sense of * correct use*, 
then, * The sentence S has a correct use* obviously entails 
* The sentence S is used to make a statement which is not 
self-contradictory*. Corresponding points hold in connec­
tion with another possible (third) sense of * correct use 
in ordinary discourse*, in which 'Sentence S has a correct 
use in ordinary discourse* amounts to 'S is in the first 
sense correctly used to make a statement which is true*.
Now it seems to me that Malcolm is using 'correct use 
in ordinary discourse* more or less in the first sense and 
not in the second (or third) sense; i.e., is using it in 
such a way that the relevant portion of his argument does 
not hold. For one thing, if this is not the case, then 
assertions such as, "To understand that this claim is mis­
taken it is sufficient to realize that these sentences do 
have a correct use in ordinary discourse, which they could
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not have If they were self-contradictory", or "He was not 
Legging the question against Hume . , , because his very 
point was that it is really not open to question that such 
sentences have a correct use", or "On my view, then, Moore's 
so-called defence of Common Sense . . .  is merely the asser­
tion, in regard to various sentences, that those sentences 
have a correct use in ordinary language" (p.97), need care­
ful explaining in terms of having a correct use in the second 
sense; and no such explanation is provided. Moreover, the 
premise that the argument would then have - ' The sentence "I 
know this is a pencil" is used in ordinary discourse to make 
a statement which could be true' - would scarcely be as prima 
facie acceptable to all philosophers as the claim that the 
sentence 'I know this is a pencil' has a correct use in the 
first sense of 'correct use*, and as unquestionable as Malcolm 
takes it to be. Finally, the argument would then in fact 
amount to: If sentence S is used in ordinary discourse to
make a statement which could be true, then S is used in ordi­
nary discourse to make a statement which is not self- 
contradictory - which is a less interesting argument than the 
one Malcolm seems to want to secure.
Given this, however, consider the following remark:
"All he [Moore] needed to do was to remind his audience and 
readers that the sentence "l see a door over there" can be 
correctly used to make a true statement" (p.97). In this
6.
instance, although he is using * correctly used* in the first 
sense, he is not confining his appeal to correct use in this 
sense, but is in effect appealing to correct use in the 
second sense. For he is appealing to the truth, and there­
fore the possible truth, of the statement which the given 
sentence is used to make in ordinary discourse. Now, as 
shown above, the two appeals are distinct in very important 
ways. But Malcolm does not seem to see this clearly. And 
it is because he tends to run the two points together that 
his argument has more initial plausibility than it m i ^ t  
otherwise have.
In this connection, one m i ^ t  also put some pressure 
on an expression he occasionally uses, apparently without 
hesitation - viz., "has a correct use in ordinary discourse". 
As indicated above, 'Sentence S has a correct use in ordinary 
discourse* m i ^ t  mean that the words composing S have a use 
in ordinary discourse and S is syntactically sound (or some­
thing sufficiently like this). Now, as far as ordinary usage 
is concerned, there could be some redundancy involved in 
using the expression in this way. For, relative to ordinary 
usage, either * Sentence S has a correct use* or 'Sentence S 
has a use in ordinary discourse* alone could effectively be 
used to mean that the words composing S have a use in 
ordinary discourse and S is syntactically sound. There is, 
however, a sense of * S has a correct use* in which * Sentence
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S has a correct use in ordinary discourse* does not run the 
danger of any such redundancy - viz., the sense in which *S 
has a correct use* amounts to *8 is used to make a statement 
which is true (or, at least, which could be true)*. In this 
sense, then, *S has a correct use in ordinary discourse* 
does amount to *8 is used in ordinary discourse to make a 
statement which is (or at least could be) true*, and does so 
without any trace of redundancy. And the fact that Malcolm's 
use of * correct use in ordinary discourse* is not clearly 
marked by traces of redundancy suggests that he does not 
always clearly distinguish correct use in the indicated senses, 
In this respect as well, then, his argument commands greater 
plausibility than it would if the relevant distinction had 
been drawn. For, although from *8 has a correct use* in the 
sense of *8 is used to make a true statement* it does follow, 
from *8 has a correct use* in the sense of * The component 
words of 8 have a use in ordinary discourse and S is syntac­
tically sound* it does not follow, that 8 is used to make a 
statement which is not self-contradictory,
3. Waiving the preceding considerations, however, consider
the argument as simply moving from * The sentence "l know this 
is a pencil" is used in ordinary discourse to make a statement 
which is true* to * The sentence "l know this is a pencil" is 
used to make a statement which is not self-contradictory*, and
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lkg..P to *It is possible for someone to know that this is a 
pencil*,
Strictly speaking, the only way in which the second 
stage of this inference can come close to holding is the way 
in which any statement entails a statement which is necessarily 
true. For, * The sentence "l know this is a pencil" is used 
to make a statement which is not self-contradictory* is it­
self a contingent statement. And then the argumentative 
value of appealing to the given premise vanishes. On the 
other hand, if the conclusion * It is possible for someone to 
know that this is a pencil* is viewed as a contingent state­
ment, then it is possible for it to be not true - e.g., for 
there to be no material object present - and yet for the 
sentence * I know this is a pencil* to be used to make a state­
ment which is free from contradiction - e.g., the statement 
that an automobile is dangerous, or that a cow gives milk, 
or, indeed, that I know that there is a pencil here. Further­
more, it is equally possible for * It is possible for someone 
to know that this is a pencil* to be not true and, conjointly, 
for the sentence *I know this is a pencil* to be used to make 
a statement which is not only free from contradiction but is 
also true - e.g., the statement that all men are mortal, or 
that all horses are animals.
Thus, the only way to get near constructing a cogent 
and valid argument along such lines is to introduce premises
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about the (possible) truth-values of statements - notably of 
the statement that I know this is a pencil. And, aside from 
canvassing public or expert opinion on this point - a proce­
dure neither Moore nor Malcolm advocates as providing an 
exhaustive means to philosophical truth - the only effective 
way of, e.g., securing the truth of the statement that I know 
this is a pencil is either by showing via argument that I do 
in fact know this is a pencil or by appealing to the purpor­
tedly obvious fact that I know this is a pencil. And if some 
philosopher disagrees with an advocate of Moore on this point, 
particularly as a result of disputing the general claim that 
one can know there are material objects, and introduces argu­
ments to defend his position, it is no adequate reply simply 
to point out or remind him that the sentence * I know this is 
a pencil* has a use in ordinary language. Certainly, it is 
relevant to show that the sceptic is using *know* in a 
special, restricted sense - if he is doing so - in order to 
keep in view just what the claim in question is, i.e., to 
prevent merely verbal disputes. Moreover, it is important to 
distinguish knowledge, in the sense in which the claim to the 
knowledge that there are material objects is made, from know­
ledge in any special but analogous sense in which the sceptic 
might be making his counterclaim, in the event that the 
sceptic confuses the two and overstates his case. In those 
situations where such verbal and partly verbal points do
1 0 .
apply, they are of central importance. Nevertheless, to allow 
this role to a linguistic appeal is not to allow that simply 
because such-and-such a sentence has a use in ordinary 
discourse, either therefore it is used to make a statement 
which could be true, or therefore such-and-such a non-verbal 
point holds.
In the case under consideration, then, Moore is arguing 
that, in the relevant ordinary sense of 'know*, I do know 
that this is a pencil and, since the conjunction of Hume * s 
principles entails that I cannot know this, therefore at least 
one of Hume* s principles is not true; for it is more evident 
that this is a pencil than that the conjunction of HuiDe* s 
principles is true. Granted, in the particular passage 
Malcolm quotes, Moore presents his argument in a rather poor 
way since he sets out with the problem that, if he is to 
prove that he knows the pencil exists, 'then he must disprove 
Hume; and he attempts to accomplish this by simply claiming 
that he knows the pencil exists and inferring therefrom tiiat 
Hume is wrong - which 3^ circular. Nevertheless, if a broader 
view of Moore*s position is taken, it supports in substance,
I think, the very brief description I have given of it. In 
this case, then, Moore opts for what m i ^ t  be considered as 
just plain common sense - in the sense of what anyone equipped 
with an average amount of reasoning power or sound judgment 
is capable of seeing - and for what as a matter of fact is.
11 o'
in its general form, also common sense in the sense of v/hat 
is generally held to be the case. And, as well as not being 
an argument which relies upon the fact that most people hold 
such a view, it is neither a defence of ordinary language nor 
a defence by appealing to ordinary language, in any sense in 
which making such an appeal involves adopting the linguistic 
argument Malcolm seems to find tenable.
To be published in Analysis.
D. A. Odegard, Ph.D.
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UNIQUE REFERENCE AND ENTAILMENT
By D o u g l a s  O d e g a r d
1. T ^ O E S  an ordinary subject-predicate statement, the subject term 
JLV of which refers to a particular, entail the simple statement 
asserting the existence of the particular referred to? For instance, does 
‘ Bill is a thief ' entail ‘ Bill exists ' ? (Where ' Bill exists ' amounts to 
something like ' There exists one and only one man who . . . ’ and does 
not presuppose, as well as assert, the existence of one and only one man 
who . . . Similarly, ‘ Bill does not exist ' amounts to something like 
' There is no (solitary) man who . . . ’ and does not both presuppose and 
deny the existence of one and only one man who . . . .  In the interests 
of economy, ‘ Bill exists ' and ‘ Bill does not exist ’ are generally used 
throughout this paper.)
In On Referring P. F. Strawson denies that a statement (of 
the kind indicated) involving a unique reference entails any statement 
(also of the kind indicated) asserting the existence of the particular 
referred to: “ To say ‘ The king of France is wise ' is, in some sense of 
‘ imply % to mply that there is a king of France. But this is a very 
special and odd sense of ‘ imply % ‘ Implies ' in this sense is certainly 
not equivalent to ' entails ’ (or ‘ logically implies ’). And this comes 
out from the fact that when, in response to his statement, we say (as we 
should) ‘ There is no king of France % we should certainly not say we 
were contradicting the statement that the king of France is wise. We are 
certainly not saying that it is false.” (p. 34).
Strawson’s argument for denying entailment between statements of 
the relevant type, then, is briefly : If the unique-reference statement entails 
the existential statement, then, if the existential statement is false, the 
unique-reference statement is false. Whereas, in truth, if  the existential 
statement is false, then the unique-reference statement is neither true nor 
false, and therefore not false.,
I agree with Strawson that if the relevant existential statement is 
false, then the unique-reference statement is not false, but is neither 
true nor false. But I do not agree that this point warrants the claim 
that the unique-reference statement does not entail or imply, except In 
“ a very special and odd sense ”, the existential statement. In showing 
this, I intend to show that the unique-reference statement does entail or 
logically imply the relevant existential statement, in a sense of ' entail ’ 
or ‘ logically imply ’ which at least approximates the ordinary sense of 
these terms, and, I think, is not unusual or extraordinary at all.
I Originally in Mind, N.S. lix (1950); reprinted with additional footnotes in Essays in 
Conceptual Analysis^ ed. Antony Flew (London, 1956). The page reference is to the latter.
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2. A reasonably common definition of ‘ entailment ’ is : One 
statement entails another statement if and only if the conjunction of the 
former with the negation of the latter is inconsistent. I shall accept this 
formulation, but only on a tentative basis, reserving the right to attach 
quahfications where necessary.
Let ' Bill is a thief ’ exemplify the type of unique-reference statement 
we are concerned with, and let ' Bill exists ’ exemplify the corresponding 
existential statement. According to the preceding definition of ' entail­
ment % then, ‘ Bill is a thief ’ entails ' Bill exists ' if and only if the 
conjunction of ' Bill is a thief ’ with ' Bill does not exist ’ is inconsistent.
There are undoubtedly occasions when the sentences ‘ Bill is a thief ’ 
and ' Bill does not exist ' are used in such a way that the statements they 
are used to make are not inconsistent.- For instance, ‘ Bill is a thief ’ 
might be used to assert the material conditional, ' If there is one and 
only one man who . . . , then he is a thief ’, and, in this case, the state­
ment it is used to make is true if ‘ Bill does not exist ’ is true. Or, ' Bill 
is a thief ’ might be used to describe a particular fictional character, and 
‘ Bill does not exist ' to affirm Bill’s fictional status. Such uses of the 
indicated sentences are not uses with which I am here concerned, 
however. For I am concerned only with their use when the statements 
they are used to make are such that ‘ Bill is a thief ’ would be said by 
Strawson to imply, in the so-called “ very special and odd ” sense of 
‘ imply ’, ‘ Bill exists ’. Thus, the use of ‘ Bill is a thief ’ to make an 
existential statement—e.g., ‘ There is one and only one man who 
etc.’—is excluded as well.
3. Further prehminary points in connection with terminology: 
a statement is false if and only if its negation is true. In this immediate 
context, ‘ negation ’ is restricted to the form illustrated by ‘ Bill is not 
a thief ’, ' Bill does not exist ’, ‘ Not all apples are green ’, ‘ Some horses 
do not hke sugar ’, etc.
If one allows the possibihty of some types of statement being neither 
true nor false, however, one can then introduce a looser (but less usual) 
sense of ' negation ’ in which, e.g., the negation of ‘ Bill is a thief ’ is 
either ‘ Bill is not a thief ’ or  ^It is neither the case that Bill is a thief nor 
the case that Bill is not a thief ’. In this (second) sense of ‘ negation ’, 
the negation of a statement might be either the negation of the state­
ment in the first sense or the denial of both the affirmative and negative 
(in the first sense) forms of the statement. - And one can then develop 
a third sense for ‘ negation ’ in which it is applicable only to statements 
of the form ' It is neither the case that. . . nor the case that. . . ’.
The negation of a statement p in the first sense of ‘ negation ’ will 
be symbolised as p. The negation of p in the third sense will be sym­
bolised as Neither-p-nor-p.
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4. Roughly, a statement is inconsistent if there are (logically) no 
possible conditions under which it could be true. Now, there seem to be 
no possible conditions under which the conjunction of ‘ Bill is a thief ’ 
and ' Bill does not exist ’ could be true. Consequently, the conjunction 
of ‘ Bill is a thief ’ and ‘ Bill does not exist ’ seems to be inconsistent. And, 
therefore, ' Bill is a thief ’ seems to entail ‘ Bill exists
Nevertheless, so the argument might run, the claim “ ‘ Bill is a thief ’ 
entails ‘ Bill exists ’ ” itself entails ‘ Bill does not exist ’ entails ‘ Bill 
is not a thief ’ ”, and, since ‘ Bill does not exist ’ entails ' It is neither 
the case that Bill is a thief nor the case that Bill is not a thief ’, therefore 
' Bill is a thief ’ does not entail ‘ Bill exists ’.
In symbols, if p =  ‘ Bill is a thief ’, and q =  ‘ Bill exists ’, then this 
point becomes : p does not entail q, because if p entails q,then q entails p, 
and q does not entail p; rather q entails Neither-p-nor-p.
Preserving the indicated notation, it is true that q does not entail 
p. Consequently, in order to maintain that p entails q, one must focus 
the question on the claim that if p entails q, then q entails p.
The argument for this claim might read as follows :
p entails q =  pq is inconsistent.
pq is inconsistent =  qp is inconsistent (-/ pq =  qp)
qp is inconsistent =  q entails p (-.' p =  §)
Therefore, if p entails q, then q entails p.
Now, the weakness in this proof, in a context where Neither-p-nor-p 
is possible, lies in the claim that qp is inconsistent =  q entails p. For, 
although qp is inconsistent, in such a context qp might be inconsistent 
as well, and, therefore, q might not entail p but rather, might entail 
Neither-p-not-p. In non-symbolic terms, the conjunction of ‘ Bill does 
not exist ’ with ' Bill Is a thief ’ is inconsistent. But it does not follow 
from this that ‘ Bill does not exist ’ entails ‘ Bill is not a thief ’ ; indeed,
' Bill does not exist ’ is inconsistent with  ^Bill is not a thief Conse­
quently, in this case, 'Bill does not exist ’ entails ' It is neither the case 
that Bill is a thief nor the case that Bill is not a thief
The point might be put in slightly different terms, given another 
customary formulation of entailment, viz: q entails p if and only if 
q=3p is necessary. Given that qp is inconsistent under conditions where 
Neither-p-nor-p is possible, it does not necessarily follow that q=^p 
is necessary, i.e., that q entails p . For, it might be the case that q=> 
Neither-p-nor-p is necessary, and therefore that qp is inconsistent. 
Thus, given that ' Bill does not exist and Bill is a thief’ is inconsistent, 
it does not necessarily follow that ' Bill does not exist => Bill is not a 
thief ’ is necessary. Indeed, ' Bill does not exist and Bill is not a thief ’ 
is inconsistent, and ' Bill does not exist =) It is neither the case that Bill
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is a thief nor the case that Bill is not a thief’ is necessary. Consequently, 
the statement " ' Bill does not exist ’ and ' Bill is a thief ’ are incon­
sistent ” does not entail the statement “ ‘ Bill does not exist ’ entails 
‘ Bill is not a thief ’
5. Thus, in general, equating ' p entails q ’, in the sense in which 
it is customarily formulated as 'p=^q is necessary’, with ' pq is incon­
sistent ’ can be dangerous, for the equation does not hold unconditionally 
—viz., under conditions where the conjunction of p and Neither-q-nor- 
q is not inconsistent.
Consequently, if we call the claim that ' p entails q ’ entails ' q 
entails p ’ the rule of transposition, then such a rule does not hold under 
all conditions. For, p entails q only if either
(a) pq is inconsistent. And Neither-q-nor-q is self-contradictory, 
and therefore the conjunction of p and Neither-q-nor-q is in­
consistent,
or (b) pq is inconsistent. And, although Neither-q-nor-q is possible, 
the conjunction of p and Neither-q-nor q is inconsistent.
Now, under most conditions, in addition to either (a) or (b), either 
Neither-p-nor-p is internally inconsistent or q contradicts (in the usual 
sense) p, and therefore the conjunction of q and Neither-p-nor-p is 
inconsistent. Under such conditions, the rule of transposition holds. 
But, in the type of case under consideration, the conjunction of q and 
Neither-p-nor-p is not inconsistent, and therefore the rule of trans­
position does not hold.
Thus, claiming " ' Bill is a thief ’ entails ' Bill exists ’ ” does not 
itself entail claiming " ' Bill does not exist ’ entails ' Bill is not a thief ’ ”. 
For, all that the claim " ' Bill is a thief’ entails ' Bill exists ’ ” itself entails is : 
the conjunction of ' Bill is a thief ’ with ' Bill does not exist ’, and the 
conjunction of ' Bill is a thief ’ and ' It is neither the case that Bill exists 
nor the case that BiU does not exist ’ are both inconsistent. But this 
in itself does not entail that the conjunction of ' Bill does not exist ’ 
and ' Bill is a thief ’, and the conjunction of ' Bill does not exist ’ and 
' Neither Bill i s . . .  nor Bill is not . . . ’, are both inconsistent. And 
both these latter conditions must be met in order that ' Bill does not 
exist =) Bill is not a thief ’ is necessary.
Consequently, one (possibly) central argument against viewing the 
logical relationship between a unique-reference statement and the 
relevant existential statement as entailment is invalid.
Therefore, a unique-reference statement entails the relevant existential 
statement in the ordinary ' p=)q is necessary ’ sense of ' entails ’. For 
' Bill is a thief =5Bill exists ’ is necessary; and applying ' entails ’ in its 
usual sense does not logically commit one to make further claims which 
are falsified by this type of situation,
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6. In presenting this argument, I think I have used terms such as 
' necessary ’, ' inconsistent ’, and (therefore) ' entails ’ in relevant 
ordinary senses. For one thing, claiming ' p=)q is necessary ’ or ' pq is 
inconsistent ’ does not itself entail that Neither-p-nor-p and Neither-q- 
nor-q are self-contradictory. Nor is the use of ' necessary ’ or ' in­
consistent ’ necessarily restricted to contexts where the relevant logical 
incompatibilities are solely in the form of one statement being the 
negation of, or entailing the negation of, another statement, in the 
ordinary sense of ' negation ’. For instance, the conjunction of p and 
Neither-p-nor-p is every bit as logically inconsistent—in an ordinary 
sense of ' logically inconsistent ’—as the conjunction of p and p.
It might be, and probably is, the case that terms like ' necessary ’, 
' inconsistent ’, etc., as ordinarily used, have a flexible sense, and the 
conditions which render their application correct in one case are not 
identical with the conditions which render their apphcation correct in 
another. But, (a) their flexibility in respects which are relevant to the 
present argument needs further demonstrating, and (b) even if this 
point is true, it simply shows that the ordinary use of such terms is 
flexible, and not that using them in the way they are used in this paper 
is using them in an unusual or extraordinary sense.
Admittedly, statements of the form ' It is neither the case that Bill 
i s . . .  nor the case that Bill is n o t . . . ’ may play a minor role in ordinary 
discourse. But once a statement of this kind is recognised as a possible 
form of discourse—a thoroughly justifiable move, I think—' necessary ’ 
can then be used in a relevant, ordinary sense to claim (e.g.) that ' Bill 
is a thief => Bill exists ’ is necessary, although the kind of necessary 
agreement is different from the kind with which one is usually concerned.
7. Now, a critic might re-introduce one of the central points at 
issue in slightly different terms, claiming that, e.g., ' Bill does not 
exist ’ does not contradict ' Bill is a thief ’, in the ordinary sense of 'con­
tradict ’, since it does not assert or entail ' Bill is not a thief ’—i.e., 
it does not entail the negation of ' Bill is a thief ’, in the appropriate 
ordinary sense of ' negation ’. Rather, ' Bill does not exist ’ contradicts 
' Bill is a thief ’ in a way corresponding to the (unusual) sense in which 
' It is neither the case that Bill is a thief nor the case that Bill is not a 
thief ’ negates ' Bill is a thief ’. And therefore, ' Bill is a thief ’ does not 
entail ' Bill exists ’, because such an entailment itself entails that ' BiU does 
not exist ’ contradicts ' Bill is a thief ’.
Nevertheless, (1) at least the analogies between ' negation ’ in the 
' Neither is nor is not ’ sense, and ' negation ’ in its more usual sense, 
and between corresponding senses of ' contradicts ’, are stronger than 
any claim that the unusual sense of ' negation ’ or ' contradicts ’ is 
" very special and odd ” might suggest. And, (2) a term such as ' in­
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consistent ’ does not seem as confined in this respect as ' contradiction ’ 
or ' negation Thus, ‘ Bill does n o t exist ’ and ' Bill is a thief ’ are 
inconsistent, whereas ' Bill does not exist ’ does not contradict ' Bill is 
a thief And, since ' entailment ’ can, in at least one of its ordinary 
uses, be formulated in terms of inconsistency, therefore ‘ Bill is a thief ’ 
entails ' Bill exists ’ despite the fact that ' Bill does not exist ’ does not 
contradict ' Bill is a thief
8. Even if—and I heavily doubt this postulate—‘ entails ’ is not 
being used in its ordinary sense, or in one of its ordinary senses, in 
claiming (truly), for example, that ' Bill is a thief ’ entails ' Bill exists % 
the argument in this paper has at least shown, I think, that the sense of 
' entails ’ or ' implies ’ in which it can be claimed that a unique-reference 
statement entails the relevant existential statement, is not so very 
" special and odd ” in relation to ordinary usage as Strawson might 
suggest.
In fairness, however, it should be pointed out that Strawson, in 
" On Referring ”, is not primarily concerned with what the logical 
relationship between a unique-reference statement and the relevant 
existential statement />, but is more concerned with what it is not. He 
is chiefly interested in denying the claim that uniquely referring express­
ions are disguised assertions or that unique-reference statements are 
simply kinds of existential statements. Consequently, he denies that the 
relevant negative existential statement contradicts (in the usual sense) a 
unique-reference statement, and, believing that entailment involves the 
indicated type of contradiction, he is therefore forced into denying 
entailment between unique-reference statements and the relevant 
existential statements. And, to prevent any confusion on this issue, he 
claims that a unique-reference statement implies the relevant existential 
statement only in " a very special and odd sense ” o f  implies ’. Now, 
viewed strictly within this context, to say that the relevant sense of 
' implies ’ is " very special and odd ” need not be particularly misleading. 
But if the expression suggests, as well it might, that " special implication” 
and entailment differ significantly beyond the fact that the negation of 
an implied statement does not contradict the implying statement, 
whereas the negation of an entailed statement contradicts the entailing 
statement (where ' negation ’ and ' contradicts ’ are used in their more 
customary senses), then it can be misleading.
To do fuU justice to Strawson, it should also be pointed out that 
his discussion of this and related points in Introduction to l^ogical Theory 
(London, 1952) does not even “ suggest ” so radical a difference between 
special implication and entailment. In this context, he states that there 
is “ a kind of logical absurdity ” in conjoining, e.g., ‘ Bill is a thief ’ 
with ' Bill does not exist ’, but warns that this type of logical absurdity
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must be distinguished from “ straightfoward self-contradiction 
Consequently, he denies that ' Bill is a thief. ’ entails ' Bill exists ’ and 
prefers to say that ' Bill is a thief ’ presupposes ' Bill exists ’d Thus, 
he retains the view that the sense of ' implies ’ in which one can say 
that a unique-reference statement implies the relevant existential 
statement is special, and therefore presumably different from any ordinary 
sense, but at least he does not put it forward as a “ very special and odd 
sense
9. Finally, to repeat the stronger claim in brief, although the 
logical relationship between ' Bill is a thief ’ and ' Bill does not exist ’ 
is not one of " straightforward contradiction ” where straightforward 
contradiction involves denial or negation in the ordinary sense, " ' Bill 
is a thief ’ entails ' Bill exists ’ ” does not itself entail “ ' Bill does not 
exist ’ straightforwardly contradicts ' Bill is a thief ’ And, since the 
existence of Bill is a logically necessary condition of his being a thief, 
I see no good reason for denying the claim that ' Bill is a thief ’ entails 
' Bill exists
 ^ See especially pp. 174-175.
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ONE FORM OF SCEPTICISM ABOUT INDUCTION
Bj K e it h  C a m p b e l l
SOME principles of thought are so fundameiyal that they cannot coherently be called in question; any succe^ul denial of such a 
principle’s validity must itself depend on whayit would impugn. The 
“ laws of thought ”, notably those of contra^ction and excluded third 
(fourth, fifth,. . . ) are commonly held to be/6" this kind. The character­
istic is shared also by some inductive principles, in particular by A: 
A t  least one inductively established result is justifiable.
Let ' regular concomitance ’ be ta k ^  as synonymous with ' repetitive 
concomitance in accordance with /some law ’. Let a sub-predictive 
generalisation be any assertion of thoTorm ' There is a regular concomit­
ance of characteristics a and tnroughout a substantial segment of 
space-time, past and present ’. These assertions are labelled sub-predictive 
because, although any such as^rtion does entail that given favourable 
conditions for confirmation, ymr every occurrence of a up till now, an 
occurrence of j8 would be mund to have been its concomitant, yet it 
makes no claim about futme occurrences of a. Each is a generalisation 
because it makes an asserdon about the whole class occurrences of a hitherto 
in a situation where it p  not known that more than a proper part of 
that class has been examined.
In all that follow^ it is to be understood that no analytic relations 
hold between a and/j8. So a sub-predictive generalization can only be 
established by tak i^  the cases of a observed up till now as establishing 
a law of concomitance, and using this law as the basis for a general claim 
concerning as. That is, its mode of establishment is inductive, but as 
a sub-predictiv/ generalization does not claim that the concomitance in 
question will/continue, the inductive process is a weak one. It is, 
consequently^ the less likely to be dispensable. Whether the generaliza­
tion is regarded as inferred from, or confirmed by, the relevant observa­
tional truffis is here irrelevant.
For brevity, sub-predictive generalizations connecting two character­
istics will be referred to by descriptions of the form ' the sub-predictive 
generÿization that as j3, or ' the inductive result that as ’.
Consider now the sceptical assertion A: No inductive generalisation, 
of arh kind, is justifiable. Any use of a language to communicate evinces 
faipn in the inductive results that language utterers are language under- 
s^nders, that sound patterns are propagated in air without radical 
distortion, that human beings can distinguish areas of light and dark on 
/a page under normal conditions, and so on. And any successful use of 
/  language for communication entails the truth of some of these proposi-
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